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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Choosing Our Terms
On September 18, 1989, I returned my first set of graded essays. There 
were six Ds, eleven Cs, five Bs, no As, no Fs, and one missing paper—I 
still have the gradebook. The Ds weighed most heavily on my mind. In 
my carefully scripted percentages, this first essay was worth 5% of the total 
grade for the course; those students with Ds had suddenly seriously dam-
aged their chances for an A, yet they had barely begun the course. One of 
them—I can still see his face—met with me for about an hour after class 
that day, trying to understand how he could have gotten a D. “I’m not 
asking you to change the grade,” I remember him saying several times, 
but he did want to understand how he had done so poorly. I remember 
painstakingly going over his paper with him, and although I do not 
recall the particulars of the discussion, I do remember feeling that my 
explanations were entirely inadequate. In class we had discussed “focus,” 
“coherence,” “content,” “organization,” “style,” and “mechanics,” but I 
am certain that these concepts floated over the class’s heads as abstrac-
tions; I am not certain that I had a clear handle on them myself at the 
time. Worse—or at least I thought so at the time—my plan for the course, 
which followed departmental guidelines, did not allow for revision after I 
graded a paper. The grades stood. Looking at the gradebook today, I am 
not surprised to see that the final grades for the class were all Bs and Cs; 
no one failed, but no one made an A either. Without the option to revise 
their essays, students would have had to exhibit a fairly high proficiency 
in writing prior to entering the class—a condition that would have placed 
them in second semester composition rather than my first semester class, 
or even exempted them from the composition requirement entirely. Add 
to that my relatively vague understanding and explanations of the crite-
ria for evaluation, and I do not see how any of my students could have 
excelled.
Sometime during that same semester, I heard about portfolios as a way 
of deferring grading until students had had a chance to revise. While I 
used peer workshops in my class so that students received feedback on 
rough drafts prior to handing in their essays, I had never been intro-
duced to a procedure that allowed students to use teacher commentary for
revision. Portfolios, I felt, would solve the worse of my two pedagogical 
dilemmas—and at the time I was certain that the immutability of early 
semester grades was a bigger problem than a vague understanding of the 
criteria. I wanted to use portfolios during the second semester but was not 
allowed to; I was a TA and my mentor used a percentage-based system. In 
fact, only one mentor in the department used portfolios. Because I was 
not in her group and no one else knew enough about portfolios to use 
them effectively, I could not. However, I was not entirely deterred. Using 
the portfolio idea as a guide, I got around the restriction by allowing any-
one with a D or F to revise for a higher grade. The result, however, was 
less than stellar. Of the forty-two students who completed the work for the 
course, only one student managed to get an A- and one got a D+; the rest, 
again, were Bs and Cs. Revision was certainly a good idea; I remember 
believing that my students learned more about writing, and quite a few 
of them took advantage of the revision policy to change what might have 
been Ds to higher grades. Still, I felt their grades did not reflect the qual-
ity of their work for the semester.
Throughout my TA training I was reminded by my mentor to empha-
size that students earn their grades, we do not give them. Dutifully I passed 
this perspective on to my students, making them claim responsibility for 
their own performances. I could not help but feel, however, that part of 
the responsibility was mine, particularly when I had trouble articulating 
exactly what had earned them a particular grade. While I could compare 
papers and see that one was better than another and mark errors in gram-
mar and mechanics, for more important issues like focus, organization 
and development, there was little to guide me. My mentor reviewed my 
grades and agreed most of the time, so my judgments must have been 
“right.” In our conversations about the papers, we used the same terms, 
and for brief moments I even knew what a strong controlling idea and 
good organization looked like. That certainty, however, was fleeting. Too 
often, particularly when I was using my comments to show students how 
they earned those Cs, I was even more certain that my grading was arbi-
trary. Since my mentor and I were in agreement, however, I decided that 
either we were both arbitrary in the same way or that I just knew, perhaps 
instinctively, how to grade. At the time, the latter interpretation seemed 
more likely, or perhaps more appealing.
In the years since that first set of essays, I have often revisited and occa-
sionally obsessed over the issue of assessment in both my pedagogical and my 
scholarly work. I have developed courses in which students grade each other 
and worked on committees to change assessment policies and procedures.
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I have designed and implemented portfolio assessment pilots. I have driven 
at least two of my graduate professors to distraction over “the problem of 
grades” as they were trying to teach me about process pedagogy. I have 
presented conference papers on the subject more than half a dozen times. I 
have written this study. Looking back at my first experience in evaluating stu-
dent writing, I realize that my judgments were neither arbitrary nor instinc-
tive. Instead, my mentor and I valued similar qualities in writing, probably 
because of similar training, and even though we had difficulty articulating 
the nature of those qualities, we knew them when we saw them.
Focus, organization, and the like are no longer particularly elusive to 
me, although they are certainly abstractions. My dissatisfaction with the 
grading, I now realize, had less to do with my inability to articulate their 
meanings to my students than my sense that when I emphasized these 
elements, I was not evaluating what really mattered in good writing. But 
I had no way to step back from looking at those particulars; I had no way 
to evaluate my evaluations. I know now that “validity” and “reliability” 
comprised the dominant theoretical framework for evaluating assess-
ments—and still do—but these concepts were not available to me at the 
time. My mentors never communicated them to me, and I was instead left 
with a growing dissatisfaction about my assessments.
I know these terms now, but I am still not satisfied. The current lexicon 
used to explicate assessment practices comes from educational measure-
ment theory and carries the baggage of an objectivist paradigm that is 
ultimately incompatible with what compositionists know about writing 
and learning to write. Educational measurement principles, most often 
signified by these terms “validity” and “reliability,” tend to characterize 
writing assessment as a technical activity with objective outcomes. This 
approach ignores the complexities of written literacy valued by compo-
sitionists, including the influence and importance of communicative 
context, the collaborative and conversational aspects of the process of 
writing, and the social construction of meaning. The technical and objec-
tively oriented principles of educational measurement theory do not pro-
vide an adequate method for evaluating such aspects of written literacy. 
This text represents my attempt to develop a theoretical vocabulary for 
writing assessment that grows out of principles accepted within composi-
tion studies. We need new terms.
Historically, compositionists have been inclined to accept the authority 
of educational measurement principles to define assessment procedures, 
particularly in large-scale situations where the sheer numbers of students 
prevent the carefully individualized responses that classroom teachers 
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favor. The discipline of psychometrics—the branch of psychology devoted 
to measuring mental ability—and formal work in the assessment of stu-
dent writing arose almost simultaneously during the first two decades of 
the twentieth century. To most educators of the time, including those 
teaching writing, educational measurement theories seemed better 
equipped to handle large student populations, and their procedures 
resulted in statistically satisfying outcomes, an important quality during 
the first half of the twentieth century, the height of positivism in the 
United States.
More recently, however, compositionists have begun to acknowledge 
the mismatch between composition theory and assessment practices 
based on educational measurement principles, but they have yet to seri-
ously challenge those principles directly. For instance, they question 
the value of practices that require extensive reader training to produce 
“reliable” results, even for experienced teachers and evaluators. They 
only occasionally challenge the ideal of “reliability” itself, however. Brian 
Huot’s recent (Re)Articulating Writing Assessment, for example, accepts the 
value of educational measurement theory and argues for compositionists 
to embrace cutting edge validity theory, even as he describes the “differing 
and often conflicting epistemological and theoretical positions” among 
the scholars in different fields involved in writing assessment research 
(2002, 23). My problem with this approach is that it does not appear to 
work. Huot acknowledges that the “cutting edge” theory has not trickled 
down to the practice of developing assessment instruments, despite the 
fact that it has been around for some time (2002, 90). Instead, we have a 
set of assessment principles from educational measurement theory that 
are amazingly persistent in their attachment to older positivist notions.
Educational measurement theory defines large-scale assessment as a 
technical activity. Consequently, each aspect of an assessment situation 
is treated as a variable more or less within the control of the assessment 
designer or administrator. Composition theory, however, treats writing as 
a complex of activities and influences, most of which cannot be cleanly 
isolated for analysis or evaluation. Until the mid-1960s, when composi-
tion began to develop professional status, writing instructors were gener-
ally content to leave large-scale assessment to psychometricians. In the 
decades since, however, composition scholars have come to reject objec-
tivist approaches to writing. The social constructionist principles which 
have supplanted objectivist approaches among composition scholars—in 
theory, if not always in practice—generally contradict the notions of a 
knowable and universal reality independent of the observer, foundational 
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concepts in objectivism. But although theories of composing and phi-
losophies of knowledge-making in composition have changed, objectiv-
ist-oriented psychometrics still exerts considerable influence on writing 
assessment practices at all levels of schooling.
My study characterizes the incompatible approaches to writing assess-
ment generated by educational measurement principles and composition 
theory in terms of a paradigmatic clash. Most of us in composition studies 
are familiar with the term “paradigm,” but it is worth revisiting Thomas S. 
Kuhn’s thinking in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996) for the rela-
tionship between a paradigm and a discipline. Kuhn argues that “advanc-
es” in science occur not through the weight of accumulated knowledge 
but through upheavals in the beliefs, values, and models of the members 
of a particular scientific community. While in the original text Kuhn pro-
vides multiple, and occasionally contradictory, definitions of “paradigm,” 
he devotes his 1969 “Postscript” to a more careful explication of the term. 
A “paradigm,” according to Kuhn, “stands for the entire constellation of 
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given 
community” (1996, 175). This shared “constellation” solidifies related 
sets of assumptions into foundational concepts that no longer require 
explicit justification within the community (1996, 18–20). Paradigms are 
dependent on community affiliations, and for Kuhn, specifically on disci-
plinary affiliations; the shared assumptions at work in paradigms are the 
result not of accident or proximity, but of training. Those who share the 
same disciplinary preparation are inclined, for example, to accept similar 
premises, to use similar models, and to define problems in similar ways.
“Paradigm,” then, is a descriptive term, a shorthand indicating a set 
of common models, values, commitments, and symbolic exchanges that 
unite disciplinary communities. Within any given community, paradigms 
do two related primary types of work. First, they provide foundational 
concepts and legitimate disciplinary scholarship by delineating what 
counts as knowledge and knowledge-making within any given field. For 
example, cognitive research using think-aloud protocols barely exists any 
more, not because we learned all we need to know about the cognitive 
aspects of writing, but because this approach was only valuable as long as 
objectivist principles determined the legitimacy of knowledge in the field. 
As social constructionist epistemologies gained acceptance, such objectiv-
ist approaches lost favor among researchers as a means for contributing 
knowledge to the field.
In addition to providing a legitimating context, paradigms also pro-
vide a knowledge base, a common language. They enable scholars to 
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assume that members of their community will share certain assumptions 
and models, and that they will understand references to those elements 
without substantial explanation. In composition studies, for example, 
concepts such as cognitive theory, process pedagogy, and social con-
structionism, as well as names such as Mina Shaughnessy, Shirley Brice 
Heath, and James A. Berlin require little explanation among scholars, 
except where such elements are specifically the object of study. Familiarity 
with concepts and scholars such as these are effectively prerequisites for 
membership and constitute much of the graduate education in the field. 
The existence of a paradigmatic structure, however, does not presup-
pose thorough agreement among the community members who speak 
the lingo. Members of the same paradigmatic community may disagree 
vehemently about the relative merits of Berlin’s work or the particulars 
of social constructionism. What they share is a set of general disciplinary 
concepts; they speak the same language, work toward similar goals, and 
accept many of the same premises.
My study characterizes the tension surrounding current assessment 
practices as a clash between the objectivist paradigm dominant in edu-
cational measurement theory and the social constructionist paradigm of 
composition studies. While certainly an oversimplification, this paradig-
matic delineation allows me to explore large-scale writing assessment as 
a site contested between two communities with differing values, goals, 
and lexicons. As composition studies has gained disciplinary status in the 
academy, its members have, at various times, attempted to reconfigure 
writing assessment practices so that they more nearly correspond with 
composition pedagogy and theory; the development of impromptu essay 
tests and portfolios are the best known examples. These methods have 
met with moderate success, but the number of institutions and programs 
still using objectivist instruments such as multiple-choice tests, particu-
larly for placement purposes, is substantial.
Attempts to transform assessment practices within composition have 
been seriously limited by the principles of educational measurement in 
force for large-scale writing assessment situations, principles that have 
historically been held in place by political and economic factors. Even 
while accepting a social constructionist paradigm, compositionists work-
ing with large-scale writing assessment have continued to evaluate and 
theorize their practices according to the criteria of “validity” and “reli-
ability”—terms developed within the objectivist paradigm of educational 
measurement theory and still carrying positivist baggage. In relying on 
these terms—whether actively or reluctantly—composition professionals
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turn over decisions about the value of their existing procedures and the 
shape of plans for the future to scholars working in a different and incom-
patible paradigm.
The active support is probably the most damaging. When prominent 
assessment scholars such as Brian Huot (2002) and Edward M. White 
(1996c) argue that psychometric principles are appropriate for writing 
assessment and that compositionists need to understand the terms of edu-
cational measurement theory in order to justify their practices to those 
outside of composition, I feel they put our practices and our principles at 
risk. In this study, I argue that such a move not only authorizes supervi-
sion of composition’s procedures by the educational measurement com-
munity, but also limits our ability to theorize our own practices and thus 
to understand how they work and to imagine what they might become. 
The analysis of writing assessment as a site of paradigmatic contention 
highlights the fact that composition studies needs to develop its own 
terms for theorizing assessment.
I am using “theory” here to mean a systematic statement of principles 
that provides an explanatory scheme or model. Theories serve two pri-
mary functions: they interpret existing practice and they propose modi-
fications to existing practice. The interpretive variety provides models 
that explain what is already occurring, while the propositional variety 
performs a heuristic function, suggesting alternative programs for what 
is already occurring. In Beautiful Theories, Elizabeth Bruss argues that 
there is a real, though not absolute, distinction between explanatory and 
programmatic theories, and that the “real danger” lies “in confusing one 
kind of theory with the other: allowing procedural recommendations to 
mask themselves as explanations or failing to provide sufficient reasons 
for their use” (1982, 40). Writing assessment within composition studies 
seems to suffer from confusion in both directions. Educational mea-
surement theory as embodied in the terms “validity” and “reliability” is 
descriptive: it provides a model for explaining how accurate, appropriate 
and reproducible the results of any given test are. In the translation to 
composition studies, however, this theory has become both programmatic 
and explanatory. To meet the criteria, numerous programs have adopted 
assessment procedures that produce valid and reliable results—the pro-
grammatic use of theory—while at the same time, these criteria have 
been used to explain the assessment procedures they helped create—the 
explanatory use of theory. In this way, the criteria have predetermined 
the theoretical implications for and results of writing assessment. Of 
course we have developed valid and reliable measures: the entire design 
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of instruments such as holistic scoring was based on the need for valid 
and reliable results.
More important than the confusion of functions, however, is the 
fact that, in my view, the criteria of “validity” and “reliability” have little 
theoretical significance within composition studies, except as has been 
provided by and interpreted from educational measurement theory. 
Definitions appearing in composition studies’ literature usually simplify 
the meanings of these terms—as in White’s work—or, in more conscien-
tious (and much rarer) moments, refer to current debates in educational 
measurement theory, as in Huot’s. Both appropriations, however, belie 
the technical rigor with which these criteria are applied in educational 
measurement settings and the objective paradigm that supports their use. 
The paradigmatic analysis I develop here suggests that these adopted cri-
teria are not particularly relevant to writing assessment, considering the 
theoretical distance between the disciplines of educational measurement 
and composition studies.
I am not saying that educational measurement theory is somehow “bad” 
or “wrong.” I am, however, arguing that there is an inherent problem in 
the forms that educational measurement theory takes and the pressures 
that it has imposed on composition studies and on writing programs. I 
agree with Huot that there is interesting thinking going on in contempo-
rary psychometrics, and that we should pay attention to the work of schol-
ars such as Samuel Messick and Pamela Moss. But their interesting work 
does not regularly appear in high stakes, large-scale assessments at any 
level, even at the university level, where we have more say in our programs 
and assessments than K-12 educators do in theirs. The principles of “valid-
ity” and “reliability” have cemented practice in ways that militate against 
the use of cutting-edge reconfigurations and re-definitions. Educational 
administrators do not apply them; policy makers do not accept them. In 
writing programs at the university level, compositionists must take our 
share of the blame; historically, we have accepted the principles without 
sufficiently questioning them.
Educational measurement theory has traveled to composition studies 
in the form of its primary terms, “validity” and “reliability.” Composition 
studies has no similarly influential lexicon, no concepts for understand-
ing the process of evaluating writing that arise from scholarship in the 
field or that are compatible with the principles of social constructionism 
generally accepted in the field. Although members of the composition 
community have proposed alternative models for assessment, these 
practices have almost always been evaluated—by compositionists and
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non-compositionists alike—on the basis of their adherence to the quali-
ties of “validity” and “reliability.” Without an alternative set of principles, 
writing assessment practices remain limited by these criteria. In addition 
to analyzing the paradigmatic clash between educational measurement 
theory and composition theory, then, this study begins the work of devel-
oping such a lexicon by proposing a pair of theoretical terms: “meaning-
fulness” and “ethics.” Although not particularly identifiable as “composi-
tion words,” these interrelated terms provide a preliminary assessment 
vocabulary steeped in social constructionist principles generally accepted 
within the field. 
The value of these terms lies less in their particular definitions and 
applications than in their potential for opening up assessment as an area 
of theoretical inquiry for composition scholars. Composition studies, as a 
discipline, has yet to claim the authority to define principles for assessing 
our assessments. Moreover, scholars’ reliance on principles beholden to 
an objectivist paradigm tends to circumvent, ignore, or even negate the 
paradigmatic tenets at work within the discipline of composition studies. 
Explorations and vocabularies such as those offered in this study suggest 
ways of claiming this definitional authority that are both responsive to 
disciplinary principles, and accountable to those in the profession and to 
those affected by writing assessment.
A  F O U CAU L D I A N  A P P R OAC H
Power adheres at the level of lexicon. In a frequently cited passage, 
Kenneth Burke argues that “[e]ven if any given terminology is a reflection
of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; 
and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality” (1966, 45). 
This passage is often used to demonstrate how particular philosophies or 
perspectives shape our view of a particular world. Burke, however, is more 
specific than this interpretation would indicate. According to Burke, 
the power to configure reality resides specifically in the terms chosen to 
describe that reality. The specific words used, that is, direct our observa-
tions, making some observations more likely than others and making 
some nearly impossible.
In the practice of writing assessment, the terms “validity” and “reliabil-
ity” currently delineate reality. In order to understand how these terms 
function and the “reality” they constitute, in chapter one, I analyze the dis-
course of writing assessment within composition studies for the moments 
when these terms exert influence and the shape that influence takes. 
By drawing attention to these terms, I focus on the assumptions about
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writing, knowledge, and the process of assessment that incur as a result of 
their deployment. This analysis is rhetorical; it looks specifically at the ways 
in which these terms shape our horizon of discourse, at the ways in which 
we are persuaded to understand the landscape of writing assessment.
The first part of this study, specifically the first four chapters, is critical, 
or archaeological in the Foucauldian sense of the word. “Archaeology,” 
for Michel Foucault, “is the systematic description of a discourse-object,” 
a rhetorical analysis describing the methods and implications of the ways 
specific discourses constitute the objects about which they speak (1972, 
140). For example, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault describes his 
attempts to understand particular concepts, such as “madness,” as uni-
fied objects around which particular and consistent types of statements 
can be made (1972, 32). As he examined statements, however, he found 
not a unified object, but multiple objects with the same signifier that 
were treated as if they all referred to the same signified. Archaeology 
erases such apparent unity so as to examine the specific occurrences of a 
discursive object. In Archaeology, Foucault suggests that to begin examin-
ing discursive objects we should look to the discursive locations in which 
those objects appear—their “surfaces of emergence” (1972, 41). In his 
examination of madness, for instance, he looks at how the term emerged 
in the nineteenth century discursive locations of the family, the penal 
system, and sexuality. These surfaces serve a normative function: limit-
ing, defining, and determining the status of those objects which emerge 
within them (1972, 41).
In a strictly Foucauldian configuration of my study, the discursive 
object would be “writing assessment” or some similar term, and the 
analysis therein would demonstrate how this term has historically and 
actually referred to a number of different objects which are dealt with 
as if they are essentially the same thing. Part of the rhetorical work of 
my argument is, in fact, the construction of such a historical account 
of the succession of writing assessment practices and the paradigmatic 
shifts in literacy scholarship and pedagogy across the same time period, 
which I explore in chapter two. What is more interesting and important 
about writing assessment, however, is that the objects that have emerged 
in the composition studies’ literature bear the mark of a value system 
that is alien to the current paradigmatic structure of composition stud-
ies itself. That is, composition studies, as a “surface of emergence” for 
writing assessment, produces a paradigmatically inconsistent discursive 
object. Instead of focusing on the discursive object, then, the first four 
chapters here analyze the surface itself, examining the ways in which the 
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discursive space of composition studies has been shaped so as to produce 
objectively-oriented assessments in spite of its own social constructionist 
shape and trajectory.
According to Foucault, the emergence of a discursive object is not a 
quiet event, and surfaces of emergence are not peaceful places. As sites 
of struggle “where forces are risked in the chance of confrontations, 
where they emerge triumphant, where they can also be confiscated,” 
the locations in which discursive objects take shape may be better called 
“scenes” (1977, 93), which indicate locations for action rather than 
the more passive location of a “surface.”1 The struggles of a particular 
scene and the more powerful combatants within that scene delimit how 
a particular discursive object emerges and what that object may denote 
and connote as a part of that context. The power structures of a given 
discourse determine what may be spoken and what may not; there are 
winners and losers, those with more authority and power and those with 
less. Foucault calls the losers “subjugated knowledges,” which are those 
knowledges discounted and hidden by systemizing structures and which 
cannot emerge because they do not fall into patterns appropriate for a 
particular discourse (1980, 82).
My study casts these scenic struggles in writing assessment in terms of 
a clash of two paradigms. This representation has the advantage of high-
lighting the ways in which the particular terms and conditions of each 
paradigm influence—or fail to influence—the shape of writing assessment 
in the context of composition studies. The absence of social construction-
ist principles for writing assessment suggests that the objectively-oriented 
paradigm of educational measurement theory has considerable power to 
determine the shape of writing assessment, even where writing assessment 
exists as an area of activity within the domain of composition studies. 
Knowledge about writing assessment that would take social construction-
ist principles into account, then, is subjugated, discounted, and hidden in 
the face of the need to meet the criteria of “validity” and “reliability.”
However conceptually productive, archaeology results in descriptions 
that are insufficient by themselves to change power structures. Although 
Foucault tends to favor description over prescription, he does offer 
“genealogy” as the result and employment of archaeology. Genealogy is 
the understanding, gained from archaeology, of the struggles which have 
subjugated certain knowledges and privileged others and, more impor-
tantly, the tactical deployment of such subjugated knowledges (1980, 
83). Archaeology exposes the rules of struggle; genealogy interprets and 
deploys them to obtain a different advantage.
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The archaeological rhetorical analysis of large-scale writing assessment 
here describes the struggle as a lexical problem: educational measure-
ment theory has terms for evaluating assessment practices; composi-
tion studies has not. Given the paradigmatic inadequacy of educational 
measurement’s terms for work in composition studies, a genealogical 
interpretation would suggest that composition studies develop its own 
vocabulary for writing assessment. This is the work of the sixth and sev-
enth chapters of this study. It is not enough to criticize existing assessment 
practices; historically, this has tended to result in the refinement of prac-
tices, but not in their reconceptualization. “Validity” and “reliability” are 
theoretical terms: they explain the value of existing practices and outline 
directions for change based on the values at work in the discipline of 
educational measurement. Composition studies has no terms with which 
to perform similar work. The genealogical move this study makes, then, 
is to propose such a set of principles.
Applying the principles of a Foucauldian archaeology, this text con-
structs an account of the history, theory, and practice of writing assessment 
which centers on the need for an appropriate theoretical terminology. Its 
aim in large part is to estrange the familiar. “Validity” and “reliability” are 
a normal part of the terrain of writing assessment. These terms, however, 
are not indigenous to composition studies. Rather than explicate and 
thus normalize these terms as some recent work in composition studies 
has done, this study challenges their suitability for rhetorical deployment 
in writing assessment.
O R G A N I Z AT I O N
My first chapter constructs a historical account of large-scale writing 
assessment practices in the United States from the advent of written 
examinations in the 1820s through the grassroots development of portfo-
lio assessment in post-secondary composition programs in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The most significant events for the purposes of this study, 
however, took place not at the beginning or the end of the period, but in 
the middle. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the field of 
psychometrics arose; at the same historical moment, writing teachers and 
researchers—there were a few at this time—were searching for a way to 
make teachers’ “marks” on student papers more uniform. Psychometrics 
provided the answer in the form of standardized tests. As members of a 
society generally receptive to scientific advancements and procedures, 
many writing teachers greeted the regularity and reproducibility of the 
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results with enthusiasm. When writing teachers adopted these tests, they 
also adopted the principles of educational measurement that supported 
their use, namely, “validity” and “reliability.” These terms have since 
directed the shape of large-scale writing assessment practices, even when 
teachers and institutions have favored the direct evaluation of students’ 
written work over the indirect assessment of writing by multiple-choice 
testing. Even portfolio assessment, which resists the more rigid applica-
tions of the psychometric concepts, is nonetheless subject to evaluation 
according to these criteria. This chapter argues that continued reliance 
on these terms perpetuates an intolerable incongruity between the ideals 
of literacy education and the practice of writing assessment.
Chapter two examines the ideals of literacy education over roughly the 
same period as the first chapter. Working with the premise that evidence 
of literate ability is the object under scrutiny in large-scale writing assess-
ment, this chapter examines paradigmatic changes in literacy pedagogy 
and scholarship. Whereas such assessment adopted an objectivist para-
digm whose influence has endured, literacy education has undergone 
a series of shifts and currently operates within a contextual paradigm 
grounded in social constructionist theory. The social constructionism of 
literacy and the objectivism of assessment, however, are incompatible. In 
spite of postmodern challenges, objectivism continues to dominate assess-
ment practices. Consequently, the literacy conceptualized and theorized 
in scholarship bears little resemblance to the literacy ostensibly evaluated 
in large-scale writing assessment.
Chapter three analyzes early significant changes and challenges to 
conventional writing assessment practices. Reviewing recent work on the 
expert reader method of assessment in composition studies and influ-
ential work by Guba and Lincoln (1989) in social science research, this 
chapter focuses on the ways that the literature about these cutting-edge 
assessment procedures negotiates the demands of educational measure-
ment theory on the one hand and composition theory on the other. In 
their justifications and analyses, the authors of the research in compo-
sition studies tend to rely too heavily on the principles of validity and 
reliability for justification, while Guba and Lincoln’s principles sacrifice 
pragmatics and become too unwieldy for large-scale assessment situa-
tions. Ultimately, these practices do not meet the need for strong changes 
in writing assessment.
Even the more theoretically-oriented ventures in composition studies—
including the “Position Statement” published by the CCCC Committee on 
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Assessment (1995) and Huot’s (Re)Articulating Writing Assessment (2002)—
continue to accept the value of validity and/or reliability to define their 
projects. Chapter four analyzes contemporary theoretical work in both 
composition studies and in educational assessment for the alternatives 
to traditional psychometric principles they offer. Those who try to co-opt 
educational measurement theory for composition purposes are the more 
prevalent group, and although they ultimately fail to divorce themselves 
entirely from objectivist principles, they do succeed in foregrounding 
possibilities for the application of social constructionist principles to 
large-scale writing assessments settings. In this chapter, I also examine 
contemporary challenges to traditional educational measurement theory, 
particularly to reliability, from within educational assessment, as well as 
challenges in composition studies that do not rely on educational mea-
surement principles at all. While these latter challenges have a lot of 
potential, the principles they offer are incomplete and in the final analysis 
unable to provide the kind of broad theoretical support needed for large-
scale writing assessment.
Ultimately, I believe, we need a stronger challenge to conventional 
educational measurement theory, and chapter five makes that argument. 
It begins with an analysis of the conflict over the Standards for the English 
Language Arts (National Council of Teachers of English and International 
Reading Association 1996) as a particularly public example of the clash of 
paradigms. The Standards relies explicitly on notions of contextuality and 
community indicative of a social constructionist perspective, while critics 
charge that the standards are inexcusably vague and ultimately unassess-
able. The distance between these positions reflects the conceptual distance 
between the social constructivist ideals of composition studies, of which 
written literacy education is a part, and the objectivist ideals of assessment 
theory and practice. The negative reception of the Standards was due, in 
part, to the timing of its release; those of us in post-secondary composi-
tion studies had not yet developed the evidence to support constructivist 
principles for literacy assessment. In this chapter, I argue that post-second-
ary compositionists have the responsibility to develop both principles and 
evidence, and that we need to do so apart from educational measurement 
theory. Whenever we return to conventional assessment theory, our innova-
tions are subsumed and inherently weakened. Separate development would 
give us the opportunity to assemble persuasive arguments in favor of alter-
natives before bringing them back to the broader assessment discussion.
My research in the first part of this book suggests the need for an 
alternative set of principles, and chapter six provides a preliminary 
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sketch of just such a lexicon. Developing the concepts of “meaningful-
ness” and “ethics” as principles for describing and evaluating assessment 
practices, this chapter begins the work of theorizing writing assessment 
in social constructionist terms. “Meaningfulness” draws attention specifi-
cally to the purposes for and substance of any given assessment practice. 
Meaningful assessment, then, should be conducted for specific and 
articulated reasons, and its content should be intelligible to those affected 
by the procedure. “Ethics” draws attention to assessment as it is practiced 
and specifically to the relationships among those involved in the process. 
This chapter proposes an ethical structure based on Jürgen Habermas’s 
“communicative ethics,” which advances the notion that communities 
reach ethical decisions on the basis of rational argumentation (1990a). 
Habermas relies on “ideal speech communities,” a condition too broad 
and utopian for most assessment situations; however, with the caveat of 
a limited speech situation, in which those accountable for the assessment 
occupy positions of authority, communicative ethics provides a reasonable 
preliminary structure for assessment procedures. Thus, “meaningfulness” 
and “ethics” offer an introductory lexicon for theorizing writing assess-
ment in ways that are compatible with the social constructionist paradigm 
at work in composition studies.
My seventh chapter provides some examples of what contemporary 
writing assessment practices look like when examined through the lens of 
“meaningfulness” and “ethics.” I begin by looking at the published schol-
arship on assessments at the University of Cincinnati and Washington 
State University. Both cases demonstrate strongly ethical practices, but 
have comparatively little to say about meaningfulness, particularly in 
terms of what I call in chapter six “primary substance,” the content of 
our assessments. To examine the substance more fully, I turn to two other 
studies, one by Bob Broad (2003) and the other based on a pilot I ran at 
North Carolina State University. These analyses, taken as a whole, dem-
onstrate the value of looking outside reliability and validity to understand 
and evaluate what happens when we assess writing.
Finally, the conclusion argues that the imposition of educational mea-
surement principles on large-scale writing assessment situations is no 
longer warranted and is indeed detrimental to pedagogical and theoreti-
cal efforts in composition studies. Although there is a good-sized body of 
published work on assessment within composition studies, the majority of 
it takes a thoroughly practical approach, focusing on procedures rather 
than on principles. While there are legitimate reasons for the practical 
emphasis, such a pragmatic focus—along with the historical precedents 
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described in the early chapters of this study—has encouraged composi-
tionists to uncharacteristically accept educational measurement’s prin-
ciples rather than to develop their own or to at least actively modify them. 
Terms such as those suggested in chapter six would not only provide 
principles that correspond more nearly with composition’s social con-
structionist paradigm, they would also help establish composition’s disci-
plinary authority in matters of evaluating evidence of written literacy.
This book reflects my own attempt to come to terms with writing assess-
ment and particularly with compositionists’ acquiescence to theoretical 
principles which have little to do with current thinking about writing and 
learning to write. Although my work began in a moment of dissatisfaction 
with my own ability to evaluate student writing, I have since found that my 
personal difficulties reflect composition studies’ own historically conflict-
ed relations with objectivism, politics, economics and disciplinary author-
ity. The discomfort I have experienced could hardly be mine alone, but 
few scholars have analyzed the ways in which these relations have enabled 
educational measurement theorists to put words in our mouths, whether 
they mean to or not. That ventriloquist’s trick ultimately fails to provide 
sufficient guidance for developing the kinds of assessments we want. In 
order to reconceive assessment, compositionists require a different theo-
retical lexicon. We need, that is, to come to our own terms.
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L A R G E - S CA L E  W R I T I N G  A S S E S S M E N T  
P R AC T I C E S  A N D  T H E  I N F L U E N C E  O F  
O B J E C T I V I T Y
Assessment and objectivity have a long-standing conceptual link in the his-
tory of education in the United States. Regardless of the specific subject 
matter, the job of “testing”—a colloquial synonym of “assessment”—has 
been to arrive at some “accurate” or “truthful,” i.e., objective, measure-
ment of a student’s ability. The connection between assessment and 
objectivity, however, is neither necessary nor absolute, in spite of both 
professional and popular tendencies to join the terms. The connection 
is, in fact, both historical and rhetorical, at least in the case of writing 
assessment.
The story of large-scale writing assessment in the United States is inex-
tricably tied to the rise of positivism in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. During the nineteenth century, as assessment practices shifted 
from oral to written examinations, educators increasingly relied spe-
cifically on examinations of writing in English in large part because of 
persistent increases in student enrollments and Harvard’s unorthodox 
embrace of English as the language of choice. The use of written compo-
sitions was driven in part by a desire among educators to develop effec-
tive educational methods. Evaluating those compositions, however, was 
another matter. Although Harvard’s faculty complained most about the 
quality of the compositions they received from students, the substantial 
variation among teachers’ “marks,” or grades, broke the camel’s back. 
Educators and researchers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries tended to equate such variance with inefficiency and with a 
subjective approach to writing assessment that became increasingly inde-
fensible and uncomfortable in the face of positivist science. In response, 
writing teachers developed composition scales as a method for regulating 
the evaluation of student compositions. At the same time, however, edu-
cational measurement obtained disciplinary status as the Stanford-Binet 
scale and standardized testing gained popularity and authority. These 
methods relied on a positivist epistemology and boasted an efficiency and 
objectivity that composition scales could not hope to achieve. In the face 
of such an obvious solution to the “problem” of excessive subjectivity, 
research into the assessment of actual pieces of writing all but ceased by 
1930.
This chapter analyzes this historical shift from direct to indirect assess-
ment methods for the ways in which assessment came to incorporate an 
objectivist paradigm. The replacement of evaluation of student composi-
tions (direct assessment of actual pieces of student writing) with standard-
ized tests (indirect assessment of writing-related skills) as the instrument 
of choice reflects the broader social acceptance of positivist science at the 
time. But even as positivism’s influence waned, objectivity remained as a 
pertinent attribute of assessment. During the early decades of the twenti-
eth century, “reliability” and “validity” first appeared, attached to objectiv-
ist assessment as principles for measuring the qualities of any given instru-
ment. Direct assessment methods most clearly failed the test of reliability, 
which measures the reproducibility of test scores. In classical educational 
measurement theory, reliability was—and still is—a prerequisite for valid-
ity; consequently, direct methods failed the validity test as well.
The educational measurement theory embodied in these terms contin-
ues to dominate large-scale assessment practice. In the 1960s, as composi-
tion studies developed disciplinary status, direct assessment instruments 
reappeared in the form of impromptu essay examinations, but researchers 
had to devise holistic scoring, a method that secured reliability, before 
institutions would accept their results. Moreover, impromptu essays gained 
their substantial following by arguing specifically that direct assessment 
methods were more valid than indirect ones. Much of the recent literature 
on portfolio assessment presents a strikingly similar justification. Even as 
social constructionist and postmodern theories have become mainstays in 
other areas of composition studies, assessment scholarship continues to 
rely on objectivist theoretical principles from educational measurement.
These terms—“validity” and “reliability”—have become a normalized 
part of assessment discourse within composition studies. Large-scale 
assessment of writing arose historically at the same moment as positivist 
science in the United States. Since positivism could successfully address 
the assessment concerns of the majority of writing teachers at the time, 
the connection was obvious and nearly inevitable. By the time writing 
teachers became dissatisfied with objective measures of literate ability, 
“validity” and “reliability” had become “normal,” functioning as a termi-
nistic screen that has successfully deflected questions about the necessity 
of a connection between writing assessment and objectivity. This “normal” 
connection persists, in spite of our discipline’s tendency to reject objectiv-
ist epistemologies.
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F R O M  O R A L  TO  W R I T T E N  E X A M I NAT I O N S
Orality dominated the curriculum in the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury at all levels of schooling in the United States. Oral testing done by the 
teacher at the classroom level often involved “disputation”—not unlike 
the process Quintilian describes in Institutio Oratoria—which required 
that students present a thesis and defend it against other positions offered 
by the teacher and classmates. Its aim was also not unlike Quintilian’s, as 
Andrea Lunsford points out: “to produce good citizens skilled in speak-
ing, who could use the arts of discourse to influence the life of society” 
(1986, 4). Among its most important characteristics, disputation brought 
“all the language skills—reading, writing and speaking—to bear on prob-
lems of public concern,” and it presented a dynamic and collaborative 
model of learning (1986, 4). Ideally, classroom-level testing encouraged 
students to make connections among various subjects and to apply that 
formal knowledge to situations they might confront as members of a 
larger society. Today, we would call this type of assessment contextually-
dependent or contextually-aware.
Similarly, for promotion and graduation, students were tested either 
by travelling examiners or by prominent members of the community 
in which the students resided and would be expected to participate as 
citizens (Mann 1845; Williamson 1994, 154). During these examinations, 
examiners asked students a series of questions about their studies to which 
they responded orally. Because the students were tested all together and 
because time was limited, each student answered only a few questions and 
no two students received the same questions.
While these tests promoted ideals of good citizenship, they were time-
consuming and became even more so as enrollments increased. Written 
tests represented a particularly popular response to these numbers; the first 
formal discussion of them appeared in 1845 with a report on the Boston 
Public Schools’ practices in the Common School Journal (Mann 1845).2 The 
experimental tests described in the report ask students to identify, define, 
and discuss particular aspects of the curriculum, including grammar and 
language, in the form of what we would now call short answer responses. 
Horace Mann,3 editor of the Journal, responded enthusiastically, listing 
seven reasons for the superiority of written exams over oral exams:
1.  they are more impartial, asking all students the same questions at the 
same time;
2.  they are more just to the students, allowing them time to collect them-
selves and answer to the best of their ability;
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3.  they are more thorough in that they allow the examiner to ask more ques-
tions and thus test a broader range of the students’ knowledge;
4.  they prevent the “officious interference” of teachers who occasionally 
prompt students with information that will help them answer the examin-
ers’ questions;
5.  they determine whether students have been taught to apply what they 
have learned rather than just to recite factual information, the latter of 
which would indicate a failing on the part of the teacher more than the 
student;
6.  they eliminate the favoritism—both real and presumed—of the examin-
ers; and
7.  they provide a record rather than a memory or rumor of the examina-
tion—“a sort of Daguerreotype likeness, as it were, of the state and condi-
tion of the pupils’ minds, is taken and carried away for general inspec-
tion.” (1845, 330–34)
Mann’s reasons are primarily pedagogical: written examinations dem-
onstrate students’ knowledge better than oral examinations do. Yet they 
also emphasize distance as a commendable quality in testing, particularly 
through a separation of the examiner from the examinee, and even the 
examinee from the examination. Written tests are better than oral exami-
nations, according to Mann, in large part because they foster objectivity: 
they are impartial, neutral, and reproducible. The separation would allow 
anyone to see “the state and condition of the pupils’ minds” at any time, 
including in the absence of the student. At the time of Mann’s writing, 
and well into the twentieth century, educators and educational theorists 
held that knowledge could be transferred unmediated between the mind 
and the world outside via language; objective testing of writing regularly 
takes this as a major premise. Moreover, the objectivity admired by Mann 
was matched by the efficiency of the new tests. Under the oral system, 
examiners in larger public schools had five minutes or less to question 
each student; under the written system, all students could be tested for 
a full examination period (Witte, Trachsel, and Walters 1986, 16–17). 
If students are all asked the same questions at the same time and more 
questions are asked, then—at least in theory—the time and resources of 
both the students and the schools, not to mention the community mem-
bers, are used more productively. It is interesting to note, however, that 
Mann’s article still advocates oral examinations for those who would be 
teachers.
For the Boston examinations, writing was more the medium than the 
object of assessment, although there were sections of the test that asked 
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students to “parse” sentences, for example. Thirty years later, in a move so 
influential that it would lead to the birth of the College Board, Harvard 
specifically tested writing ability on a large scale when it instituted its 
entrance exam in English composition. But while objectivity and efficien-
cy encouraged the adoption of written examinations in Boston, Harvard’s 
reasons for testing writing were more political. During the second half 
of the nineteenth century, Harvard waged a campaign to promote the 
study of English over the study of Latin and Greek, which until then had 
been the hallmarks of proper education at both the secondary and post-
secondary levels. Under the guidance of Charles W. Eliot, president from 
1869 to 1909, Harvard added modern languages and literature, as well as 
experimental sciences, to the curriculum (Kitzhaber 1953, 28–29). Under 
Adams Sherman Hill, Boylston Professor of Rhetoric appointed by Eliot, 
Harvard’s requirements in written composition increased, becoming by 
1879 the only requirement after the first year of college (Hill, Briggs, and 
Hurlbut 1896, 16, Appendix). Both Eliot and Hill firmly believed that in 
an age of positivist science, the study of classical languages was nearly use-
less and certainly outdated when compared to the study of English, a tool 
for everyday use (Kitzhaber 1953, 28–29, 53–9). One expression of their 
views required all candidates for admission to pass an entrance examina-
tion in English: the first of these appeared in 1865–66 as a requirement 
for reading aloud; the written exam itself dates from 1874–75 (Hill, 
Briggs, and Hurlbut 1896, Appendix).
Unfortunately, the natives could not write the language to Harvard’s 
satisfaction. In a series of essays written between 1879 and 1892 and dis-
tributed as a pamphlet in 1896, Hill, L.B.R. Briggs, and Byron Hurlbut 
complain about the candidates’ inability to write grammatically correct 
and rhetorically elegant prose. Hill’s essay, for example, catalogs the 
errors in spelling, mechanics and grammar in the examination books 
of June 1879, concluding that “[m]any books were deformed by grossly 
ungrammatical or profoundly obscure sentences, and some by absolute 
illiteracy” (1896, 10). Of the 316 examinees, only 14 passed “with credit” 
(1896, 9–11). Hill’s primary complaint was that Harvard had to fix these 
errors. He argues that Harvard, “the university which professes to set up 
the highest standard in America,” should be given better material from 
which to make “educated men” (1896, 11). All three authors in this pam-
phlet blame the secondary schools. In response, the secondary schools 
tried to prepare students for college entrance examinations, whether 
those students were planning on attending college or not, to the exclu-
sion of more general instruction in writing. The result was that many
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students could write an essay on the texts they had studied but were nearly 
incapable of writing on any other subject (Kitzhaber 1953, 71).
The development and application of Harvard’s entrance examination 
in English had far-reaching political and pedagogical consequences. 
Unlike Mann, Harvard’s leaders did not find merit in the objectivity or 
efficiency of the exam; they saw it as a necessary means of maintaining 
the university’s elite position and mission in higher education. Under a 
banner of standards, Harvard banished instruction in grammar to the 
secondary schools and raised its admission standards in an attempt to 
force the lower schools to do a better job of teaching writing, specifically 
in English. In effect, this response established the testing of writing as a 
gatekeeping mechanism: those who could not write well did not belong.
Moreover, Harvard’s examiners defined writing well as writing correctly. 
The 1873–74 catalog, for example, required “a short English Composition, 
correct in spelling, punctuation, grammar, and expression”—the last of 
these meaning diction and word choice more than the creativity or style 
we might read in the term today. By 1895–96, the only change to these four 
was the rather disappointing substitution of “division into paragraphs” for 
“expression” (Hill, Briggs, and Hurlbut 1896, 6, Appendix). This standard 
established not only a legacy of grammatical obsession, but also the mea-
sure of grammatical and mechanical competency necessary to attend col-
lege. In the 1896 pamphlet, Hurlbut explains that the content of the June 
1891 tests was reasonably intelligent and “well proportioned” (1896, 44). 
However, the applicants’ punctuation and diction were unacceptable, and 
their grammar relied too heavily on Latin constructions.
Harvard’s practices had a number of long-term consequences. While 
the emphasis on English composition certainly helped establish this field 
as an appropriate scholarly discipline, the demands for “correct” com-
position that Harvard educators placed on secondary schools heralded 
the low status of post-secondary composition instruction to-date. More 
importantly for this study, their grammatical and mechanical emphasis 
set the stage for positivist assessment methods. According to their writ-
ings, these highly influential educators stressed spelling, punctuation and 
grammar, aspects of writing which contemporary compositionists would 
consider rudimentary and mechanistic. The most advanced or rhetori-
cally complex element—“expression”—became merely a requirement for 
paragraphing in the later examinations. Thirty years later, the College 
Board combined objective testing methods with these standards, so that 
tests of English composition became tests of discrete grammatical skills 
and required no writing at all.
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Surveying societal trends during these early years, Lunsford concludes 
that the pressures behind the decline of oral examinations and the rise of 
written ones came from burgeoning college and university enrollments, 
the growing influence of scientific methodologies, and the increasing 
emphasis on writing in colleges (1986, 5). Of these reasons, the influence 
of science—and more specifically, the approbation for objectivity—was 
the most far reaching in the history of writing assessment. While increas-
ing enrollments at all levels bolstered demands for more efficient testing, 
the rising numbers could just as easily have led to calls for more teach-
ers and schools, or even less testing. However, positivism, a flourishing 
endeavor in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, argues the laws 
of nature are knowable and applicable through science and relies on 
measurement as a primary tool in the search for these principles. Mann’s 
“Daguerreotype likeness,” for example, reflects a positivist belief that 
the faculties of the mind can be readily seen in writing produced by that 
mind. The increased interest in writing coming from colleges following 
Harvard’s lead meant that the pictures most often took the form of com-
positions; the cultural affinity for objectivity helped establish the criteria 
by which those pictures would be judged.
C O M P O S I T I O N  S CA L E S
The institutionalized testing of writing begun by the Boston schools and 
the Harvard exams brought the interests of writing and science together 
in writing assessment by the end of the nineteenth century in such a way 
as to push efforts at standardization to the fore. Researchers found that as 
teachers and institutions evaluated writing, their standards for assessment 
varied significantly from examiner to examiner and even from scoring 
session to scoring session for the same examiner.4 Teachers, administra-
tors, parents, and college educators equated this irregularity with a lack 
of standards, a condition intolerable in an age of scientific education, and 
their complaints about this unreliability spurred attempts by educational 
theorists and researchers to find ways to measure writing ability with 
scientific precision. The “solution” they developed in the early twentieth 
century was a series of what were called “composition scales.”
Composition scales consisted of a graduated series of essays that served 
as models for comparison with actual student compositions to determine 
the merit of the students’ work. The first of these was developed for 
use with secondary school students by Milo B. Hillegas, a professor at 
Columbia University, and was published in 1912. From 7,000 composi-
tions originally collected, Hillegas chose 21 papers for his scale, mostly 
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written by secondary school students, but supplemented on the high and 
low ends by compositions produced by adults or taken from the early 
writings of literary authors because Hillegas could not find actual student 
writing that would fill out the scale. Ideally, anyone who wished to deter-
mine the merit of a student composition could hold it up to the samples 
comprising the scale, find the nearest matching model, and deliver a “cor-
rect” score. Hillegas’s scale did not attempt to differentiate among grade 
levels, although later supplemental scales and adaptations did.
While scholars, administrators, and teachers writing at the time 
criticized Hillegas’s scale in its particulars, many of them enthusiastically 
embraced the idea of uniform standards.5 These scales at least theoreti-
cally addressed a pressing need in education for some sense of agreement 
about grading, scoring, and marking. Even those who disagreed with the 
scales in principle admitted that the inability to deliver consistent scores 
on compositions indicated a deplorable absence of standards. Thomas 
H. Briggs (1922), for example, finds the scales limited, but he still argues 
that schools, teachers, and departments should devise scales of their own 
to determine at least grade level promotion, and that any scale used intel-
ligently would be an improvement. He points out that “the alternative 
seems to be a frank admission that English teachers can not discriminate 
qualities of composition with sufficient accuracy to gain credence in the 
reliability of their marks, acceptance of the principle that all pupils shall 
have the same number of semesters of instruction, each one profiting as 
he may and no one failing if he is earnest in effort” (1922, 442). With 
positivist science gaining popularity and influence throughout American 
society, teachers’ marks needed to be consistent in order to gain even a 
modicum of respect from those outside of education, including those 
who funded the schools. This condition reflects the value of objective 
measures at the time; without reproducible results, teachers’ marks pro-
vided no rational justification for assessment.
Hillegas (1912), Frank Washington Ballou (1914), M.R. Trabue (1917), 
and others who developed and applied these scales saw the need for 
uniform standards as their primary purpose. Standards, Hillegas argues, 
would lend credibility to education: “If there were standards or scales 
for the measurements of results in the various school subjects that would 
approximate the accuracy of the scales used in measuring extension, 
weight and time, educational administrators and investigators would be 
able to measure and express the efficiency of a school system in terms that 
would carry conviction (1912, 2). Hillegas’s concern for standards that 
could “carry conviction” derives in part from a desire to apply positivist 
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theories to educational practices. In positivist science, what is real can be 
observed the same way by multiple observers. To proclaim itself scientific, 
composition scoring would have to become, at the very least, consistent; if 
such testing could prove itself scientific, it would be beyond reproach. In 
this manner, researchers such as Hillegas became invested in an objectiv-
ist paradigm.
Consistency in marking was not the only stumbling block on the way to 
the laboratory. Even more problematic was the inherent subjectivity of the 
object of assessment. What Hillegas’s scale measures—and what Trabue’s 
and Ballou’s accept as the object to be measured—is something he calls 
“merit” (1912, 9). In defining this term, however, Hillegas uses circular 
logic: “The term as here used means just that quality which competent 
persons commonly consider as merit, and the scale measures just this 
quality” (1912, 9). His definition gets no more specific than this, though 
he identifies “competent persons” as teachers of English at the secondary 
and post-secondary levels, literary authors, and psychologists “familiar 
with the significance of scales and zero points in the case of intellectual 
abilities and products” (1912, 12). In effect and reminiscent of many 
early forays into criteria for assessment, Hillegas claims to measure merit 
without defining it except to insist that those who know it will recognize it. 
In so doing, he works into the equation a subjective judgment not unlike 
teachers’ marks.6
The subjectivity of the judgments required by those developing and 
applying the scales was largely ignored; the inconsistency, however, was 
not. Ultimately, these scales resulted in scores as inconsistent as teachers’ 
marks without the benefit of scales (Kelly 1914; Sackett 1917). Without 
consistency, the scales could not claim uniform standards; without uni-
form standards, they could not claim objectivity; and without objectivity 
in an age of science, they had to be replaced.
I N D I R E C T  T E S T I N G  O F  W R I T I N G
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, substantial effort 
went into refining methods for assessing student writing, but by the late 
1920s most research into the direct assessment of writing—assessing of 
actual pieces of writing—including composition scales, had stopped. 
R.L. Lyman’s Summary of Investigations Relating to Grammar, Language and 
Composition (1929) summarizes the primary research findings from the 
turn of the century through its publication, and there is considerable 
work on direct assessment. With some exceptions, particularly in British 
journals (e.g., Cast 1939a, 1939b; Vernon and Millican 1954), there is 
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little on direct assessment after this until the holistic movement almost 40 
years later.7 As Norbert Elliot, Maximino Plata, and Paul Zelhart (1990, 
30) point out, at the time the methods for direct assessment were becom-
ing more standardized—as societal norms required—but they were still 
time-consuming and reliant on subjective judgments except where tests 
were limited to grammar and mechanics. Research might have been 
more vigorous but for the development of indirect, “objective” assessment 
methods coming out of educational psychology. The efficiency of these 
“new-type” tests far exceeded even the most optimistic expectations for 
direct assessment. There was no contest.
The first developments in indirect testing came from France at the 
turn of the century when Alfred Binet and his colleagues developed tests 
to determine the abilities of school children, particularly those in need of 
additional or special assistance. Like Hillegas’s measurement of composi-
tion, Binet’s method for determining the mental age of a child—and thus 
determining whether or not the child was “subnormal”—was a scale, in 
this case, a series of thirty tasks of increasing difficulty (Chapman 1988, 
19–20). Binet’s first scale appeared in 1905; he followed it with a revision 
designed for testing all children in 1908 and a second revision in 1911. 
Lewis M. Terman, a researcher at Stanford, modified it for use in the 
United States in 1916 and renamed it the Stanford-Binet.
Both the Binet scale and the Stanford-Binet were labor-intensive 
measurements conducted through interviews and observations which 
required “the time and efforts of one examiner working with a single 
student for a period typically involving several hours, including the tasks 
of test administration, test scoring, and evaluation of results” (Williamson 
1994, 156). Moreover, the interviewer was crucial to the process and was 
expected to intervene during the testing to “probe ambiguous answers” 
(Williamson 1993, 23). In an exercise of American ingenuity, Terman’s 
student, Arthur Otis, developed a multiple-choice version of the exam 
that expedited the process and erased the interviewer. Terman adapted 
this test for the United States Army to sort recruits for officer candidacy 
and specialized training during World War I. The American adaptation 
eliminated the labor-intensive aspects of the Binet scales while preserving 
its use as a sorting mechanism.
Shortly following World War I, Terman and a group of his colleagues 
received funding from the National Education Association to adapt the 
“group testing” developed for the war effort for the purpose of reorga-
nizing the public schools (Terman et al. 1922, 2). The reorganization 
resembled what we might call “tracking,” slating some secondary students 
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for vocational coursework and others for college preparation. This track-
ing institutionalized self-fulfilling prophecies about whether the students 
would be attending college: those on the academic track generally went to 
college, while those on the vocational track usually took up a trade after 
high school. Michael Williamson argues that the nation’s need for orga-
nizing its fighting force provided the jump-start for objective testing, but 
that the rise of mass public schooling supported its longevity (1993, 24). 
It did not hurt that both conservatives and liberals agreed on the value of 
objective tests, although for different reasons. Conservatives approved of 
them because they reinforced uniform standards for certification in the 
subject areas and encouraged discipline. Liberals found them useful to 
diagnose student needs so that teachers could address them on an indi-
vidual basis (Applebee 1974, 95).
The College Board, originally developed to standardize college admis-
sions testing, also began using these “new-type” examinations and took 
objective testing to new heights. Prior to 1894, each college developed 
its own entrance examination with its own required reading list. In an 
attempt to standardize the lists, the National Conference on Uniform 
Entrance Requirements, a joint effort among east coast professional 
educational associations, was formed in 1894, and the College Entrance 
Examination Board (CEEB)—which came to be known as the College 
Board—grew out of that original conference. When the CEEB admin-
istered its first examination in 1901, it used the Restricted Examination 
in English—an essay test drawn from a list of literary texts. The early 
Restricted Examinations required “a good memory for textual features 
such as plot construction and descriptive details” (Trachsel 1992, 76). 
In 1916, in response to the complaints of secondary teachers about 
the emphasis on textual detail, the College Board introduced the first 
Comprehensive Examinations in English which would test the examinees’ 
abilities to interpret texts more generally and to express themselves in 
writing (Trachsel 1992, 77–79; Elliot, Plata, and Zelhart 1990, 31).8
In 1921, Edward L. Thorndike, a colleague of Hillegas, demonstrated 
that the objective “mental” tests from the field of psychology were better 
predictors of college performance than the College Board’s existing essay 
entrance examinations or the student’s high school record (Trachsel 
1992, 108–9). Based on this and other studies, the College Board admin-
istered its first Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) in 1926. Offered in a pre-
dominantly multiple-choice format, the SAT quickly became popular for 
its efficiency, particularly with the governing bodies of universities—bod-
ies that were and are increasingly made up of corporate and financial 
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executives (Trachsel 1992, 108–09). The first SAT exams took an analytic 
approach to reading and writing skills, dividing each into a series of dis-
crete skills to be tested individually—an approach commensurate with the 
technocratic model of literacy prevalent at the time, which I will discuss 
in chapter two.
Not everyone, however, welcomed the SAT with open arms, even in the 
ranks of the College Board. In 1929, the Board appointed a Commission 
on English to determine the effectiveness of the SAT and the Restricted 
and Comprehensive Examinations in English. The Commission did not 
approve of the SAT, but they did find that the results of the SAT cor-
related well with a student’s ability to succeed in first year English. The 
Comprehensive Exam—which the Commission favored—did not. These 
findings were buried in Appendix D of their 1931 report (Commission 
on English 1931, 261–74). The Commission argued that objective tests 
were of limited use for measuring “creative values” (1931, 210), i.e., those 
reflecting students’ ability to summarize and interpret passages of litera-
ture (1931, 154). This emphasis on literary skills led to the retention of 
the composition portion of the English entrance exam, at least in the 
short run, but the questions moved away from general experience and 
toward more poetic and literary topics (Trachsel 1992, 116–21). In 1934, 
however, in the face of the effectiveness and popularity of the SAT, the 
College Board discontinued the Restricted Examination in English, and 
in 1942, the Comprehensive Exam (Trachsel 1992, 110–11; Elliot, Plata, 
and Zelhart 1990, 34).
Williamson argues that a combination of factors led to the rise of large-
scale objective testing. These factors included a belief in meritocratic 
ideals, the promise of positivist science, questions about the fairness of 
examinations—particularly the variability of subjective scoring—and calls 
for accounting of the funds spent on education. In comparison with essay 
exams and other labor-intensive efforts, large-scale objective testing pro-
vided what seemed to be a fair and consistent way to gather information 
about students. Moreover, because they were standardized, the test results 
could be used to compare schools and provide information to agencies, 
parents, and governing bodies (Williamson 1994, 159–60). These “ben-
efits,” however, also impeded curricular development at the elementary 
and secondary levels. Trachsel points out that because the tests were so 
important, teachers had to teach to them, and even when crises called 
for significant reform of the curriculum, the predictive nature of the tests 
tended to reinforce the status quo (1992, 172). Concerns such as these, 
however, were insignificant at the time when compared to the benefits 
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accrued by objective testing. Objectivity provided strong answers to the 
most pressing questions of the day; the fit between assessment and objec-
tive principles seemed only natural.
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N D  VA L I D I T Y
In 1922, Thomas Briggs used the term “reliability” in connection with the 
variable results of testing done by individual teachers (442). This term 
and its partner, “validity,” were derived from psychological testing, specifi-
cally psychometrics, a branch of psychological testing using quantitative 
methods to measure mental qualities such as intelligence. Psychometrics 
emerged from the positivist belief that anything that exists is measurable, 
and the corollary that mental processes exist and therefore are measur-
able. In writing assessment, the application of psychometric principles 
also depends on the premise that written abilities mirror mental capabili-
ties. Prior to World War I, the terms “reliability” and “validity” had no par-
ticular currency in educational assessment, and no one used them. Since 
World War I, however, these terms, which signify objective assessment 
principles, have governed writing assessment scholarship and practice to 
the exclusion of alternative theories.
Reliability carried more weight than validity for most of the twentieth 
century. Reliability “refers to the reproduceability [sic] of a set of test results” 
(Lyman 1991, 22). In practice, a test cannot be considered reliable unless 
it consistently provides the same results or nearly the same results, regard-
less of the conditions under which it is scored. The multiple-choice for-
mat of the SATs claims high reliability because the machines that score it 
do not wake up on the wrong side of the bed or become enamored with 
a clever turn of phrase. Essay tests are necessarily less reliable.
Reliability has remained an issue throughout the history of large-scale 
writing assessment in the United States. The first written tests were devel-
oped not only to meet the need to test large student populations, but also 
to address concerns about fairness to students and favoritism by teachers. 
In oral examinations, each student was asked a different question, so 
because there was necessarily some variation in the level of difficulty of 
the questions asked, this testing was ultimately uneven. In contrast, writ-
ten assessment asked all students the same questions at the same time with 
less teacher intervention. Moreover, their responses could be compared, 
not only within classes, but also across schools, districts, and states.
The comparison of results in situations such as college admissions 
testing led to concerns for ways to set and measure standards so that 
comparisons would be meaningful and fair to the schools, students, and 
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teachers involved. Hillegas takes comparative standards as the primary 
motivation for his scale:
[e]very attempt to measure the efficiency of instruction in a school or system 
or to evaluate different methods of educational procedure serves to empha-
size the importance of standards. Proper standards would make it possible to 
compare with certainty the work done in one school or system of schools with 
that done elsewhere. They would make it more difficult for mere opinion to 
control so much of our school-room practice. (1912, 1)
Both Hillegas (1912) and Trabue (1917) went to great lengths to assure 
the reliability of their samples. For each scale, they sent their samples to 
multiple readers, and they only chose the samples whose scores demon-
strated the highest reader agreement. In addition, Hillegas spends a fair 
amount of time in his essay explaining the normal deviation from the 
“true” score of each sample—that such deviation is regular: for every 
high score there will be an equally low score, in effect canceling the 
difference. From a contemporary perspective, his explanations sound 
somewhat defensive and contrived. His science, however, differs from our 
own, and his explanations conform to the expectations of his day. Our 
own embrace of deviation would likely sound lackadaisical, at the very 
least, to his ears.
In spite of efforts such as Hillegas’s, reliability problems contributed 
to the downfall of those early direct assessments of writing. As Elliot, 
Plata, and Zelhart point out, the inter-rater reliability among the original 
readers was so low in the Hillegas scale of 1912 that only 21 papers out 
of 7,000 samples collected generated sufficient agreement to appear in 
the published version; in the Nassau County supplement of 1917, only 
30 out of 5,500 made the final cut (1990, 29). They argue that research 
in direct writing assessment was thriving during the first thirty years of 
the twentieth century, but that “the methods of evaluation were extraor-
dinarily time consuming, yielding low rates of inter-reader agreement. 
Moreover, the claims made for the scales were greatly exaggerated” (1990, 
30). Although direct writing assessment might have improved, indirect 
assessment was far more efficient, and the combination of “the rise of the 
College Board, the beginning of the efficiency era in education, and the 
growth of intelligence testing” undermined work in the direct assessment 
of writing (1990, 35).
Edward M. White, perhaps the best-known contemporary writing assess-
ment scholar, calls this quality “fairness.” In translating “reliability” into 
“fairness,” however, White oversimplifies the term and conflates ideals of 
30 C O M I N G  TO  T E R M S
consistency, objectivity, and ethics. In psychometrics, reliability is a techni-
cal measure of consistency; White’s implicit argument is that in order to 
be ethical, evaluators must be technically consistent, and in White’s con-
figuration, consistency depends on objectivity. This is the reasoning used 
by most contemporary compositionists who favor the application of psy-
chometric principles: in order to be “fair,” evaluators must be objective. 
This equation makes a certain sense, but its logic is loaded: who among 
us would want to be “unfair” to students? Refuting this claim requires that 
the responder carefully disentangle ethics, objectivity, and consistency—a 
substantial task and one that few assessment scholars in composition have 
even attempted. Some contemporary scholars challenge the need for 
reliability by treating it as irrelevant or inconsequential, but most have 
not refuted this logic directly. Consequently, even though its usage is 
imprecise in composition studies, “reliability” remains part of the writing 
assessment landscape as a means of assuring that we treat our students 
justly when we evaluate their work.
Validity, reliability’s partner term, refers to the ability of the test to 
measure what it is required to measure, its suitability to the task at hand.9
In classical testing theory, the dominant approach through most of 
the twentieth century, a test is valid if the results of that test have some 
determinable connection to the actual competencies, aptitudes, skills, or 
knowledge the test purports to measure. For example, a twelve-inch string 
is both valid and reliable for measuring one foot; a thirteen-inch string is 
reliable in that its length does not vary, but it is not valid for measuring 
one foot. Tests that measure mental skills are hardly as simple, but the 
principles are basically the same.
Multiple-choice and other “objective” tests originally proved their 
reliability through the use of questions with ostensibly only one correct 
answer, which eventually machines could score. Their validity seemed to 
come as part of the package, except that the dictates of reliability meant 
that only what could be agreed upon as “correct” could be tested. The 
result: grammar, mechanics, usage, vocabulary, and the like dominated 
objective tests of writing ability. This need for unequivocal “correctness” 
coupled with Harvard’s endorsement of these standards encouraged test 
designers to rely on this narrow definition of “writing.”
Our contemporary disapproval of this oversimplification, however, 
does not mean that no correlation exists between the results of such tests 
and other “measures” of writing ability. As Roberta Camp points out: 
“From the perspective of traditional psychometrics, in which high test 
reliability is a prerequisite for validity, the multiple-choice writing test has 
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also been seen as a valid measure. The claims for its validity have rested 
on its coverage of skills necessary to writing and on correlations between 
test scores and course grades—or, more recently, between test scores and 
performance on samples of writing, including writing generated under 
classroom conditions” (1993, 47). The 1931 Report from the Commission 
on English produced the same results, and this correlation substantiated 
much of the use of objective tests during the twentieth century. In effect, 
psychometrics claims that a test cannot be valid if it is not reliable, and 
reliability has been defined in terms of consistency of scoring, which is 
why evaluators have tended to prefer machine-scorable tests. Given the 
cultural affinity for efficiency and scientific precision of the early twenti-
eth century, it is hardly surprising that educators and scholars used these 
principles to bolster calls for objective tests at the time.
More importantly, these principles gathered significant currency dur-
ing this early period, so much so that they have influenced large-scale 
writing assessment to the present day. There was no effective competi-
tion, so the terms became dominant and then normal: all assessments 
were, as a matter of course, subject to the criteria of validity and reli-
ability. Contemporary compositionists continue to invoke these terms to 
substantiate their assessment procedures, often without questioning their 
applicability to the evaluation of writing and even assuming a necessary 
connection between these principles and any assessment procedure, 
regardless of subject matter. Through these normalized principles, even 
contemporary writing assessment practices carry an objective orienta-
tion.
H O L I S T I C  S C O R I N G
While multiple-choice remained the test format of choice, between 1954 
and 1971 the College Board made a series of concessions to educators 
who insisted on the direct assessment of writing. From 1954–56, for 
example, the board offered the General Composition Test, a two-hour, 
impromptu exam consisting of one question on a popular topic, as an 
alternative to the objective English Composition Test. These essay exams 
were scored by trained readers according to predetermined criteria—in 
this case and in order, mechanics, style, organization, reasoning, and con-
tent—a process known as analytic scoring (Trachsel 1992, 148–49). Such 
innovations, however, did not last long during this period.
Ironically, test development specialists at the Educational Testing 
Service (ETS) are the ones who devised holistic scoring in response to 
their smaller clients who wanted to see actual pieces of writing and who 
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were less concerned with efficiency. Working for ETS, Paul B. Diederich, 
John W. French, and Sydell T. Carlton (1961) determined that the lack 
of inter-reader reliability in scoring essays arose from differences in the 
criteria for judging essays. In their NCTE publication, Richard Braddock, 
Richard Lloyd-Jones, and Lowell Schoer (1963) took this idea a step fur-
ther and argued that readers must help develop the criteria to be applied 
and must review and apply these criteria periodically to ensure that they 
continued to agree. Fred I. Godshalk, Frances Swineford, and William 
E. Coffman (1966)—also researchers at ETS—took up this research and 
published a monograph on holistic scoring. They solved the reliability 
problem of scoring compositions by limiting the number of topics on 
which students would write and by training readers to develop and dis-
cern particular criteria.
This last process is an early version of the procedure that composition 
programs adopted during the 1970s and 1980s. Godshalk, Swineford, 
and Coffman devised holistic reading of essays—which they define as a 
scoring method in which “readers [are] asked to make a single judgment 
with little or no guidance as to detailed standards”—to address the dual 
problems of “reading reliability and the burden of a slow analytical read-
ing” associated with essay scoring to-date (1966, 1–2). They solved the 
“reading reliability” problem by asking readers to score a series of care-
fully chosen sample essays (on a 3–point scale in this case) and then to 
publicly compare the scores. The comparison of scores—what we now call 
“norming”—had the controlling effect on the readers it was intended to: 
The researchers reported that “[n]o effort was made to identify any read-
er whose standards were out of line, because that fact would be known to 
him [sic] and would be assumed to have a corrective effect” (1966, 10). 
Upon finding that they had obtained statistically sound reliability, the 
team reported the experiment a success.
From our current-day perspective, however, the success was at best 
partial. True, holistic scoring helped locate writing more centrally in writ-
ing assessment. But nowhere in the Godshalk report does the reader get 
a sense that writing has any particular value as a whole, as an activity, as 
a method of instruction. Instead, the authors tend to treat writing assess-
ment as a puzzle to be worked out. Or, in the terms I have been develop-
ing thus far, as a problem of positivist science: writing exists; therefore, 
it can be measured, and we can truly know it only through that measure-
ment. The trick was to find the right yardstick. In fact, the introduction 
to the Godshalk report—written by Edward S. Noyes, special consultant 
to the president of the CEEB and a College Board researcher during the 
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1940s—declares “that this problem [the measurement of a student’s abil-
ity to write] has at long last been solved” (1966, iv).
White argues that ETS developed holistic scoring “as a bone to throw 
to English teachers” while the multiple-choice tests provided the actual 
data for testing experts, and that the supporters of holistic scoring in 
ETS were and are few (1993, 82). The report by Godshalk, Swineford, 
and Coffman bears this out at least in part: “In spite of the growing 
evidence that the objective and semi-objective English composition 
questions were valid, teachers and administrators in schools and col-
leges kept insisting that candidates for admission to college ought to 
be required to demonstrate their writing skill directly” (1966, 3). While 
the researchers do not entirely ignore these pressures, they do make it 
clear that for the purposes of their testing, the essay exam adds nothing; 
only in pedagogical eyes are direct measures of writing necessary. They 
return to this idea in their conclusion, where they argue that the best 
test in statistical terms combines the objective and direct writing aspects 
(1966, 41). However, they point out that if cost is factored into the statis-
tical equation, and if cost carries any real import, then direct assessment 
measures alone—which are substantially more expensive to score than 
the objective measures—are clearly not any better than the objective 
measures alone. They find the value of direct assessment elsewhere, argu-
ing that “the advantage [to evaluating actual pieces of writing] has to be 
assessed in terms of the model the essay provides for students and teach-
ers” (1966, 41), but the authors are not clear on what the pedagogical 
uses of essays might be.
White, however, tells the pedagogical side of the tale in “Holistic 
Scoring: Past Triumphs, Future Challenges” (1993).10 He suggests that 
holistic scoring is, in a sense, a product of its time. It emerged during a 
period when educators and students began challenging the privilege of 
“correct” English, when poststructuralism, writing research and writing 
scholars appeared, when universities opened their doors to non-tradi-
tional students, and in the wake of the student rebellions of the 1960s 
(1993, 83). He describes the mood of those scholars and teachers working 
with holistic scoring:
Those of us who were involved in the missionary activity of promulgating holis-
tic scoring of student essays in the 1970s tended to feel that we had achieved 
the answer to the testing of writing. By developing careful essay questions, 
administering and scoring them under controlled conditions, and recording a 
single accurate score for the quality of writing as a whole (with scoring guides 
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and sample papers defining quality), we had become committed to a flexible, 
accurate, and responsive measurement method, one that could come under 
the control of teachers. (1993, 79)
The benefits were many. On the social front, holistic scoring addressed 
the inequities of class by providing “a procedure that defined writing 
as producing a text, that could award scores for originality, or creativ-
ity, or intelligence, or organization, as well as mechanical correctness 
in the school dialect” (1993, 86). In contrast, objective tests of writing 
ability, such as the Test of Standard Written English, tally the responses 
to multiple-choice questions on grammar, usage and vocabulary—the 
grammar, usage and vocabulary of the upper middle-class white family in 
America—and thus define scholastic aptitude in terms of socioeconomic 
status. On the pedagogical front, holistic scoring brought evaluation into 
the classroom. Many teachers made it part of their pedagogy, including 
scoring guides and peer evaluation as part of their classroom materials 
and activities. Moreover, questionable as this claim may seem, holistic 
scoring brought revision into the classroom, according to White, since 
it made standards public and treated them as goals to be met through a 
focus on the writing process (1993, 89).
The sense of gain associated with the rise of holistic scoring, the 
success which led White to describe the movement as a “remarkable 
triumph” (1993, 80), was not unanimous. Some teachers found it “unset-
tling” because it undermined the time-honored tradition of red ink. 
Testing professionals often treated it as a poetic attempt by subjectivists 
to overcome the hard numbers of objective tests. And administrators 
who used it had to fight regular battles over cost and reliability (1993, 
82). However, the work done on holistic scoring during the 1960s and 
1970s made possible broader discussions about the relationship between 
assessment and the context in which the assessment takes place, discus-
sions which had not been welcomed in the days of composition scales and 
intelligence testing.
Holistic scoring, however, was unable to escape the influence of an 
objectivist paradigm. White’s celebratory account of holistic scoring, for 
example, codes the limitations of this process in terms of “validity” and 
“reliability,” to the point of using subsections so titled. Under the section 
titled “Validity,” White argues that holistic scoring relies on face validity: 
holistic tests that measure writing look at actual pieces of writing to do 
so. While face validity has a great deal of currency, at least with teach-
ers, White observes that the “reality” of the holistic writing situation is 
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based on a constricted view of writing: without revision (a point which 
contradicts his earlier claim in the same essay), with a grader for an audi-
ence, and without purpose beyond the test question. Ultimately, though, 
White defends holistic scoring by arguing that the artificial situation of 
a holistically scored essay test beats the artifice of a multiple-choice test. 
Moreover, he claims that just because holistic scoring is a good idea does 
not mean that it is good for all situations; its uses should be limited to 
situations that call for general assessments of overall writing ability and 
the scores must be used responsibly (1993, 90–93).
In his accounts of holistic scoring, White spends almost twice as much 
time on reliability as validity. He points out that some areas of reliability, 
such as variability in student health on test days, are beyond the realm 
of test development and influence all tests. He argues, however, that 
those elements of reliability within the test developers’ influence should 
be addressed. He outlines potential problems in the misdevelopment 
of test questions and the mismanagement of reading sessions, and he 
emphasizes the increased cost of holistically scored essays. He argues that 
readers should be encouraged to develop a sense of community through 
socializing so that they will be more willing to cooperate and see each 
other’s points-of-view. His emphasis on reliability functions as a warning 
to teachers and administrators: follow these procedures carefully or the 
testing experts will take your essays away from you—an argument that 
White has made repeatedly in his career.
The acceptance of holistic scoring marked the return to the direct 
assessment of writing. Unlike earlier scholars working on direct mea-
sures such as composition scales, researchers working in holistic scoring 
focused their energy specifically on proving its validity and reliability. 
Testing experts and administrators, then and now, tend to favor indirect 
assessment, arguing that multiple-choice examinations allow for high reli-
ability, reasonable validity, and relatively efficient administration and data 
collection. Composition scholars, among others, favor direct assessment 
of writing, arguing that it is more valid because it measures writing ability 
by examining actual writing, that it can be almost as reliable as indirect 
assessment, and that the costs are roughly equivalent considering that 
indirect assessment has as large a pre-test cost (for continuous design) as 
direct has a post-test cost (for scoring). Composition scholars also favor 
direct assessment because it encourages aspects of writing that educators 
value, including process and rhetorical awareness.
Validity and reliability have governed the scene of large-scale writing 
assessment through most of the twentieth century and into the current 
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one, determining in advance the standards to which all assessment meth-
ods must measure up. Much of the literature debates the relative value 
of these principles but remains nonetheless locked into addressing them. 
Early in their history, indirect writing assessment methods employed these 
terms, as part of the package of psychometrics, to bolster their legitimacy. 
In claiming these principles, indirect assessment accrued the advantage 
of defining the terms of the struggle over the legitimacy of any testing 
measure. Holistic scoring fought its primary battle proving that it could 
be as reliable as indirect assessment methods. The question was always 
whether or not holistic scoring could measure up. Holistic assessment 
has “face validity” (it looks like the “right” thing to evaluate), but with the 
emphasis in its literature on inter-reader reliability, its aim is ideally to be 
as objective as multiple-choice examinations. Essay tests were discredited 
in the 1910s and 1920s precisely because of problems with reliability. They 
reappeared when they could be scored like objective tests, and at the 
time, no one much questioned the appropriateness of objective criteria.
P O RT F O L I O  A S S E S S M E N T
Used for many years by the fine arts, portfolios are a way of collecting 
materials, rather than an actual evaluation process. In writing instruction, 
portfolios became popular during the early 1990s as an extension of the 
single-sitting impromptu essay writing assignment that resulted from the 
development of holistic scoring. While the impromptus looked more like 
“real” writing than did multiple-choice questions, they still did not match 
the process pedagogy employed in many, if not most, composition class-
rooms. Specifically, impromptu exams had no provisions for revision and 
did not allow students to demonstrate a range of abilities, both of which 
portfolios could do.
The movement for portfolio use came from within the ranks of writ-
ing teachers—not since composition scales had this been the case—but 
like holistic scoring, the College Board experimented with the idea first. 
In the early 1980s, ETS developed a proposed Portfolio Assessment 
Plan in response to educators’ demands that testing reflect pedagogical 
theory. The plan would have asked students to submit a variety of essays, 
including a student-selected piece and an introductory letter addressed 
to admissions officials or prospective employers. However, the plan “was 
abandoned by ETS on the basis of its failure to meet the agency’s required 
standards of time- and cost-efficiency, scoring reliability, and the appear-
ance of scientific objectivity” (Trachsel 1992, 175–76). Trachsel points 
out that such reasoning becomes increasingly acceptable in the face of 
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diminishing budgets and increasing demands for accountability (1992, 
176), both trends which we are facing currently as we did in the 1980s.
Used in the context of the classroom or for program-wide placement 
or competency assessment, however, portfolios have become popular as 
locally driven assessments of writing. Perhaps because of the grassroots 
origins of the method—a large-scale writing assessment procedure that 
actually comes from teachers—researchers in portfolio assessment have 
resisted providing experimental and objective “proof” that portfolios are 
quantitatively “better” than holistically scored impromptus or objective 
tests. As the editors of New Directions in Portfolio Assessment point out, “the 
research on portfolios has been more classroom-based, more reflective, 
and more qualitative in nature” (Black et al. 1994b, 2).
Even proponents of portfolios, however, speak in ETS’s terms: validity 
and reliability. In fact, their central claim about the value of portfolios is 
that they are more valid than holistically scored impromptus, which are 
more valid than objective tests. Peter Elbow, one of the earliest portfolio 
proponents, relies on these principles to make his point, even as his 
essays spill over with commentary about portfolios’ pedagogical value. For 
example, in the Foreword to Portfolios: Process and Product, Elbow outlines 
reasons why portfolios hold more promise than impromptu examinations. 
His first reason is “improved validity”: he argues that “portfolios give a bet-
ter picture of students’ writing abilities” (1991, xi). His second reason seems 
fairly perverse, but still stays within the realm of accepted discourse: he 
argues that portfolios are promising precisely because they complicate 
reliability. His point is that real reading, even by trained readers such as 
English professors, necessarily involves disagreement and that portfolios 
encourage something more like this real world reading. However, Elbow 
sees validity and reliability in a sort of inescapable binary that must be 
addressed: “Given the tension between validity and reliability—the trade-
off between getting good pictures of what we are trying to test and good 
agreement among interpreters of those pictures—it makes most sense 
to put our chips on validity and allow reliability to suffer” (1991, xiii). 
Taking up this comment, White protests that if compositionists treat reli-
ability and validity as oppositional and ignore the former, we risk becom-
ing irrelevant to the larger testing community, including ETS and their 
allies—governmental agencies and administrations (1994c, 292). The 
composition community, he argues, cannot afford to be so shortsighted. 
Elbow argues that we have sufficient power to dictate writing assessment 
practices, but even as he says this, he relies on the terms garnered by indi-
rect assessment to make his point.
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In White’s estimation, validity is not a problem for portfolios—they 
have a better claim on “real” writing than impromptus do—but reliabil-
ity is. The variable contents of portfolios, even under the most directive 
guidelines, make it even more difficult for examiners to generate reliable 
scores than do impromptu essays. Multiple pieces of writing developed 
and revised over the period of a semester or more are harder to agree 
on than essays written in a limited time period in response to a limited 
number of prompts. White argues that “reliability should not become the 
obsession for portfolio evaluation that it became for essay testing,” but 
he points out that “portfolios cannot become a serious means of mea-
surement without demonstrable reliability” (1993, 105).11 White clearly 
understands the power of the lexicon.
From the outset, portfolios have contained the potential to displace 
reliability and validity as the central principles in writing assessment, 
but they have yet to do so. The terms are, admittedly, difficult to push 
aside, and it is hardly wise to ignore them, considering their currency in 
national-level assessment practices. Collections about portfolios such as 
New Directions in Portfolio Assessment (Black et al. 1994b), Portfolios: Process 
and Product (Belanoff and Dickson 1991), and Situating Portfolios: Four 
Perspectives (Yancey and Weiser 1997) outline alternative assessment paths, 
but tend not to develop a research agenda that would realign the existing 
power structures. Most of the essays in these collections seem to have dif-
ficulty theorizing assessment, opting instead for personal narratives and 
local descriptions that circumvent the terms altogether.12 While these nar-
ratives and descriptions suggest alternative assessment practices and could 
be extrapolated to theoretical principles, their authors seem to have some 
difficulty moving beyond the context of their local programs. However, 
the focus on the instrument—portfolios—may limit the discussion, and in 
chapter four, I will look at more specifically theoretical endeavors in the 
past decade that are not attached specifically to portfolios.
Liz Hamp-Lyons and William Condon, by contrast, specifically under-
take the development of a theory for portfolio assessment in Assessing the 
Portfolio: Principles for Practice, Theory, and Research (2000). Their project is, 
in large part, to develop “a credible, well-articulated theoretical base” for 
portfolio assessment (2000, 116), and while their work is careful and well 
thought-out, it remains within the educational measurement tradition. 
Specifically, Hamp-Lyons and Condon point out, echoing prior scholars, 
that “before [portfolios] could be taken seriously, the issue of reliability 
had to be solved” (2000, xv). Now that portfolios can demonstrate reliabil-
ity, they claim, “the next stage, the process of theory-making and research 
Large-Scale Writing Assessment Practices and the Influence of Objectivity            39
that will establish portfolio-based writing assessment as firmly as, today, we 
see with timed writing tests” can begin (2000, xv). That is, Hamp-Lyons 
and Condon accept reliability as a prerequisite for theoretical work in 
portfolio assessment, rather than as a theoretical concept in and of itself.
The lack of alternative principles leaves portfolios subject to the dic-
tates of reliability and validity. As such, portfolio assessment in large-scale 
situations often demands increased norming so that readers can learn to 
read the same way. It may also demand restrictions on the contents, which 
in turn raise questions about the pedagogical value of an assessment 
instrument that supposedly allows for student input but which ultimately 
restricts the choices that might tell us the most about their writing ability. 
Reliability and validity do not give us ways to explain and legitimate the 
pedagogical practices we value in the writing classroom and our evalua-
tions of the work our students produce. We either need a way to address 
the concerns for objectivity and consistency coming from educational 
measurement theorists and governing agencies, or we need to challenge 
them. Scholars working in portfolio assessment have not been able to do 
so successfully to-date.
T H E  P OW E R  O F  O B J E C T I V I T Y
An alternative theory for large-scale writing assessment must begin with 
the understanding that objectivity has been the primary driving force 
behind contemporary assessment. While other considerations, such as 
efficiency, have played a role, objectivity has been bolstered by the force 
of positivist science and consequently has carried the day. In fact, the story 
of writing assessment I have constructed here demonstrates how in large 
part writing assessment has taken particular forms specifically to avoid the 
subjectivity that positivist science has taken pains to erase. From Mann’s 
praise of impartiality in 1845 to White’s defense of the reliability of holis-
tic scoring, the desire for objectivity has motivated the form of large-scale 
writing assessment in the United States.
During the last twenty years, however, postmodern theory has attacked 
objectivity, pointing out that objectivity begins with a stance that is as 
invested as any “subjective” position. These arguments, which I will take 
up in further detail in the latter half of this text, claim that in the final 
instance, there is no such thing as absolute objectivity. Consequently, 
most disciplines today, including the “hard” sciences, are questioning 
the nature of the reality their fields examine, and many are acknowledg-
ing that these realities are constructed through the frames of particular 
interests.
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Some postmodern reflection exists in the assessment literature outside 
the field of composition. Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln’s Fourth 
Generation Evaluation (1989), for example, argues explicitly for a “con-
structivist” or “fourth generation” evaluation that differs from existing 
and previous generations primarily in its focus on negotiation among all 
stakeholders in any assessment. These earlier generations, they argue, 
depend on positivist methodologies that cannot permit stakeholders to 
have a central place in evaluation, in large part because of the subjectiv-
ity they bring to any assessment practice. Constructivist evaluation finds 
both the purpose and the uses of evaluation to be constructed by all the 
stakeholders in the evaluation and thus breaks radically from positivist 
evaluation which measures “reality” independent of those involved in 
the assessment itself. Guba and Lincoln, however, are education scholars, 
and their work has been taken up only sparingly in composition studies.13
Yet they offer an alternative vocabulary for writing assessment, which I 
examine in more detail in chapter three, and while it may not provide all 
the answers composition scholars are looking for—and Guba and Lincoln 
explicitly claim that it will not—it does provide suggested avenues for 
exploration.
The same is true of the work of Pamela A. Moss, whose work I return 
to in chapter four. In “Can There Be Validity Without Reliability?” 
(1994), for example, Moss argues that a hermeneutic approach to assess-
ment could incorporate context in ways that reliability as a defining 
principle does not allow. Her work gets a bit more airplay than Guba’s 
and Lincoln’s, primarily from scholars like Huot and Williamson. But 
the limited exposure seems odd, considering that the constructivist 
model composition scholars advocate has been an explicit part of the 
discipline’s theory since at least 1986 when Kenneth A. Bruffee’s “Social 
Construction, Language, and the Authority of Knowledge” came out. 
Social constructionist researchers in composition, however, have focused 
primarily on the act of composing, and their theoretical work has not 
transferred well to assessment.
Kathleen Blake Yancey does some work toward bridging this gap. In 
her retrospective, “Looking Back as We Look Forward: Historicizing 
Writing Assessment,” Yancey (1999) argues that writing assessment in 
composition studies has moved through a series of overlapping waves and 
that we are now in a space where compositionists have developed certain 
kinds of expertise that allow us in turn to develop better assessment 
practices. She claims that the pendulum of writing assessment theory has 
swung from a focus on reliability in the first wave to a focus on validity 
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in the third, and she points to a change in the idea(l) of reliability, away 
from statistics and toward interpretation and negotiation (1999, 491–2). 
Yancey’s picture of the field tends to be hopeful, and she gestures toward 
a fourth wave in which any number of changes are possible. As her histori-
cal construction progresses, the terms “validity” and “reliability” appear 
less and less frequently and are replaced by concepts such as “interpreta-
tion” and “reflection” and “ethics.” In this way, among others, her essay 
does important work, getting us to think about other approaches to 
assessment. However, Yancey does not directly challenge validity and reli-
ability (although, admittedly, a retrospective may not be the appropriate 
forum for such a challenge). She points out compositionists’ “reluctance 
at best, and aversion at worst, to writing assessment,” and the way assess-
ment is often “foiled against a teaching grounded in humanism” (1999, 
495). Compositionists, she notes, do not want to be assessment people, 
even though assessment has always been bound up in writing.
The history of writing assessment as I have constructed it here suggests 
some reasons why composition scholars and other stakeholders might 
resist, either consciously or unconsciously, employing an alternative 
paradigm for assessment even as they embrace its models for other areas 
of teaching and scholarship. The testing of writing in the United States 
came into being during the same moment as the rise of positivism, the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. Almost immediately, the pressures 
on writing assessment tended to push such evaluation toward increasing 
standards of reproducibility and scientific precision. Composition scales 
were developed explicitly in an attempt to regulate and standardize the 
scoring of student compositions—if not across the country, then at least 
within a district or school—and their mission was defined in these terms. 
But when composition scales failed in their self-defined mission, they 
opened the door for other methodologies. The result was objective test-
ing, and between 1930 and the mid-1960s, there was no other game in 
town. During this time, the objectivist paradigm solidified, becoming the 
norm and dictating the terms of assessment.
The most recent methods—holistic scoring and portfolio assessment—
look like significant breaks from positivist assessments, but they are not 
as long as they claim legitimacy through “validity” and “reliability.” These 
terms, even in current usage, make sense only in an objectivist paradigm 
that not only acknowledges but also actively seeks objective reality. If 
change is integral to assessment, as it would be in a constructivist para-
digm, for example, reliability becomes highly questionable and limited 
as a defining term. When holistic scoring and portfolio assessments use 
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these objectivist ideals to provide evidence of their worth, they remain 
solidly within that paradigm. The need for legitimation in the face of 
conflicting demands such as these tends to limit the exploration of alter-
native models for assessment and to keep especially large-scale assessment 
programs from straying too far—theoretically, at least.
The public nature of most composition programs further militates 
against embracing constructivist assessment or at least against relinquish-
ing the objectivist paradigm. Universities tend to treat composition, like 
some other general education requirements, as common property, as 
subjects which are remedial in some sense and which can be taught by 
almost anyone on the staff. Such core requirements receive more scru-
tiny from those outside the university as well, and thus English depart-
ments and specifically writing teachers are blamed when graduates do 
not produce grammatically correct prose—the common understanding 
of the content of composition courses. “Hard” numbers demonstrating 
improvement or decline satisfy more people—including politicians and 
parents—than carefully articulated narrative explanations of a result or 
rationales for assessment methods. The objectivist paradigm provides 
writing teachers and administrators with a tried and true way to deliver 
these numbers under increasing pressure to demonstrate the success of 
particular programs.
Extricating assessment from objectivism is no simple job, nor is it 
entirely clear that compositionists should want to do so. Objectivist assess-
ment grew out of a desire in part for more equitable and meaningful 
assessment, ideals few educators would reject today. Objectivity is thus 
both desirable and limiting. The problem for those considering alterna-
tive assessment paradigms is twofold: retaining these ideals while moving 
beyond the confines of objectivist principles. In many ways the latter is the 
more difficult task because, more than convenience or habit, objectivist 
principles are integral to assessment as it is currently conceived. Until 
an alternative theory of assessment becomes widely accepted in compo-
sition, anyone implementing, analyzing, or theorizing about a writing 
assessment program must speak to those values. Without an alternative 
vocabulary with which to talk about assessment, objectivist thinking will 
continue to direct the ways arguments about large-scale assessment are 
conducted.
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C O N T E M P O R A RY  L I T E R AC Y  
S C H O L A R S H I P  A N D  T H E  VA L U E  O F  
C O N T E X T
Theoretically, large-scale writing assessment measures students’ ability 
to work with written language, i.e., their literate ability. The relationship 
implied here between assessment and literacy, however, is deceptively 
simple. On the one hand, assessment operates from the premise that tests 
can reflect some measure of ability. This premise relies on a historically 
positivist paradigm which accepts both the possibility of measurement and 
the value of it. Of course, some scholars, such as James A Berlin (1994) 
and Peter Elbow (1993), challenge the notion that such measurement 
is even possible, but since testing remains a significant part of the land-
scape, these challenges are largely ineffectual and the premise remains. 
Still, like these scholars, contemporary literacy scholarship does not share 
assessment’s traditional value system and instead tends to reflect a con-
cern for social and individual welfare, values less interested in objectivity 
than in interpersonal relations and community norms.
The idea that “literacy scholarship” embodies a single value system, 
however, strains the imagination. “Scholarship” here is a broad term, and 
by it, I mean to include both research and practice—and their intersec-
tions, particularly in pedagogical forums. My use of this term is in no 
way intended to suggest that scholarly work on literacy is monolithic, but 
rather that certain tendencies appear in the body of the scholarship on 
the subject, whether that scholarship takes the form of theory, ethnog-
raphy, historiography, teacher research, or classroom accounts. Part of 
the work of this chapter is to analyze these tendencies and to argue that, 
taken together, they can be described as a paradigm. The argument in 
the first chapter made much the same claim about assessment; in the area 
of literacy, this idea is more difficult to accept, in part because the term 
“literacy” applies to a much broader area in composition studies than 
does “assessment.” A paradigmatic analysis of each, however, allows us to 
compare their assumptions, guiding metaphors, and research agendas.
My first chapter argues that assessment research and practices tend to 
exhibit characteristics consistent with an objectivist paradigm. This chap-
ter argues that literacy research, practices, and pedagogy tend to exhibit 
characteristics consistent with a contextual paradigm. Although these 
paradigms are not necessarily mutually exclusive, neither are they particu-
larly compatible. Contemporary literacy scholarship focuses on rhetorical 
and social context: on the ways in which the location and purpose of liter-
ate ability influences not only what counts as “literacy,” but also the ways 
in which literate ability matures, the social and political impact of literacy, 
and the limitations—economic, social, rhetorical—imposed by the situa-
tion in which literacy develops. This emphasis on context suggests that 
contemporary literacy scholarship relies on a social constructionist episte-
mology, or even that it operates within a social constructionist paradigm, 
a connection I will return frequently in this book. This chapter analyzes 
the value of context in contemporary literacy scholarship in order to 
delineate more clearly the distinctions between the prevailing scholarly 
tendencies in literacy and those in assessment.
As in the first chapter, part of the analysis is historical. Suzanne de 
Castell and Allan Luke (1986) describe historical changes in literacy edu-
cation in terms of a series of paradigms: classical, progressive, and tech-
nocratic. This chapter extends these categories to include what I argue 
is yet another paradigm shift—to the contextual—and, drawing on the 
work of the first chapter, analyzes the connections between literacy prac-
tices and assessment practices at various historical moments. In each case 
prior to the most recent paradigm shift, assessment practices sufficiently 
reflected the prevailing values in literacy pedagogy so that they comple-
mented each other. In the most recent shift, however, the aims of literacy 
education have diverged from those of assessment practice, so that while 
assessment scholarship has maintained roots in objectivism, literacy schol-
arship has embraced instead the implications of situation and the limits 
of location. Contemporary literacy scholarship breaks radically not only 
with prior conceptions of the meaning of literacy and its value in society, 
but also with the values of assessment as currently articulated in ways that 
strain attempts to assess literate ability.
C O N T E M P O R A RY  L I T E R AC Y  S C H O L A R S H I P
When “literacy” is understood as the ability to read and write, a certain 
universality adheres to the concept. After all, “reading” and “writing” are 
arguably abilities that virtually all people are capable of possessing, if only 
in an ideal world, however complex the actual processes. Contemporary lit-
eracy scholarship challenges the idea that literacy is a universal concept by 
emphasizing the contextual boundaries of any literate act. That is, instead 
of talking about literacy in general terms, contemporary literacy scholars 
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insist that the context of the literacy act be made an explicit part of the 
definition, and some even attach a qualifier to the term “literacy” (e.g., 
cultural literacy or formal literacy). Their claim is that reading and writing 
differ depending on the context in which such abilities are learned and 
employed. By thus emphasizing boundaries, contemporary scholars recog-
nize that literacy is most meaningful when situated in specific contexts.
Harvey J. Graff (1987), long-time historian and scholar of literacy, 
argues that any study of literacy requires a definition of “literacy” that will 
serve across time and space, but which is neither ahistorical nor acontex-
tual. He claims that the “only” sufficient definition is “[b]asic or primary 
levels of reading and writing” where the definitions of “basic” and “primary” 
are determined by the context of the literacy under discussion (1987, 3–4, 
Graff’s emphasis). Specifically, he argues that literacy study means under-
standing literacy as a technology of reading and writing for the purposes 
of communication and understanding in a particular social, historical, 
and cultural context (1987, 4). He carefully emphasizes that literacy’s 
“meaning is established only in precise historical contexts; it is not univer-
sally given or proscribed. It need not connote dimensions of the liberal, 
the polished, or the literary, and may not even contrast strongly with illit-
eracy” (1987, 374). Graff uses his model of literacy to argue in historical 
and cultural detail that the relationship between social movements and 
consequences on the one hand and literacy instruction and levels on the 
other is far more complex than effect and cause.
Graff emphasizes the historical dimensions of literate ability, but other 
contemporary scholars ground literacy in specific social contexts, focusing 
their arguments on the ways in which literate acts are meaningful only in 
the specific communities in which they arise. Sylvia Scribner and Michael 
Cole’s definition—a “set of socially organized practices which make use 
of a symbol system and a technology for producing and disseminating 
it”—makes context implicit throughout; they argue that literacy is mean-
ingless without a social context for its use (1981, 236). Similarly, David 
Bleich argues that literacy “is the study of language use in intrasocial situ-
ations. This meaning for literacy already suggests that to be literate is to 
have a socially governed strategy or set of customs and habits for any use 
of language, either oral or written. To study literacy is to study the social 
prompts and styles that call for the use of language” (1989, 22). Bleich’s 
definition emphasizes the social practices of communication and the par-
ticular contexts in which those practices are grounded. Implicit in these 
definitions is the notion that apart from context and social practices, the 
written (or spoken) word has no particular meaning.
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Unlike Graff, Scribner and Cole, and Bleich, who arrive at their 
definitions analytically, other contemporary scholars contrast different 
models of literacy using qualifiers to develop categories that roughly cor-
respond to contextual literacy and acontextual literacy. For example, in 
Institutionalizing Literacy, Mary Trachsel (1992) distinguishes between “for-
mal” and “functionalist” theories of literacy. “Formal” literacy, for Trachsel, 
connotes a mastery of the skills of reading and writing, focusing on writ-
ten text as an abstraction, an objectification of thought, and a separation 
of the writer from the context of the reader. This, she argues, comprises 
the literacy of standardized tests. “Functionalist” literacy—the literacy that 
Trachsel is most interested in—foregrounds purpose and understands 
reading and writing to be social acts connecting reader, writer, and con-
text through language. This is the literacy that most educators in English 
studies would claim they teach, and she argues that this bond through 
literacy could “become the site where English studies at last confronts and 
overcomes its split personality”—the split she sees between knowledge 
production and service that has resulted in a significant gap between 
literature and composition (1992, 179). Trachsel numbers Walter Ong 
and Eric Havelock among those subscribing to largely formal definitions 
of literacy and Shirley Brice Heath and Deborah Brandt among those 
who advocate functionalist definitions, although she acknowledges that 
these two sides are not entirely dissimilar and that their theories overlap. 
Trachsel uses the distinction to argue that formal literacy inappropriately 
dominates English Studies through apparatuses such as the SAT, and that 
in order to overcome the hold of such objective testing, English profes-
sionals should adopt a functionalist approach to literacy.
Other scholars develop and rely on structures similar to Trachsel’s. 
For example, Brian V. Street, working in anthropology, distinguishes 
between “autonomous” and “ideological” models of literacy (1984, 1).14
The autonomous model derives from “the assumption that [literacy] is a 
neutral technology that can be detached from specific social contexts”; 
scholars using this model treat literacy most often as a set of skills which 
develop progressively (1984, 1). In contrast, the “ideological” model 
focuses “on the specific social practices of reading and writing,” showing 
that literacy grows out of social rather than formal institutions (1984, 2). 
To develop these models, he illustrates the differences in literacies taught 
through formal schooling and those generated in response to specific 
social needs. For example, he contrasts the relative failure of traditional 
educational approaches to adult literacy campaigns with the success of 
need-based programs. He concludes that, unless the adult learners’ goals 
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include pursuing formal education in academic settings, adult learners 
miss nothing significant if they do not learn academic literacy.
Working in composition studies, Deborah Brandt (1990) also contrasts 
contextually-oriented literacy with an acontextual notion, which she calls 
“strong-text literacy.” “Strong-text literacy,” she argues, focuses on the 
“interpretive demands” of text, treating literate activity as distinct from 
social interaction and thus decontextualized (1990, 2–3). In contrast, she 
presents a process model of literacy that references not only the context 
of the reader and writer at work, but also “the implicit process by which 
intersubjective understanding is getting accomplished” (1990, 4). For 
example, Brandt contrasts schooling in the features of language—pho-
netics, spelling, and grammar—with the active process by which children 
learn to read and write in the home prior to schooling, in which literacy 
develops in response to the needs of social interaction. Missing in the 
strong-text approach, she maintains, are the “human ties” that connect 
real people to language (1990, 126).
The particular merits of each of these models—Trachsel’s, Street’s, 
and Brandt’s—are less at issue here than the structure they propose. The 
acontextual halves of their contrastive definitions treat literate ability as 
distinct from any particular historical and cultural framework for reading 
and writing, while the contextual halves find the connection between 
location and literate ability necessary to understanding literacy at all. 
More precisely, Trachsel, Street, and Brandt would argue that acontextual 
theories of literacy fail to acknowledge their always already situatedness, 
while contextual literacies foreground situation. The qualifiers these 
scholars add to “literacy” do more, however, than clarify the meaning: 
they also enact the models they describe. Without the qualifiers, “literacy” 
could be taken as an overarching concept. Instead, the qualifications 
outline the limitations their authors envision. In all three cases—and 
throughout contemporary literacy scholarship—these limitations explic-
itly reflect a concern for the social context in which literate activity par-
ticipates, regardless of whether the qualifying term embraces or disavows 
context as a necessary piece of the literacy puzzle.
In addition to proposing contextual principles for theorizing literacy, 
contemporary literacy scholars tend to treat literacy pedagogy as a contex-
tual endeavor. For example, Shirley Brice Heath’s Ways with Words (1983) 
argues that a child’s literate ability is directly tied to the oral and literate 
practices in her immediate context—most particularly in the language 
practices of her family, which are, in turn, tied to the historical and eco-
nomic context of that family. J. Elspeth Stuckey, in her Marxist analysis, 
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argues that literacy instruction in schools participates in “social practices 
that prevent freedom and limit opportunity” by enforcing conformity to 
hegemonic values, which perpetrates violence on those without power to 
define those values (1991, vii). Perhaps most familiar of all—and a good 
example of the type of hegemonic inculcation Stuckey argues against—E. D.
Hirsch’s Cultural Literacy (1987) argues that in order for students to be lit-
erate in a meaningful way, they must learn the dominant cultural context 
in which they live. And while a number of scholars have pointed out the 
problems with Hirsch’s position—not the least of which is the ethnocen-
tric and masculinist emphasis of the culture he delineates—he explicitly 
argues that literacy is contextual, and he defines his understanding of 
that context not only through his arguments about what students do 
and do not know, but also through his list of “What Literate Americans 
Know.”
This type of concern for context typifies contemporary literacy schol-
arship, and stands in stark contrast with the emphasis on objectivity and 
universality in psychometrics. Even Hirsch argues explicitly that context is 
crucial to literacy; in his case, national boundaries are crucial to delimiting 
the subjects that schools should address in order to help students become 
literate. Contemporary composition pedagogy also reflects this emphasis 
on context. For example, instruction on composing processes—a staple 
in writing courses—includes a concern for the individual writer’s particu-
lar methods and the situation in which she is writing. The Standards for 
the English Language Arts developed by the National Council of Teachers 
of English and the International Reading Association (1996), which I will 
return to in chapter five, enacts the ideals of context in myriad ways, not 
the least of which is the authors’ refusal to provide grade level objectives, 
which they claim should be designed at the local level. While various 
scholars and educators take up literacy in different ways, their work shares 
a common premise: the idea that literacy—whether theoretical, practical 
or pedagogical—is virtually meaningless without a context for its use.
L I T E R AC Y  I N  T H E  C L A S S I CA L  PA R A D I G M
Of course, literacy education in the United States has not always looked 
like this. Prior to the twentieth century, literacy educators focused primar-
ily on developing appropriate moral and aesthetic responses in students, 
and considered the same responses appropriate for all students in all 
situations. Then, from the turn of the century through approximately the 
mid-1970s, literacy education focused on reading and writing as universal 
skills to be taught to every person, without particular concern for the 
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ways that reading ability, for example, was influenced by cultural attitudes 
toward print.
De Castell and Luke describe these changes in terms of a series of para-
digms: “classical,” “progressive,” and “technocratic” (1986, 87), and their 
discussion is helpful as an introduction to the primary methods of literacy 
instruction until approximately the last quarter of the twentieth century.15
The classical paradigm dominated until roughly the late nineteenth cen-
tury, and literacy instruction during this period focused on the inculca-
tion of proper morality and behavior. The progressive paradigm replaced 
the focus on morality with an interest in the incremental development 
of skills and lasted from the late nineteenth into the early twentieth 
centuries. Finally, the technocratic paradigm, which the authors argue 
persists at the writing of their text, treated education in general—and 
reading and writing in particular—as composed of discrete skills which 
should reach a “functional” level through sequential drills. These terms 
are not intended to designate clear lines of demarcation by de Castell and 
Luke—or by myself. Instead, the authors posit these models to get at the 
“normative context” in which literacy instruction has taken place at par-
ticular times, arguing that “[e]ach educational epoch has framed literacy 
instruction in terms of principles, norms, values, and beliefs considered 
to be worth reading and writing about” (1986, 87). Thus, the differences 
among these models tend to reflect cultural and historical differences in 
prevailing values as much as they reflect differences in literacy theories 
and practices.
De Castell and Luke delineate three paradigms; however, I want to use 
only two of theirs: the classical and the technocratic. While the progressive 
paradigm can be considered a separate model, the distinctions between 
it and the technocratic paradigm—which I do explicitly examine—seem 
more a matter of degree than kind, and the details on the former are not 
particularly relevant here. According to de Castell and Luke’s argument, 
the emphases on practicality and reason introduced in the progressive 
paradigm easily became central tenets as positivist thinking took hold 
in the technocratic paradigm. For my purposes, these distinctions are 
more appropriately seen as a continuum that broke radically from the 
classical paradigm, and from which, I argue, contextual literacy has since 
broken.
The tension between contemporary literacy scholarship and assess-
ment reflects traces of these earlier paradigms, a situation reinforced 
by historical changes in the definition of “literacy.” In the classical para-
digm, a “literate” person was an educated person, educated specifically in
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matters of literature or religion. The conventional meaning of “literacy” 
today—the ability to read and write—did not become common until near 
the turn of the century, with the rise of the progressive and then techno-
cratic paradigms. In fact, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the 
word “literacy” did not come into regular usage until the 1880s, when 
it was formed in specific opposition to “illiteracy.”16 Prior to the rise of 
progressive and technocratic literacy, possessing the ability to read and 
write could not make a person “literate”; while these skills were con-
sidered necessary to being “educated,” they were not sufficient for that 
appellation. “Educated,” “learned,” and even “literary” are much older 
definitions for “literate,” dating from the mid-fifteenth century. Within 
these denotations for “literacy” and “literate,” there are two primary 
definitional categories: the first focuses on the quality of being educated 
and knowledgeable, particularly in moral and aesthetic terms; the second 
emphasizes proficiency in the skills of reading and writing.
Prior to the turn of the century, to be literate meant to be educated, 
and to be educated meant to be familiar with hegemonic values and to be 
disciplined by those values. Literacy instruction in the classical paradigm 
aimed at cultivating “educated” persons by instilling moral and aesthetic 
values considered appropriate by the dominant culture of the time. Thus, 
the literate/educated person in the nineteenth century United States 
would have been well-versed in Christian doctrine and morality, par-
ticularly of a Protestant variety, and would have held aesthetic values not 
unlike those we would now associate with “high culture.” The teaching of 
these values was an explicit part of the literacy curriculum.
Elementary and secondary students of this period read the Bible and 
literary classics of the time, and they studied Latin and Greek. Originally 
organized by religious leaders, formal literacy instruction during the first 
few decades of the nineteenth century relied on the Bible as a primary 
text. Educators of The First Day Society of Philadelphia, for example, 
used the Bible for all reading material, and even primers and spellers 
consisted of short sentences and words taken directly from scripture 
(Soltow and Stevens 1981, 18). Even as literacy instruction moved to the 
secular forums of the common schools in the 1830s and 1840s, the Bible 
remained a primary text. Students progressed through a series of “grades” 
studying the same material “in greater and greater detail and depth; 
underlying ‘truths’ were explicated in terms of grammatical rules, rhetori-
cal strategies, moral content, and aesthetic worth” (de Castell and Luke 
1986, 93). Educators of the time accepted the premises that students 
should be exposed only to ideas and texts considered exemplary, and that 
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through repeated exposure to the values espoused in those texts, students 
could develop similar moral and aesthetic values.
Not surprisingly, the primary method of instruction was imitation. 
Writing instruction consisted of “stylistic imitation and repetition, guided 
by explicit rules,” and reading instruction consisted of oral recitation with 
an emphasis in both cases on correctness and orthodox presentation (de 
Castell and Luke 1986, 93–4). In this model, writing consisted of practice 
in handwriting, grammatical correctness, and authorial emulation; read-
ing was an exercise in mnemonics, pronunciation, and posture. Neither 
encouraged interpretation or creativity, and consequently both encour-
aged the acceptance of established values. In this way, classical education 
disciplined students to accept and reinforce cultural norms.
Assessment practices were congruous. Evaluation was done orally by 
outside examiners who “embodied, however tacitly, standards of cul-
tural and disciplinary excellence and applied these unstated criteria to 
laud or correct the performance” (de Castell and Luke 1986, 95). This 
is the model—discussed in the first chapter—that Horace Mann found 
unwieldy as enrollments increased. However, it complemented the clas-
sical paradigm in that the assessment employed exemplars from the 
student’s society to measure his ability to follow pre-established norms of 
thought and behavior.
The pedagogical repetition and imitation of material and the reliance 
on morally sound texts make sense given the purposes of education in 
the classical paradigm. Education during this period was not concerned 
with adding to the knowledge base, nor were students expected to arrive 
at their teachers’ conclusions on their own. Because the overall purpose 
of education in this model was acculturation, instruction was designed 
to acquaint students with accepted beliefs and practices and to reinforce 
them. Essentially conservative—antiquarian in the Nietzschean sense—
this education focused on preserving the best of existing thought rather 
than re-examining that thought or adding to it.
This educational model preserved not only exemplary thought of the 
past, but also the social order of the present. By training individuals so 
that their ideas and goals would match those of the society at-large, clas-
sical literacy instruction maintained social order specifically through the 
salvation of the individual. According to Lee Soltow and Edward Stevens, 
the concerns of educational leaders “were both social and individual; 
both the salutary effects of Bible reading on individual souls and the 
preservation of social order were their objectives” (1981, 11). The social 
order of this paradigm, however, derived from the moral and aesthetic 
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training of the individual, who would integrate the appropriate responses 
and tastes through imitation of models, and thus would enact those 
responses and tastes. The educated individual, then, would contribute to 
the social order both by setting an appropriate example and by behaving 
in an orderly fashion.
In this paradigm, it is not at all clear that the ability to read and write 
would have held any meaning outside the state of being “educated.” That 
is, reading and writing were a condition of being educated, but only a 
part of the process and with limited value as independent skills. In fact, 
“skill” seems an inappropriate term; it is more likely that reading and 
writing would have been thought of as innate “faculties” or “talents” pos-
sessed by the educated rather than “skills” to be learned. Morality, specifi-
cally Protestant Christian morality, was the trainable quality, and literacy 
education during the classical paradigm sought to instill in students the 
appropriate moral responses; if some were better educated than others, 
it was only because of the increased access to schooling and high culture 
that their social station provided. Born of the conviction that there is only 
one correct way, the same moral code was applicable to all, regardless of 
their beliefs—witness, for example, the Christian education of colonial-
era Native Americans. The intended result of literacy instruction, then, 
was a society with a clear and coherent set of moral and cultural values. 
While there were certainly differences in moral responses and aesthetic 
appreciation among the educated in the classical paradigm, only one set 
of dominant values constituted a legitimate literate education.
L I T E R AC Y  I N  T H E  T E C H N O C R AT I C  PA R A D I G M
Around the turn of the century, as scientific ideals and progressive theo-
ries gained popularity, the theories and practices of literacy education 
changed. The progressive movement of the early twentieth century began 
to atomize education—to see instruction in any given area as a series of 
progressive skills in the social development of the individual. The techno-
cratic movement took the progressive movement to its logical conclusion, 
atomizing and sequencing information to the point that the transmission 
of information surpassed the development of the person as the primary 
motivation for education. The growth of the individual as a member of 
society—a classical goal and a goal at the beginning of the progressive 
paradigm—was replaced by a concern for the transference of knowl-
edge, and metaphors of training and conditioning became prevalent. In 
progressive and technocratic movements, which I am joining under the 
heading of the technocratic paradigm, the purpose of education was to 
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train the individual so that the individual would fit a social niche. The 
language of progressivism suggests a set of social goals, goals obscured in 
my combination of these models. But the paradigm I am calling “techno-
cratic” foregrounds the importance of the individual in ways that a clas-
sical literacy education had not. It also had a much greater influence on 
the shape of assessment.
The addition of the ability to read and write to the definition of literacy 
coincides with the rise of positivism around the turn of the century, and it 
seems likely that positivism was a primary reason why the later definition 
was taken up so readily in education. In the positivist world view, every ele-
ment that science “discovers” fits with those already uncovered like a jigsaw 
puzzle; once all the pieces have been found, the whole can be under-
stood. Under this logic, it makes perfect sense to dissect any whole into its 
component parts in order to understand it. When this logic turns toward 
education, it makes perfect sense to teach students the parts so that they 
will eventually understand the whole. Thus, technocratic educators and 
theorists “scientifically dissected literacy into individually teachable units” 
such as “decoding” and “reading comprehension” (de Castell and Luke 
1986, 101). In comparison to the complexity of what it means to be “edu-
cated”—the dominant definition in the classical model—the intricacies of 
reading and writing are more readily separable, teachable, and testable. To 
be educated is a subjective quality at best, while to be able to read and write 
has an element of measurability that would appeal to a positivist mindset.
Not surprisingly, the purpose of education changed as the paradigm 
changed. In the classical paradigm, educational goals included the 
development of the individual’s sense of morality, the cultivation of 
appropriate aesthetic refinement, and the training of social responses so 
that the individual would conform to society’s standards of behavior and 
knowledge. The progressive movement, associated primarily with John 
Dewey, “originated as a self-conscious attempt to make schooling socially 
responsive—oriented toward a social future rather than a cultural past” 
(de Castell and Luke 1986, 97). The technocratic paradigm translated the 
social emphasis of progressivism into an interest in the staged improve-
ment of every individual. Consistent with positivist atomization, each indi-
vidual would be trained to reach at least a certain level of proficiency that 
would allow him to contribute productively to society. A sound classical 
education provided for the moral well being of the individual and only 
by consequence, for that of the society. A sound technocratic education 
provided for the economic and social productivity of both the individual 
and society, but emphasized society’s well being.
54 C O M I N G  TO  T E R M S
During the period in which the classical paradigm dominated educa-
tion, morality had been an explicit part of the curriculum. Students were 
expected to develop appropriate moral responses through the examples 
set by the classroom reading material. During the progressive era, literacy 
instruction aimed at developing skills for life in a social democracy, and 
the examples provided by the texts shifted from an emphasis on the ide-
als of high culture to exemplars of life in an industrial nation. Thus, Dick
and Jane replaced the New Testament.17 As the technocratic model took 
over, the white, middle class, secular morality of the progressive paradigm 
gave way to an industrial morality in which students were trained to see 
themselves as workers in a thriving capitalist society.
Although morality did not actually disappear from the curriculum, 
developers of readers like Dick and Jane were less overtly concerned 
with imparting traditional moral values than with providing graduated 
material so that students could progress toward the goal of literacy. The 
technocratic era augmented the progressive emphasis by developing 
grade-level standards, including adopting the notion of “functional lit-
eracy”—a concept taken from the United States Army which defined it as 
“the capability to understand instructions necessary for conducting basic 
military functions and tasks,” or more simply, a “fifth grade reading level” 
(de Castell and Luke 1986, 100–101). Technocratic education fostered an 
emphasis on vocational skills, and thus literacy instruction shifted from 
a reliance on exemplary texts to those deemed socially useful in a world 
where scientific reasoning was quickly becoming the final arbiter in mat-
ters of value. Readers gave way to “systems,” such as SRA, whose cards 
directed students through a series of sequential language skills. Each 
student could progress individually on the way to the goal of (functional) 
literacy (de Castell and Luke 1986, 102).
The terminology of technocratic education was intended to be value-
neutral, a seemingly naive position from a contemporary vantage point 
which finds even the advocacy of “value-neutral” terminology clearly 
indicative of a particular set of values. Further, the emphasis on the “skills” 
of reading and writing tends to avoid the complexities of the term “edu-
cated,” including the various investments particular institutions and even 
individuals might have in what constitutes an appropriate “education.” The 
move toward defining “literacy” as reading and writing ostensibly strips the 
term “literacy” of these investments in a manner consistent with the drive 
for objectivity that characterizes the positivist thinking of the time.
The equation of literacy with education, however, never entirely disap-
peared. “Educated” is a loaded term, invested with the principles and aims 
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of those doing the defining. In the technocratic paradigm, the values of 
those defining literacy reflected the objective ideals of positivism. A pri-
mary principle of objectivity is that anything that is truly objective must be 
consistently recognized regardless of context. Thus, literacy in the tech-
nocratic paradigm, as in the case of the classical paradigm—although for 
different reasons—was treated as a universal ideal. That is, literacy func-
tioned as a stable concept against which to measure the abilities of diverse 
populations. And, as in the classical paradigm, while there were varying 
degrees of literate ability among people, only one set of values constituted 
a legitimate education in literacy, in this case objectivist values.
T H E  C O N T E X T UA L  PA R A D I G M
De Castell and Luke argued in 1986 that contemporary literacy instruc-
tion operates primarily within a technocratic paradigm. The values at 
work in the technocratic paradigm, however, cannot account for the 
contextual emphasis in contemporary literacy instruction. Contextual 
literacy exhibits an acute awareness of the influence wielded by the cir-
cumstances in which literacy instruction takes place. This emphasis on 
variation attached to location, time, and purpose defies the universal 
notions of what it means to be literate that are central to the classical 
and technocratic paradigms. In the classical paradigm, the moral educa-
tion literacy provided was considered the best morality for all persons. In 
the technocratic paradigm, the progressive and sequential steps toward 
improved reading and writing ability were applicable to all students. 
Contemporary literacy scholars, such as Graff, Brandt, and Heath, reject 
such universal understandings, arguing instead that the term “literacy” 
is only meaningful in specific locations, a claim that is entirely illogical 
according to either of the other two paradigms. Reflective of the social 
constructionist turn in contemporary composition scholarship in general, 
contextual literacy represents a clear challenge to the universal ideals of 
the technocratic and classical models. The thorough integration of con-
text into literacy scholarship signals a shift from these earlier paradigms 
toward what I am calling the contextual paradigm.
In the contextual paradigm, at the level of theory, definitions, models, 
and practices of literacy cannot be readily imported from one location to 
another, as in the classical model, nor does literacy consist of a series of 
discrete skills that can be transmitted in the process of schooling, as in 
the technocratic model. Instead, literacy is profoundly situated: literate 
acts occur only in specific circumstances, and without an understanding 
of the historical, theoretical and political context, literacy has limited 
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value. In post-secondary composition instruction, for example, the con-
temporary focus on context has resulted in a heightened awareness of the 
ways in which learning Standard American English impinges on students’ 
abilities to maintain their own dialects, too often insidiously alienating 
them from the community in which they live. This literacy—what we now 
call “academic literacy”—has currency not only in schooling, but also in 
realms such as business and politics. Historically, however, academic lit-
eracy has been denied to certain groups of people—African-Americans, 
women, Hispanics, immigrants—in ways that have kept them from power. 
Contextually aware literacy research helps scholars see that however wide 
these boundaries seem, they are nonetheless constructed boundaries and 
certainly not inevitable.
Furthermore, literacy in the contextual paradigm is no longer singu-
lar. As the use of academic literacy above suggests, there are, instead, mul-
tiple literacies: cultural, computer, formal, ideological. These multiple 
literacies not only better acknowledge the diversity of the reading and 
writing abilities necessary in various circumstances, but also support the 
notion that different situations exhibit different values. Computer lit-
eracy, for example, carries with it a technical vocabulary and conceptual 
understanding of how electronic media work that have no substantive 
relationship to academic literacy, and in fact, may have no connection 
to formal education whatsoever. Both types of literacy, however, have 
limited use outside of their own context: computer literacy provides 
little assistance in reading a novel or analyzing a political speech, and 
academic literacy does little to solve programming problems or evaluate 
software.
While contextual literacies such as these signal a paradigmatic break, 
they do not signal a complete divorce from the earlier notions of what it 
means to be literate. The work of classical literacy was moral education, 
education for living well and appropriately according to the standards of 
the time. Technocratic literacy sought to narrow this idea of education to 
the more readily transmittable skills of reading and writing. In modern 
dictionaries, “literacy” carries both the classical meaning—to be educat-
ed—and the technocratic meaning—to be able to read and write. More 
than combining the two definitions, however, contextual literacy ques-
tions the meanings of “educated,” “read,” and “write” so that the result is 
an expanded sense of these terms. Literacy in the contextual paradigm 
still focuses on reading and writing ability, but understands these terms to 
have broader meanings, while incorporating some sense of the moral and 
aesthetic education of the classical paradigm.
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At the same time, however, contextual literacy, influenced by social 
constructionist theory, recognizes the limitations of the location of the 
literate act and the ways that literacy is necessarily tied to the situation in 
which it arises. Classical and technocratic literacy acknowledged no such 
boundaries. Their influence, however, helps make clear the social and 
moral values implicit in contextual literacy and the ways these values con-
trast with those of contemporary assessment. To be “educated,” to able to 
read and write—that is, to be “literate” in the contextual paradigm—is to 
know that reading and writing serve purposes that are tied to particular 
situations, and that those situations are value-laden. To be literate in the 
contextual paradigm, then, is to be able to read and write in and to those 
contexts with a heightened awareness of the purposes, powers, and limita-
tions of those contexts.
T H E  D I S J U N C T I O N  B E T W E E N  L I T E R AC Y  A N D  A S S E S S M E N T
While contemporary literacy scholarship and prevailing assessment 
scholarship currently operate within paradigms that are more or less 
at odds with each other, the review of literacy education in this chapter 
demonstrates that this has not always been the case. Throughout most 
of the twentieth century, literacy evinced a technocratic paradigm that 
was reasonably compatible with the objectivist paradigm of assessment. It 
has only been during the last quarter century that literacy scholarship’s 
primary value system—drawing on social constructionist notions of con-
textuality and location—has moved away from the technocratic model, 
while the primary paradigm of assessment has remained objectivist. This 
separation has intensified tensions in projects that require participants 
and organizations to address the concerns of these divergent value sys-
tems. The competing paradigms of literacy and assessment scholarship 
generate tensions not only at the theoretical level, but also at the practi-
cal level. Such situations are not infrequent; they occur, for example, 
whenever teachers are asked to evaluate the literate abilities of students 
in terms of program-level objectives.
A contemporary understanding of what it means to be literate incor-
porates both the idea of being educated and the ability to read and write. 
In general, literacy rates in the United States—when literacy is defined as 
the ability to encode and decode text—are sufficiently high that beyond 
the level of elementary education, the two meanings of “literacy” are 
nearly inseparable: the ability to read and write is what it means to be an 
educated individual. The public outcry surrounding the various literacy 
crises, for example, has far less to do with students’ abilities to write lucid 
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prose than it does with concerns about the information and attitudes they 
are learning—not to mention the political, social and economic climate 
of the moment (Trimbur 1991; Graff 1987, 390–93).
Literacy’s tangled definition creates a particular problem when it 
comes to assessment. When literacy is defined narrowly as the ability to 
read and write, testing is relatively simple. Educators evaluate abilities 
to encode and decode language in written form, to follow the rules of 
grammatical prose, to determine the meaning of a text, etc. These are 
the discrete skills tested in the height of the technocratic paradigm. They 
can be treated as universals, and as such, they can be evaluated consis-
tently—that is, reliably.
The results of these tests also appear simple. Tests of discrete skills 
result in numerical values that can be compared at a variety of levels from 
the individual to the national. The problem with these tests—and the 
reason for so much of the current dissatisfaction with them—is that the 
numerical output of these tests is relatively meaningless in the context 
of contemporary literacy education. Tests that divide those who can suf-
ficiently decode written text from those who cannot—where “sufficient” 
has been defined by whatever agency has designed the test—focus on a 
demarcation between the literate and the illiterate and de-emphasize the 
differences between high school dropouts and published authors, both of 
whom could be considered literate in any number of contexts.
This focus on gross distinctions between literate and illiterate is a con-
cern of the technocratic model of literacy and shares positivist values with 
objective testing. With the rise of contextual literacies particularly in the 
last decade, however, much literacy scholarship has engaged with more 
socially oriented values reminiscent of the classical paradigm, but with the 
explicit awareness that literacy is contextually motivated. Consequently, 
contemporary literacy scholarship is less interested in this dividing line 
between the literate and the illiterate—the primary concern of the tech-
nocratic paradigm—than in the variations among those who can read and 
write and the material conditions that influence and result from these 
differences.
These distinctions, however, are harder to delineate than the differ-
ences between those who can read a newspaper and those who cannot. 
When “literate” means “educated” and when ideals of education vary—as 
they currently do—valid testing is, at best, extraordinarily difficult. In the 
classical paradigm, testing was not a significant issue. There were fewer 
students to test, and evaluators were primarily interested in each student’s 
ability to fit into the community. The technocratic paradigm recast 
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this fit in terms of skills and abilities, and testing shifted accordingly. 
Contemporary literacy scholars face the legacies of both paradigms: lit-
eracy theory and practice focused on what it means to be educated in this 
society combined with continuing pressures to test according to objectiv-
ist principles. The result is often that literacy scholarship—both theory 
and practice—is dissociated from assessment scholarship—both theory 
and practice—and from either side of the fence, there are few attempts 
to reshape assessment to address an altered literacy paradigm.
These two paradigms—the objectivist paradigm of assessment and the 
contextual paradigm of literacy—generate a tension in English studies 
that has been too easily cast as an us/them scenario which has historically 
supported each side’s ignorance of the other. The regard in which each 
paradigm holds the other does not help matters. From a contextual—or, 
more broadly, social constructionist—standpoint, objectivism is one set 
of lenses among many, and a particularly limited one at that. From an 
objectivist standpoint, context is another name for subjectivity, perhaps 
interesting but too limited to be of much use in explaining how the 
world works. Given the continued dominance of social constructionist 
theory—at least in composition studies—the contextual paradigm would 
seem to hold a strong position, but positivism’s scientific legacy and its 
run through most of the twentieth century as the dominant paradigm 
give it the edge, particularly in formal schooling situations where testing 
carries inordinate weight. Moreover, contemporary literacy theory has 
little influence in public policy, while objectivism has considerable influ-
ence with those making bureaucratic and governmental decisions. Valid 
and reliable tests produce quantifiable results that fit with the expecta-
tions of those in power.
This is not to say that assessment has not felt the strain of the tension. 
As I noted in the first chapter, assessment scholars, such as Pamela Moss, 
are looking for alternatives—socially and contextually aware assessment 
methods responsive to contemporary theories of writing instruction. 
Some scholars on both sides of the fence recognize the tension generated 
when the values of contextual literacy scholarship compete with those of 
assessment. But assessment, nonetheless, operates from the superior posi-
tion in this tension.
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 3
W R E S T L I N G  W I T H  P O S I T I V I S M
Despite the tension between the two, the clash between the objectivist 
paradigm of assessment and the contextual paradigm of literacy has not 
simply resulted in an impasse. Large-scale writing assessment exhibits 
historical and ideological tendencies toward an objectivist epistemology, 
and while those tendencies are politically weighted, they are neither 
inescapable nor inevitable. At the post-secondary level researchers, 
scholars, and administrators have been implementing some alternative 
approaches to large-scale writing assessment more closely aligned with 
contemporary theories of literacy. Although these alternative meth-
ods are still subject to the influences of objectivism, they are genuine 
attempts, if not to move outside of this paradigm, then at least to maneu-
ver within it.
Although they appear relatively infrequently as actual writing assess-
ment practices at any level of schooling, two models in particular—the 
expert reader model and constructivist evaluation—suggest ways of 
using notions about situated reading and social constructionist prin-
ciples to inform writing assessment. These models, however, are both 
promising and limited. While they suggest methods for assessing writ-
ing compatible with at least some of the principles of contemporary 
literacy scholarship, both remained grounded in, or at least beholden 
to, theoretical principles developed outside of composition studies—at 
least as they are currently justified in the scholarship. Of the two, the 
expert reader model has closer ties to composition studies in that this 
assessment procedure has been developed within the field, but in the 
literature, it often remains circumscribed by principles of educational 
measurement. Constructivist evaluation was developed as a social sci-
ence research methodology to counter objectivist shortcomings and 
conceits regarding research subjects and results. While this model offers 
a promising move away from objectivist epistemologies, its research 
orientation limits its practical and theoretical applications to writing 
assessment. Both, however, are worth exploring for the ways in which 
they work counter to the objectivist principles that tend to strangle 
large-scale assessments.
T H E  E X P E RT  R E A D E R  M O D E L
The first contemporary model for large-scale post-secondary writing 
assessment relies on expert readers—readers with significant prior experi-
ence with the assessment decision to be made. This model has grown out 
of dissatisfaction with the process and effects of “norming” or “calibrat-
ing” readers for holistic scoring. Instead of training readers to read “cor-
rectly,” the expert reader model relies on the experience and expertise 
of the evaluators to render sufficiently accurate judgments that correlate 
well with each other. This model breaks with the procedural mainstay 
of holistic scoring—norming—and this would suggest at the very least a 
corresponding break with the principle of reliability. However, the dis-
course surrounding this model indicates ongoing ties with educational 
measurement theory, particularly in the way that discussion of the use of 
“experts” implies a kind of pre-assessment norming through experience 
and knowledge to ensure that their readers will arrive at reliable and 
valid judgments. That is, rather than engendering alternative principles 
for assessment, they appear, for the most part, to accept the principles of 
validity and reliability, particularly the latter, as a sort of ground zero, and 
to work on alternative practice, rather than alternative theory. The focus, 
for example, in the two best known expert reader models—the first at the 
University of Pittsburgh and the second at Washington State—has been 
not on disputing these principles, but rather on drawing attention to the 
assessment decision and decision-makers.
In 1993, William L. Smith presented research examining eight years 
of placement assessments at the University of Pittsburgh. This well-docu-
mented and detailed study specifically analyzes the reliability of raters’ 
judgments. Smith compares the inter-rater reliability of raters from 
within Pitt’s composition program and from other university composition 
programs. He demonstrates that while statistically acceptable reliability 
can be achieved through training readers—what Smith calls “calibration 
training”—even better reliability can be achieved by raters who have 
recently taught the courses in which they are placing students—what he 
calls “‘having taught’ training” (1993, 204). That is, those with recent 
immediate experience with the consequence of the assessment decision 
are better able to reach agreement about the results of the assessment 
than those without such direct experience, and thus expert readers are 
more reliable. Based on the results from his work with expert readers, 
Smith revised the rating procedure at Pitt so that only teachers who had 
taught a course most recently could make placement decisions about that
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course (e.g., a teacher who had taught English A the previous semester, 
but not English B or C, could make decisions about A, but not about B 
or C).
Smith focuses on “reliability” as a key concept throughout his study, 
but he replaces its companion term “validity” with “adequacy” (1993, 
144). He explains that the issue of validity in the holistic scoring of 
placement essays “has not been sufficiently addressed” and that “validity 
carries a considerable amount of baggage” (1993, 144). By substituting 
“adequacy,” Smith brackets questions about the best or most important 
kind of validity being debated at the time, and he focuses, instead, on the 
question of how “adequate” or appropriate the placement decisions are. 
To judge the adequacy of the placement decision, Smith uses a number 
of indicators, primarily classroom teacher perception of the decision and 
final course grades. These indicators, he argues, supply the necessary 
information about whether or not the placement decision is “correct,” 
and he points out that for placement purposes, “adequate” is a sufficient 
condition for success.18
Like the Pittsburgh study, Washington State’s program relies on expert 
readers. WSU’s assessment and writing program is perhaps the best 
documented, at least in terms of published materials. In the most recent 
piece, Beyond Outcomes: Assessment and Instruction Within a University Writing 
Program (Haswell 2001c), the contributors, all participants in the writing 
program at WSU, describe the development of their nationally recognized 
writing assessment program, which includes coursework, assessment, and 
writing practice throughout students’ college careers. Although used in a 
couple of places in the assessment program, WSU’s use of expert readers 
is most clearly explained in the discussion of the placement assessment 
for first-year composition. Because of local constraints, including budget-
ary limitations and reader turnover, program directors developed a two-
tiered placement system in which members of the faculty read the essays 
first to answer a single question: “did the student obviously belong in reg-
ular freshman composition or not?” (Haswell 2001b, 42). The remainder 
are passed on to more experienced instructors and program administra-
tors who make decisions about all other courses, including basic writing, 
one-hour labs, ESL courses, and exemptions.
This process is also described in an earlier essay by Richard H. Haswell 
and Susan Wyche-Smith,19 “Adventuring into Writing Assessment” (1994), 
revised and included as chapter two of this collection, which is worth 
discussing for the language choices the authors make. In this earlier ver-
sion, Haswell and Wyche-Smith characterize their assessment program as 
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focused on validity: “In that conflict between reliability and validity which 
lurks under the surface of all assessment accounts, we would put our 
money on validity” (1994, 229). They arrive at this point through their 
dissatisfaction with and dislike of holistic scoring, arguing that holistic 
scoring, which promotes reliable scores, also mitigates against the careful 
reading necessary for placement and diagnostic decisions. While their 
argument tends to conflate holistic scoring and reliability, their point is 
a good one: it is more important that a test predict students’ needs than 
that scores return a statistically satisfactory reliability coefficient.
When Haswell and Wyche-Smith describe their own follow-up work 
on the procedure in the 1994 piece, they use psychometric terms: “we 
spent much of our time investigating the validity of our rating system, the 
effects of actual placements as seen through the eyes of students and their 
teachers, and the reliability of the prompts” (1994, 234, my emphasis). The 
use of this vocabulary is predictable: “validity” and “reliability” are the 
key terms of the dominant assessment lexicon. What is more interesting, 
however, is the subtle shift in the deployment of these terms. “Reliability” 
is usually applied to rating systems and test results, not specifically or 
primarily to the prompts for assessments. “Validity,” the term of the set 
more often connected to writing prompts at the time, is here applied to 
the rating system.
The authors suggest an explanation for this shift earlier in the essay 
when they claim that instead of focusing on scoring reliability, their assess-
ment emphasizes “‘instructional validity,’ where a test elicits a response 
that can be matched with the writer’s past and future coursework” 
(Haswell and Wyche-Smith 1994, 229). This contention—in which one 
type of validity is used to dismiss reliability—is neither developed nor 
satisfying as an explanation for using these terms in this manner. It seems 
likely that in the absence of a more acceptable assessment vocabulary, 
the authors are trying to stretch the connotations of the existing terms. 
These two passages, however, are not equal to the task of revising a nearly 
century-old lexicon, nor do they seem intended to do so. “Adventuring 
into Writing Assessment,” as the title suggests, is primarily a description of 
practice, not a revision of theory. The result is a model that draws atten-
tion to the decision to be made and who is best able to make that decision 
rather than to the procedural technicalities. The inclusion of “validity” 
and “reliability” in this case seems more an acknowledgement of accepted 
principles than an attempt to redefine them.
Even though Haswell and Wyche eliminate most of the psychometric 
terms from their revision, this language follows the authors in the 2001 
64 C O M I N G  TO  T E R M S
collection. They still talk about “training future raters” (2001, 23), and 
about the need to develop a system that would “maintain reliability and 
validity from session to session” (2001, 18), but there is little specific 
reference to psychometric principles in their revision for this chapter. 
There are, however, references sprinkled throughout the book, the bulk 
of which appear in the essay by Galen Leonhardy and William Condon 
(2001). In this piece, the authors examine the “difficult cases” in the 
junior portfolio piece of the assessment program: transfer students, ESL 
students, differences between the rater’s background and the student’s 
work, etc. Leonhardy and Condon use educational measurement theory 
to bolster their claims that the WSU assessment program is theoreti-
cally sound. They begin with the premise that “[a]ny assessment must 
meet the basic requirements of validity and reliability”, though they also 
claim that success can only be determined if there is “improvement” 
(2001, 67). They argue that the WSU program “allows faculty raters to 
make highly reliable decisions about writing samples that possess a high 
degree of validity,” and they point to the previous two chapters—“The 
Two Tier Rating System” and “The Obvious Placement,” both by Richard 
Haswell—as demonstrations of this point (2001, 68). With the reliability 
and validity of the program established, it seems, the authors are free to 
make their argument for how they have examined and improved upon 
the difficult cases.
One of the two chapters Leonhardy and Condon point to as sup-
porting their validity claim is the theoretical discussion of the two-tier 
placement system by Haswell, “The Obvious Placement: The Addition 
of Theory” (2001a). Here Haswell argues that the theory followed the 
development of the procedure, a practice that he claims “may be its nor-
mal mode” (2001a, 57). In this case, he uses categorization theory—the 
process of “sorting things into conceptual boxes”—to explicate the pro-
cedure (2001a, 57). He distinguishes the kind of categorization in the 
two-tier program from holistic scoring by pointing out that the latter is 
“classical categorization” which depends on clear boundaries between 
categories, while the former is “prototype categorization” which relies on 
a fuzzier sense of what is “typical” in a category (2001a, 57–9). Haswell 
develops categorization theory more fully elsewhere (1998), which I, in 
turn, explore more fully in the next chapter, but his purpose in this sec-
tion of Beyond Outcomes is to explicate a theory supporting WSU’s place-
ment system, and here he sidesteps the issues of reliability and validity. 
He argues that the two-tiered system “finesses the double-pronged threat 
of cost-efficiency and legitimacy” that has undermines other assessment 
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systems (2001a, 55); “legitimacy” here implies validity and reliability, par-
ticularly given Leonhardy and Condon’s comments.
Like Smith’s substitution of “adequate” for “valid,” Haswell’s outline 
of an alternative theory, as well as his use of “legitimacy,” provides a fairly 
clear indication that the dominant vocabulary for assessment is flawed, 
or at the very least insufficient. The thorough development of alternative 
definitions or of an entirely different set of terms, however, is beyond the 
scope of these projects. In both cases, the focus remains on the procedure. 
Smith, for example, spends significantly less space explicating “adequacy” 
than exploring challenges to “reliability” (less than ten pages of sustained 
discussion out of an essay of more than sixty pages), and his study is cited 
primarily for the ways in which it champions teachers’ expertise and chal-
lenges the reliability of holistic scoring. Haswell’s theory chapter makes 
theoretical claims only for the placement decisions made within the two-
tier system. Moreover, it is only one of 15 in a book whose purpose is to 
describe, to provide “an unusually frank and scholarly look at the develop-
ment, the structure, the problems, and the effectiveness of a robust, uni-
versity-wide set of writing programs” (Condon 2001, xvii), and the expert 
reader model is only one element in this set of programs. The primary 
purpose of the expert reader model is not to circumvent or redefine the 
lexicon of writing assessment; however, it may suggest such revisions, and 
in that vein, I will return to WSU’s program in chapter seven.
The expert reader model is based on the notion that those most famil-
iar with the decision to be made are best able to make that decision and 
that they do not need additional “training” to do so; the studies described 
above support this “common sense” conclusion. “Common sense,” how-
ever, also suggests that those most familiar with the decision to be made 
may be the least able to act wisely precisely because of their proximity and 
investment; this was the claim of much of the early criticism of assessment 
that is done by teachers. “Common sense,” that is, does not provide ade-
quate justification for an assessment model. Educational measurement 
theory historically has provided such legitimation, and both the contexts 
described above continue to rely on that theory—even as the practices 
challenge it. Described in terms of that theory, expert reader assessments 
seem to have both increased validity and increased reliability because the 
reliance on knowledge about writing practices promotes informed evalu-
ations that are consistent within the given context.
When viewed within the framework of educational measurement prin-
ciples, the expert reader model can be understood as exchanging the 
artificial calibration necessary for inter-rater reliability in holistic scoring 
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for an implicit alignment between the context for the writing and the 
context for the assessment, which provides sufficient reliability. While the 
model itself offers interesting possibilities for alternatives to educational 
measurement principles, the political weight of the current terminology 
keeps its proponents justifying this model in psychometric terms. The 
model’s potential is unnecessarily bogged down with principles that are 
theoretically incompatible.
Legitimation via the terms of educational measurement is a double-
edged sword. By calling on “reliability” and “validity” to justify the expert 
reader model, scholars turn over judgments about the value of writing 
assessment methods to those outside of composition. Historically, such 
outside legitimation has encouraged the devaluation of compositionists’ 
expertise, a consequence that contradicts the confidence in and depen-
dence on expertise integral to this model. Moreover, as I discussed in 
chapter one, this lexicon frames writing assessment in terms appropriate 
for an objectivist paradigm. Individual programs may be able to function 
outside the established norms, but they do so without strong theoretical 
corroboration. The expert reader model offers a promising alternative to 
the practice of norming, but its continued development would seem to 
require theoretical principles more in keeping with those of research and 
scholarship in the fields of composition and literacy studies.
C O N S T R U C T I V I S T  E VA L UAT I O N
Constructivist evaluation, the other cutting-edge assessment model, relies 
generally on social constructionist principles but derives most specifically 
from the work of Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln in Fourth Generation 
Evaluation (1989). Constructivist evaluation contends that any evaluation 
should be a thoroughly collaborative and contextualized project and that 
all who are affected by an assessment should have a voice in the process. 
The idea that assessment—perhaps the most top-down, authoritarian 
aspect of composition pedagogy—could be socially constructed makes 
this model particularly appealing to composition scholars who tend to 
accept social constructionist principles in both their theoretical work and 
in their day-to-day pedagogical practices. However, the practical and polit-
ical limitations to this model call into question its value for large-scale 
writing assessment The logistical feat alone of gathering input from all 
those with an investment in any given assessment is daunting. But while 
practical problems can be overcome, compositionists should question 
whether or not all those affected by an assessment should decide how that 
assessment should proceed. The inclusion of students’ concerns in the 
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evaluation procedure sounds attractive, but students are hardly the only 
other participants. Constructivist evaluation, that is, raises both practical 
and political issues that call its efficacy into question. Its theoretical simi-
larity to generally accepted principles in composition studies, however, 
makes it worth considering as an alternative to objectivist assessment.
Guba and Lincoln present constructivist evaluation explicitly as a 
countermeasure to objectivist research and testing. They point out that 
evaluation has relied almost entirely on a scientific paradigm, “grounded 
ontologically in the positivist assumption that there exists an objective real-
ity driven by immutable natural laws,” i.e., some fixed reality, “and episte-
mologically in the counterpart assumption of a duality between observer 
and observed that makes it possible for the observer to stand outside the 
arena of the observed, neither influencing it nor being influenced by it” 
(1989, 12).20 By contrast, fourth generation evaluation is grounded in 
“the constructivist paradigm (also called, with different shades of mean-
ing, the interpretive or the hermeneutic paradigm and, sometimes—errone-
ously, we believe—the qualitative paradigm)” which relies on relativist 
ontology and a subjective epistemology (13).21 Guba and Lincoln argue 
that the assumptions of the constructivist paradigm are “virtually polar” 
to those of the scientific paradigm:
For ontologically, it denies the existence of an objective reality, asserting instead 
that realities are social constructions of the mind. . . . Epistemologically, the con-
structivist paradigm denies the possibility of subject-object dualism, suggesting 
instead that the findings of a study exist precisely because there is an interaction
between observer and observed that literally creates what emerges from that 
inquiry. Methodologically . . . the naturalistic paradigm rejects the controlling, 
manipulative (experimental) approach that characterizes science and substi-
tutes for it a hermeneutic/dialectic process. (1989, 43–44)
The social emphasis of this model makes it particularly appealing to 
compositionists who, in general, would tend to accept the idea that knowl-
edge—and by extension, writing—develops in social interaction, and that 
consequently evaluation is—or should be—a social act.
According to Guba and Lincoln, the society involved in any given 
assessment is made up of “stakeholders,” a term which refers to those 
who initiate an evaluation, who participate in it and who are affected by 
it, whether that effect is positive, negative, or in between. Fourth genera-
tion evaluation is predicated on the notion that all stakeholders should 
have a say in constructing any evaluation that concerns them. Guba and 
Lincoln identify three classes of stakeholders in any evaluation: “agents,” 
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“beneficiaries,” and “victims.” Agents are those who produce, administer 
and use the evaluation; beneficiaries are those who profit in some fash-
ion from the evaluation; and victims are those who are harmed in some 
fashion by the evaluation. If constructivist evaluation is to be “responsive,” 
it must attempt to address the concerns, claims, and issues of all of these 
groups (1989, 40–41).
Once a need for evaluation has arisen, fourth generation evaluation 
proceeds through a process of identification and negotiation. The per-
son or group initiating the evaluation first identifies all the stakeholders 
and elicits from them their claims, concerns and issues—that is, their 
construction of the evaluation. The initiator then sets up the negotiation 
by identifying points of consensus, by providing a context, methodology 
and agenda for the negotiation of points in dispute, by facilitating the 
actual negotiation, and finally by generating one or more reports that 
convey points of consensus, dissensus, and resolution. Those points still 
unresolved are then subject to further negotiation. Theoretically, fourth 
generation evaluations never end; they merely “pause until a further need 
and opportunity arise” (1989, 74).
Guba and Lincoln argue that the limitations of conventional evaluation 
are replicated in the criteria—such as “validity” and “reliability”—used to 
determine the worth or “goodness” of the assessment. After describing 
a set of criteria which would parallel the criteria of “rigor” applied to 
conventional assessment,22 they contend that their revised criteria are 
insufficient for determining the quality of a fourth generation evaluation 
precisely because they parallel the criteria of conventional evaluation and 
are thus limited by its positivist assumptions (1989, 74, 245). Moreover, 
they argue, these criteria—whether the conventional or revised set—are 
unacceptable because they are primarily methodological criteria and 
thus serve predominately as an internal check on the process of coming 
to conclusions. Such criteria do not, for example, provide principles for 
determining the value of the purpose(s) for or the outcome(s) of any 
given assessment. Guba and Lincoln point out that “[i]n the positivist 
paradigm, method has primacy,” but that in a constructivist paradigm, 
method is only one issue among many (1989, 74, 245). Thus, any criteria 
modeled explicitly on conventional criteria would be inadequate.
In place of parallel methodological criteria, Guba and Lincoln offer a 
set of criteria they pull together under the heading of “authenticity.” They 
argue that these criteria—“fairness” and ontological, educative, catalytic 
and tactical authenticities—arise from the assumptions of the constructiv-
ist paradigm itself (1989, 245–50). Fairness focuses on the solicitation and 
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honoring of all the stakeholders’ constructions and requires negotiations 
that level power dynamics. Ontological authenticity refers to the extent to 
which the stakeholders’ own constructions become more informed and 
sophisticated as a result of the evaluation process. Educative authenticity 
indicates the extent to which the stakeholders come to better understand 
the constructions of others. Catalytic authenticity signifies “the extent 
to which action is stimulated and facilitated by the evaluation process” 
(1989, 74, 249). Finally, tactical authenticity refers to the extent to which 
stakeholders are empowered to act as a result of the evaluation pro-
cess. Unlike conventional criteria, each of these draws attention to the 
relationships among the stakeholders and changes in the stakeholders’ 
understandings and/or abilities. Moreover, the application of these crite-
ria continues throughout the evaluation as part of the case study record 
that results from a fourth generation evaluation. Thus, evaluation of the 
evaluation is an ongoing part of the assessment process.
Presumably, once a negotiation is complete—or paused—the evalua-
tion would have addressed the concerns of all participants, even if they 
all could not be resolved. A “constructivist evaluation,” supported by the 
concept of “stakeholders,” ostensibly levels the playing field, and all par-
ticipants have an equal say. Guba and Lincoln argue that conventional 
evaluation “effectively reserves power and decision-making authority” to 
the clients who request the evaluations and as such, are “not only morally 
and ethically wrong but also politically naive and conceptually narrow” 
(1989, 15). Their method aims specifically at redressing the wrongs that 
inhere to conventional practices.
Sandra Murphy and Barbara Grant suggest ways to enact this construc-
tivist model in writing assessment situations in “Portfolio Approaches to 
Assessment” (1996). Murphy and Grant describe the conditional nature 
of constructivist assessment and the effort at methodological consistency 
it requires. They point out that there is nothing inherently constructiv-
ist about portfolios, that portfolios may be implemented in positivist 
ways toward positivist ends. For example, they argue that standardizing 
the contents of student portfolios—including requirements for certain 
genres or demonstrations of specific abilities—reinscribes positivist 
ideals about objectivity and reproducibility that require stripping the 
context for writing from assessment practices. According to Murphy and 
Grant, constructivist portfolio assessment, at the very least, would have to 
develop directly from the pedagogical context in which the materials for 
portfolios are generated. Nor does such a contextually aware assessment 
guarantee a constructivist model: only if the pedagogical practices in the
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classroom reflect constructivist values could constructivist assessment 
follow. According to the authors, for example, the pedagogical context 
would have to allow students to develop their own assignments—in con-
junction with their teachers—and then allow them free reign in choosing 
the contents of their own portfolios. Furthermore, a constructivist assess-
ment would need to be collaborative, which for Murphy and Grant means 
that both teachers and students, as stakeholders, participate directly in 
developing the criteria for assessment and in the process of assessing 
itself. Although they are not clear about the connection between top-
down (i.e., non-collaborative) assessments and positivism, they imply that 
assessments developed by administrators and imposed on faculty and 
students reflect an unwarranted positivist faith in the superior, objective 
knowledge of the expert/manager who stands outside the pedagogical 
context.
Murphy and Grant are only able to point out a few portfolio projects 
that embody the principles of constructivist evaluation, including the 
placement portfolios at Miami University of Ohio. Wholesale imports of 
fourth generation evaluation, however, are virtually non-existent in prac-
tice and rarely even appear in the literature on writing assessment to-date. 
The greatest obstacles are practical. The process of continual consulta-
tion and negotiation is too unwieldy, time-consuming, and expensive for 
most post-secondary composition programs to manage, a situation that 
even those advocating Guba and Lincoln’s methodology acknowledge. 
More often, the application of fourth generation principles is partial.
Composition scholars usually limit their use of Guba’s and Lincoln’s 
methodology to clarifying and addressing the concerns of the “stakehold-
ers” involved in any given assessment—though the origins of the term 
often go unacknowledged. For example, in “Power and Agenda Setting 
in Writing Assessment,” Edward M. White presents the primary “assump-
tions, perspectives, and demands” of the four dominant stakeholders 
in large-scale writing assessment: “teachers; researchers and theorists; 
testing firms and governing bodies; and students, especially those from 
minorities and other marginalized groups” (1996a, 11).23 He argues that 
these “stakeholders stand at wholly different positions and are bound to 
see writing assessment from where they stand” (1996a, 23). His point is 
that each group needs to understand the positions of the others and at 
least honestly attempt the negotiation of their differences.24 It would be 
more accurate, however, to say that White believes that compositionists 
need to understand and even concede to the viewpoints of measurement 
and testing specialists. His audience is, and has been, almost exclusively 
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composition studies professionals, so when he argues for negotiation, he 
is telling us—compositionists—to listen to them—measurement special-
ists.
White’s implicit argument that compositionists should pay particular 
attention to measurement specialists stems from his understanding of a 
power differential between those specialists and the community of writing 
teachers. White has argued repeatedly that if compositionists do not take 
the position of measurement experts and agencies seriously, this outside 
group will define writing assessment for us. He clearly understands the 
measurement community to wield greater societal power—enough that 
they could, if they wanted to, take control of writing assessment. This 
seems a logical—if somewhat dramatic—conclusion to draw, considering 
how much influence testing organizations such as ETS have in national 
affairs. Were ETS to come to the negotiation table as an equal among 
stakeholders, as they would have to in the ideal situation that Guba and 
Lincoln describe, they would be relinquishing far more power than any 
other constituent, except perhaps governmental bodies—which, until 
very recently, have seemed to be less interested in specific testing prac-
tices than in ensuring that assessment occurs. Consequently, there would 
have to be a significant incentive for members of testing agencies to even 
sit down. Guba and Lincoln’s configuration presumes that all parties 
participate voluntarily and that they voluntarily check their clout at the 
door.
There is little reason to believe that testing agencies would do so. For 
example, while some members of ETS and other major testing agencies 
do join discussions within the composition community, their numbers are 
few, and the organization as a whole does not seem to feel any pressing 
need to address wholeheartedly the concerns of compositionists. Roberta 
Camp, one of the few, may be the most frequent member of the test-
ing community to join writing community discussions. She and Hunter 
Breland, both of ETS at the time, contributed essays to the collection 
Assessment of Writing (1996), and Camp also has an essay in Validating 
Holistic Scoring (1993). Although sympathetic to the concerns of writing 
teachers, she tends to advocate refining the principles of educational mea-
surement with insights from the writing community rather than seriously 
reconsidering the principles themselves. Moreover, within ETS, at the 
time she was writing these pieces, she was not responsible for test develop-
ment or administration (Hamp-Lyons 1995, 449).25 On the other hand, 
Breland, a senior research scientist, argues that English teachers should 
consider using computers for scoring at least the more standardized
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aspects of composition, a position that ignores one of composition’s most 
basic tenets: that all aspects of writing, including grammar, are complex 
and contextually-dependent.26 Even Assessing Writing, a journal whose 
audience is “educators, administrators, researchers, and . . . all writing 
assessment professionals,” seems to attract little attention from members 
of assessment organizations.27 In the eight volumes published to-date, only 
one essay has been contributed by members of the most influential test-
ing agencies (Wolfe et al. 1996): of the four co-authors, one is from ETS, 
two are from ACT and one is from Iowa State University. Considering that 
the original editors of Assessing Writing actively encouraged submissions 
from “a range of scholars and practitioners in the fields of education, 
composition, literacy, nonacademic workplaces, electronic applications, 
measurement and administration” (Huot 1994b, 7), the absence of voices 
from these agencies does not offer much hope that these professionals 
would negotiate voluntarily from a position of limited power.28
Even in light of this obstacle, compositionists have cause to advocate 
assessment practices that call all stakeholders to the table. A significant 
portion of the composition community, particularly in post-secondary 
educational institutions, actively adopts a social constructionist philoso-
phy in both pedagogy and research, so at least in theory, constructivist 
evaluation would match our beliefs about the ways in which meaning 
is made. Student-centered and collaborative pedagogies advocating the 
central position of students in the classroom would likewise intersect well 
with constructivist assessment, which would necessarily include student 
voices. Moreover, from our standpoint, it would certainly not hurt to 
have a forum in which measurement specialists and governmental agents 
would be required to pay attention to the positions of teachers and com-
position scholars.
Yet even if such leveling could occur—and I would argue that the 
practical problems alone are formidable—I am not at all convinced 
that post-secondary compositionists should want a level playing field. 
Composition has historically occupied the role of remediator not only 
in English Studies, but also throughout higher education.29 The idea 
that composition is remedial contributes to the misapprehension that 
writing instruction—and, by extension, writing assessment—requires no 
special expertise. Compositionists have been asserting their disciplinary 
expertise for some time and have made some headway, if only indicated 
by the rising number of both undergraduate and graduate rhetoric and 
composition programs. Constructivist evaluation—both in its “pure” form 
as described by Guba and Lincoln and in its simplified “stakeholder” 
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form—implicitly limits expertise: all stakeholders have an equally legiti-
mate say in all aspects of the assessment. Moreover, because of the status 
of composition in most post-secondary institutions, the concept of “stake-
holder” is subject to inflation. As it is, composition is probably the most 
frequently mandated core requirement. The mandate generally comes 
not necessarily from composition programs or even English departments, 
but often from programs and departments throughout the university. 
That is, bringing all stakeholders to the table suddenly means that faculty 
and administrators from any and all departments can and should have a 
seat at the table—an evaluator would be remiss if s/he did not make a 
place for all of them—and the weight of compositionists’ expertise is even 
further diminished.
A level playing field carries a price that, I would argue, composition 
should not pay. This is not to say that we should reject the concerns of 
other interested parties, but rather that their positions should inform 
ours, with ours occupying a central position rather than one among many. 
The members of any other discipline—including mathematics, which 
houses the other predominant “core” requirement—are able to define 
their own standards and values, and expertise in any field other than 
composition tends to carry with it the presumption of such evaluative 
knowledge. If educators and disciplinary professionals are doing a good 
job, those standards and values are the product of an ongoing community 
discussion that incorporates the concerns of interested parties. But the 
heart of the community consists of those with expertise. Constructivist 
evaluation potentially negates this expertise, and for composition the 
effect is magnified. This might explain part of why the composition com-
munity has not warmly embraced constructivist evaluation, in spite of its 
attractive counterstatement to positivism.
T H E O R E T I CA L  N E E D
Whatever their shortcomings, both the constructivist model for evaluation 
and the expert reader model—which embraces expertise in a manner 
antithetical to constructivist evaluation—provide examples of assessment 
practices more or less in tune with composition theory and pedagogy. In 
the field of writing assessment, such models are relatively rare, though 
they are becoming increasingly prominent in terms of the research they 
generate, if not prolific in terms of actual practice. Although promising 
as challenges to conventional practice, however, neither of these mod-
els has more than one leg to stand on. Constructivist evaluation, when 
applied to composition studies and writing assessment, ignores very real 
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power dynamics and practical constraints. The expert reader model, as it 
is currently presented, relies on educational measurement principles for 
justification.
Still, these models have generated additional research and attention, 
and the limits of practice notwithstanding, they have a lot to offer. But, 
I would argue, the contributions will be limited without additional theo-
retical work. While constructivist assessment provides a theoretical model, 
it does not adequately meet the purposes of writing assessment: Guba 
and Lincoln are more focused on research, and while assessment can be 
understood as a kind of research, its needs are more particular than the 
application of this model allows. The expert reader model comes across 
first and foremost as a practice; the theoretical justification comes after. 
The use of conventional educational measurement theory to justify this 
model produces unsatisfactory results, and the use of categorization 
theory, which I will say more about in the next chapter, is not clearly 
applicable beyond the specifics of the expert reader model. Moreover, 
categorization theory is unlikely to be applicable to all large-scale assess-
ment situations, and it may not translate into generalizable principles. 
The emphasis on practice over theory—as much as the two can be sepa-
rated—either maintains the status quo where educational measurement 
remains in power, or leads compositionists toward a situation where each 
practice is supported by its own theory. Neither of these is conducive to 
effective and long-standing change.
Arguably, we are looking at a paradigm shift. These alternative prac-
tices, especially the longevity of and ongoing research into the expert 
reader model, suggest that the current dominant paradigm of educa-
tional measurement theory—as we understand and apply it—cannot 
answer the questions we currently have about writing assessment. We 
want, for example, to understand how assessments can affect curriculum 
and pedagogy positively. We want to develop assessment practices that 
allow for actual reading practices. We want to find ways to be fair to stu-
dents from diverse backgrounds that are still sensitive to our course and 
program objectives. For some time now, educational measurement theory 
has been pushed to address these concerns, but I believe that it is not up 
to the task. This tension—between the needs of compositionists in writing 
assessment and the demands of educational assessment theory—shows up 
in the contemporary practices. It is all the more apparent when we look at 
the theoretical work both in this field and in educational measurement, 
which is the work of the next chapter.
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T H E O RY  U N D E R  C O N S T R U C T I O N
The work of developing theoretical principles specifically for writing 
assessment has begun in the last decade, but it remains in nascent form. 
Influential texts in composition studies such as those by scholars in the 
CCCC Committee on Assessment and by Brian Huot suggest principles 
and procedures for contextually- and rhetorically-aware assessment; how-
ever, neither presents a fully-articulated theory of writing assessment—the 
former because of the project’s rhetorical purpose, the latter because the 
author considers such a move premature.30 While both of these texts have 
been influenced by positivist educational measurement thought, both 
also develop positions which correspond more nearly with contemporary 
literacy theory and instruction than do the best assessment methods 
developed from within an educational measurement tradition.
For some scholars, Huot included, the attachment to educational mea-
surement theory goes beyond the historical predisposition and determin-
ism that appears in many texts, and is, rather, indicative of a movement 
within composition studies to co-opt educational measurement theory. 
Unlike White’s position that compositionists should accept educational 
measurement theory and apply it as that field does, these co-opters work 
to appropriate the theory and adjust and apply it within parameters more 
conducive to thinking in composition studies. Huot’s work, in particular, 
lauds contemporary validity theory. Rather than accept reliability, howev-
er, he argues that current thinking and procedures in writing assessment 
make that principle moot.
But I do not think it is that easy. While there is much to celebrate in the 
theoretical changes in validity, reliability remains a key concept in edu-
cational measurement theory and thus remains a problem. This is not to 
say that educational assessment theorists are satisfied with the dominant 
approach, however. The work of Pamela A. Moss and others focusing 
on complex performance assessments challenges reliability as it appears 
in the dominant paradigm, but their alternatives have not reached the 
establishment, and the limitations imposed by traditional educational 
measurement theory on writing assessment remain intact. Reliability still 
serves as a limiting condition on validity, and consequently on large-scale 
assessment as it is practiced.
Co-optation is not our only option. Within composition studies, some 
scholars have posed direct challenges to educational measurement theory, 
particularly to reliability. Richard Haswell’s work on categorization theory, 
discussed briefly in the last chapter and more fully in this one, provides 
theoretical justification for the expert reader model used at Washington 
State University. Limitations of Haswell’s theory, however, make it difficult 
to apply beyond placement assessments. Other approaches, including 
Bob Broad’s use of hermeneutics and inquiry theory, have suggested dif-
ferent changes, though these theoretical efforts tend to remain specula-
tive or of limited application.
Whatever the limitations, taken together, these changes in and chal-
lenges to educational measurement theory indicate dissatisfaction with 
the principles as they exist, and they suggest a paradigm shift in progress. 
However, the traditional principles remain in force, despite these chal-
lenges. The paradigm has not shifted. Yet these theoretical alternatives 
suggest a kind of movement and indicate a willingness—and perhaps 
even a readiness—to try a different framework, certainly within composi-
tion studies and possibly within educational assessment.
T H E  PA RT Y  L I N E
In his response to Elbow and White in Composition in the 21st Century, Brian 
Huot argues that composition lacks “a Theory of Writing Assessment [sic]”
(1996a, 115). Without one, he claims, assessment practices will not reflect 
the theories and practices of writing and its learning either now or in the 
future. In the last decade, we have seen some scholarship within compo-
sition studies that begins the work of developing theoretical principles 
sensitive to a contextual literacy paradigm. The most influential of these 
take educational measurement theory as a foundation or starting point. 
For the most part, this scholarship relies on contemporary validity theory 
à la Samuel Messick, which has been generally accepted in educational 
measurement theory and which I will return to in a moment, and rejects 
or argues around reliability. However, the mainstream of contemporary 
educational measurement theory still treats reliability as a precondition 
for validity, and challenges within educational measurement have not 
been successful to-date. Still, the movement to co-opt educational mea-
surement theory is strong in composition studies.
Published in 1995, “Writing Assessment: A Position Statement” 
developed by the CCCC Committee on Assessment does not specifically 
claim theoretical status for itself, but it does offer a set of principles 
for sound practice, and given that the Statement was developed under 
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the sponsorship of CCCC, it speaks with the voice of authority, at least 
within composition circles. I address this document here because as a 
Position Statement, it articulates best practices and carries the force 
(at least potential) of theory combined with practice. The Committee 
begins with a foundational premise: “the primary purpose of the specific 
assessment should govern its design, its implementation, and the gen-
eration and dissemination of its results” (1995, 431). In order to direct 
assessment procedures, the primary purpose would need to be articu-
lated—presumably by those initiating the assessment procedure—and 
then from that aim, practice could follow. From this basis in purpose-
ful assessment, the committee then offers a set of practical guidelines: 
“Assessments of written literacy should be designed and evaluated by 
well-informed current or future teachers of the students being assessed, 
for purposes clearly understood by all the participants; should elicit 
from student writers a variety of pieces, preferably over a period of time; 
should encourage and reinforce good teaching practices; and should 
be solidly grounded in the latest research on language learning” (1995, 
431). These guidelines argue for the primacy of pedagogy, implicitly 
claiming that assessment of writing serves the instruction of writing first 
and foremost. Taken together with the foundational principle above, 
the Committee asserts that writing pedagogy provides the context for 
writing assessment and should therefore guide all aspects of assessment 
from design to dissemination.
The Committee elaborates on this context through a set of ten assump-
tions that the members claim should provide the basis for all writing 
assessments, and which thus serve as the foundation for their position 
statement. The first four assumptions reflect the values of what I have 
called the contextual paradigm of literacy:
1.  language is always learned and used most effectively in environments 
where it accomplishes something the user wants to accomplish for particu-
lar listeners or readers within that environment;
2.  language is by definition social;
3.  reading—and thus, evaluation, since it is a variety of reading—is as socially 
contextualized as all other forms of language use; and
4.  any individual’s writing “ability” is a sum of a variety of skills employed in 
a diversity of contexts, and individual ability fluctuates unevenly among 
these varieties. (1995, 431–32)31
Taken as a group, these principles require that writing assessment be 
grounded in the same context as the writing itself—however that particular 
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context is determined—and that the evaluators perform the assessment 
with that context in mind.
The next five assumptions appear to be the result of some well- and 
hard-learned lessons about the effects assessment has had on writing 
instruction:
5. writing assessment is useful primarily as a means of improving learning;
6. assessment tends to drive pedagogy;
7. standardized tests, usually developed by large testing organizations, tend 
to be for accountability purposes, and when used to make statements 
about student learning, misrepresent disproportionally the skills and abili-
ties of students of color;
8. the means used to test students’ writing ability shapes what they, too, con-
sider writing to be; and
9. financial resources available for designing and implementing assessment 
instruments should be used for that purpose and not to pay for assess-
ment instruments outside the context within which they are used. (1995, 
432–33)
These assumptions serve, in part, as a codified response to the abuses that 
writing instruction has suffered under the positivist paradigm of writing 
assessment. The first two of these specifically address the connections 
between pedagogy and assessment, contending that testing should reflect 
the best of classroom practice and that the results of the tests should be 
useful within the classroom. The last three speak specifically to the effects 
of objective testing, including the socio-political ramifications, the power 
of testing to define what is valued, and the delegitimating consequences 
of outside testing.
The final assumption defines an overarching trajectory for writing 
assessment:
10. there is a large and growing body of research on language learning, lan-
guage use, and language assessment that must be used to improve assess-
ment on a systematic and regular basis. (1995, 433)
The Committee here links scholarship and assessment, arguing that 
research in the field of composition studies is not only relevant, but also 
essential to the improvement of assessment practices. The pedagogical 
emphasis of the rest of the assumptions makes sense considering that 
teaching has been subordinated to testing for a long time; research 
has not. This assumption tacitly legitimates the first nine pedagogically 
oriented assumptions by claiming that research supports these presup-
positions. For those within composition studies, this assumption is rather 
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redundant: current research is already reflected in the earlier assump-
tions. The audience and purpose for this document, however, make it 
necessary to lay out this principle.
This audience is explained at two points. First, the immediate audience 
is outlined in the introductory section, which describes the document’s 
origins and process of development. It initially developed as a response 
to members of CCCC who wanted a document “that would help them 
explain writing assessment to colleagues and administrators and secure 
the best assessment options for students” (1995, 430). Those “colleagues 
and administrators” presumably would not be knowledgeable about 
research in the field, and this statement would explain some of the most 
basic principles. In this sense, it can serve a defensive purpose: explain-
ing the principles of assessment to those who would question assessment 
practices developed in accordance with this statement, or worse yet, man-
date something unprincipled.
The second point at which the Committee describes the audience 
assumes a more assertive posture. The final third of the statement 
enumerates the rights and responsibilities of the primary stakeholders; 
although, the Committee only uses that term indirectly. This list of who 
“should” do what—students, faculty, administrators and higher educa-
tion governing boards, and legislators—bears a distinct resemblance to 
White’s stakeholder list.32 However, instead of asking what these constitu-
encies want, the Committee diagrams their expected participation in writ-
ing assessment. This part of the document takes a more directive tone, 
explaining what the members of each group are accountable for, as well 
as what they can expect.
This document is important in large part for the way in which it claims 
authority for the practice of writing assessment. Unlike constructivist 
evaluation methods, which make the concerns of each stakeholder the 
responsibility of all the participants, and unlike the numerous assess-
ment situations in which composition professionals—alone or together 
with students—are held accountable for writing assessment outcomes, 
this position statement holds each constituent responsible for its own 
informed, ethical, and appropriate participation in the assessment pro-
cess. In part because of its pragmatic emphasis and its relatively broad 
audience, this document downplays the specific theoretical principles 
that bolster its claim to authority. A specifically theoretical text would 
address itself to members within the discipline and would tend to rely on 
a higher level of abstraction. In a document intended to explicate policy, 
such abstraction is hardly welcome.
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The theoretical principles of writing assessment that underwrite this 
document, however, are neither clear nor well developed in the literature 
to-date. As my discussion of contemporary assessment models in the last 
chapter indicates, the traditional principles of educational measurement 
theory cannot easily account for notions such as contextualized expertise 
or assessment as an ongoing and evolving process. Yet composition studies 
does not have well developed and accepted alternative theoretical prin-
ciples in place. This position statement presents assumptions and guide-
lines based on the best current thought on writing and learning to write, 
where “best” has been determined by research trends in the disciplinary 
literature—thus the gesture of the tenth assumption. This thought, how-
ever, has yet to be gathered in a systematic or developed manner.
Brian Huot does some of this developmental theoretical work in his 
recent book, (Re)Articulating Writing Assessment for Teaching and Learning
(2002), which frames writing assessment as a field and examines that 
field for ways in which it might be reconstructed more productively. The 
specifically theoretical part of Huot’s venture appears in chapter four, 
which is a revised and expanded version of “Toward a New Theory of 
Writing Assessment” (1996b), an essay that originally appeared in College
Composition and Communication. Huot’s thinking about writing assessment 
theory evolves from two directions: contemporary writing assessment 
practices that circumvent positivist epistemology and state-of-the-art 
validity theory developed by measurement scholars. Writing assessment, 
he argues, has been controlled by the measurement community, and he 
points out that the measurement and composition communities have 
distinct theoretical differences and share an inability to communicate 
across them. He begins construction from the composition side of the 
gap by summarizing some of the ways in which contemporary validity 
theory applies to some contemporary writing assessment practices. Thus, 
by sifting through the most promising writing assessment practices, Huot 
begins the important—and overdue—work of outlining principles that 
can be used to theorize writing assessment.
Huot focuses his analysis of practices within composition studies on 
the ways that some contemporary assessment procedures, such as the 
expert reader model, are grounded in specific institutional contexts 
that define the purpose of their assessments. Examining models such 
as those presented by Smith (1993) and Haswell (2001c), he concludes 
that cutting-edge procedures such as these are sound specifically because 
teachers who thoroughly understand the curriculum make the placement 
decisions, and thus that context is inherent and necessary to the decision 
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being made. He also examines the discussions on the “portnet” listserv 
presented by Michael Allen in “Valuing Differences” (1995), and con-
cludes that a general knowledge of the system in which a portfolio is to 
be assessed is sufficient to generate agreement about assessment when the 
local context is foregrounded. His final example, “Portfolio Negotiations: 
Acts in Speech,” by Russel K. Durst, Marjorie Roemer, and Lucille M. 
Schultz (1994), describes an exit portfolio assessment program in which 
“trios” of teachers in conversation make final judgments, a practice I 
return to in chapter seven. Huot argues that all of these methods “share 
assumptions about the importance of situating assessment methods and 
rater judgment within a particular rhetorical, linguistic, and pedagogical 
context” (2002, 98).
Huot’s conclusions about the contextuality of assessment coincide with 
the conclusions of contemporary literacy scholarship, but he also argues 
that contemporary validity theory, as it is evolving among measurement 
scholars, provides a sufficient foundation for principles of writing assess-
ment. Traditionally, as noted earlier, validity has meant that “the assess-
ment measures what it purports to measure” (Huot 2002, 87). In classical 
measurement theory, validity relies in significant part on an objectivist 
understanding of writing ability as a fixed, acontextual property that 
resides entirely within the text at hand. Current validity theory, however, 
makes both the context and the use of a test an explicit part of validity.33
Huot quotes Samuel Messick, a leading validity scholar whose definitional 
work has been instrumental in revising this principle and whose work I 
will return to shortly: “validity is ‘an integrated evaluative judgment of 
the degree to which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales sup-
port the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and actions based on test 
scores or other modes of assessment’” (Huot 2002, 93; Messick 1989a, 
5).34 Contemporary validity theory, that is, claims that validity as a criteri-
on for judging assessment practices is not meaningful unless it includes a 
sound theoretical base for the object and means of assessment; appropri-
ate consequences from the results of the testing; and empirical evidence 
generated by the testing of both these qualities. The implicit argument 
in Huot’s review of contemporary validity theory is that compositionists 
would find much of value in the work of the measurement community if 
we could or would understand it.
While he clearly favors contemporary validity theory, Huot challenges 
reliability as a defining concept in writing assessment. In traditional test-
ing theory, reliability is a necessary condition for a valid test; if a test can 
not be scored consistently, it can not be valid. Because validity presupposes 
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reliability, efforts in writing assessment historically have focused on the 
latter. Huot suggests that the positivist environment—which focused on 
universality and generalizability—encourages evaluators to strip the con-
text from pieces of writing used in assessment. This context-stripping, he 
argues, makes reliable assessments impossible because readers have little 
basis for judgment. Huot points out that norming procedures establish 
reliability not through developing consensus, but through rebuilding a 
context, and he argues that recent assessment methods, particularly the 
expert-reader model, have been so successful because they skip the steps 
in which context is stripped and rebuilt, and instead leave the context 
intact.
In addition, Huot discredits the notion that reliability ensures fairness 
to students. He points out that “reliability indicates only how consistent 
an assessment is,” and that consistency is only one part of fairness, not the 
sum-total (2002, 87–88). Fairness, according to Huot, should also include 
information about the basis for evaluation. He argues that “[t]ranslating 
‘reliability’ into ‘fairness’ is not only inaccurate, it is dangerous, because 
it equates statistical consistency of the judgments being made with their 
value” (2002, 88). His claims here echo earlier work done with Michael M. 
Williamson (2000) that challenges White’s assertion that fairness is anoth-
er way to understand reliability. In their examination of the relationship 
between ethics and assessment, they argue that “White’s claim that a test 
must be reliable to be fair . . . frames a technical issue in ethical terms” 
(2000, 194). Reliability, in its psychometric home, is a criterion for mea-
suring something more akin to equality than to fairness, and they point 
out that “fairness involves reasonableness, not equality” (2000, 194). To 
equate fairness with reliability is to elide issues of power and access, and 
to deny the complexity of the entire assessment. In (Re)Articulating, Huot 
concludes that the best of contemporary assessment procedures and the 
theoretical principles he outlines either bypass inter-rater reliability or 
make it moot in the face of contextually-bound evaluations (2002, 98).
The result of Huot’s exploration is a set of five principles extrapolated 
from the practices he discusses: writing assessment should be “site-based,” 
“locally-controlled,” “context-sensitive,” “rhetorically-based,” and “acces-
sible” in its entirety to those being evaluated (2002, 105). The first three 
are all variations on the theme of contextuality: assessment should arise 
from local need, remain within local control, and be sensitive to local 
issues. By “rhetorically-based,” Huot means that assessments and the 
pedagogical situations that produce them should be grounded in current 
thought in composition studies, and particularly in literacy research. The 
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final principle addresses the ideal of fairness through access to informa-
tion. According to Huot, all of these principles begin with the notion of 
context and will require new procedures for validation, which will likely 
include qualitative and ethnographic methods.
Huot’s reliance on contemporary validity theory seems somewhat 
incongruous with his self-defined project to “explore our [composition-
ists’] ability to construct a theory of writing assessment based upon our 
understandings about the nature of language, written communication, 
and its teaching” (2002, 94). However, his work, first published in 1996 
and revised in 2002, is the first in over a decade that explicitly attempts 
to develop principles for all writing assessment situations based on cur-
rent thinking about literacy (I will examine some more limited attempts 
later in this chapter). More importantly, Huot’s principles roughly par-
allel those offered by the CCCC Committee on Assessment, indicating 
some level of agreement among influential scholars in writing assessment 
within this discipline about appropriate or valuable writing assessment 
practices, if not about the specific principles supporting those practices. 
Thus, both the Committee’s and Huot’s texts begin the work of drawing 
together the practice of writing assessment and the principles of the con-
textual paradigm of literacy.
O N  T H E I R  T E R M S
Huot and the Committee are hardly the only compositionists who favor 
co-opting educational measurement theory for the purpose of writing 
assessment. We can see variations on Huot’s argument in the work of a 
range of scholars, including White (1994b), Hamp-Lyons and Condon 
(2000), Yancey (1999), and Scharton (1996), among others. The specif-
ics of the argument vary, but the acceptance of educational measurement 
theory is more than bowing to those with power, and historical precedent 
only partially explains the persistent connection. Instead, like Huot, 
advocates of co-optation are claiming master’s tools, arguing implicitly 
that compositionists can use them, too—if not to tear down the master’s 
house, at least to do some much-needed renovations.
This is a risky proposition. Compositionists do need principles for deter-
mining the value of an assessment procedure that develop from theories 
of composition and literacy learning. But if successful co-optation is pos-
sible—and I am not convinced it is—we will need to address the relation-
ship between the measurement theory that the terms we are “borrowing” 
represent and writing assessment as it is currently practiced. If we continue 
to use educational measurement theory to legitimate assessment practices, 
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we allow measurement theorists to determine the value of writing and writ-
ing instruction. And where these theories incorporate objectivist ideals, we 
perpetuate the distance between writing theory and pedagogy on the one 
hand and writing assessment on the other.
The position statement developed by the CCCC Committee on 
Assessment does perhaps the best job distancing writing assessment from 
the criteria of educational measurement theory. The document makes ref-
erence to these terms, but the Committee does not use them specifically 
to ground the principles they outline. They do argue that faculty have the 
responsibility to familiarize themselves with “the norming, reliability, and 
validity standards employed by internal and external test-makers” (435), 
but these criteria seem to be subordinate to the principles developed 
from composition theory and practice. The relationship, however, is not 
clear, nor is explicating the relationship within the scope of this position 
statement. The political nature of this document encourages a stance that 
foregrounds composition’s principles. Because of its form and purpose, it 
has been treated less like theory and more like a public declaration, and 
thus used more to justify practices to those outside of composition stud-
ies than to direct practices within it. So while this document seems to do 
a better job grounding assessment practices specifically in composition 
theory than Huot’s, it is ultimately less effective in developing an assess-
ment theory.
Huot’s book is influential, and his position is the most fully articulated 
of those I have discussed. It is also the most conflicted. He argues that cut-
ting-edge validity theory corresponds to cutting-edge theory about writ-
ing, and that reliability is made moot by context. But while he references 
neither “reliability” nor “validity” in the figure that outlines his principles, 
he seems ambiguous about the relationship between writing assessment 
theory born of composition theory and the principles of measurement 
theory. Even as he discusses the promise of contemporary validity theory, 
he acknowledges that the technicalities of concepts such as validity and 
reliability have alienated most compositionists. He tries to explain con-
temporary validity theory in terms that compositionists will understand, 
and eventually claims that this theory supports “a new theoretical umbrel-
la” which gathers together the principles at work in the best of contem-
porary assessment methods (2002, 104). In this metaphor, which he uses 
several times, measurement theory holds the umbrella. Or, framed in a 
more evenly distributed way, Huot seems to be trying to ground a theory 
of writing assessment by placing one leg in composition theory and the 
other in measurement theory. The implication is that composition theory 
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by itself does not or cannot—it is not clear which—provide sufficient cri-
teria for judging methods for assessing writing.
Other scholars make similar arguments. White, for example, has been 
arguing for years that we must pay attention to educational measure-
ment theory or the psychometricians will do our assessing for us. William 
Condon, in both his research with Liz Hamp-Lyons (Hamp-Lyons and 
Condon 2000) and in his work on the assessment system at Washington 
State University (Leonhardy and Condon 2001), treats validity and reli-
ability as a kind of point zero—though he does tend to characterize these 
criteria in much the same way Huot does. Kathleen Blake Yancey, in 
her history of writing assessment (1999), describes the phases of writing 
assessment in composition studies in large part in terms of the influence 
of reliability and validity on the shape of assessments in the field—though 
she is not clearly advocating the use of these principles.
In an essay published the year after the original version of Huot’s 
theoretical argument, Huot and Williamson (1997) make the case that 
problems in educational assessment cannot be solved at the theoretical 
level, or perhaps more accurately, that theory alone will not solve the 
problems. They review the literature from educational measurement, 
focusing on the work of Moss in particular, for the ways in which theo-
retical principles are changing. They conclude, however, “that oftentimes 
issues of power rather than theory drive important assessment decisions” 
(1997, 44). I agree, but I would add that theory and power are historically 
and rhetorically tied to one another in the case of writing assessment, as 
I discuss in the first chapter. Huot and Williamson work to separate these 
issues primarily to bring the problem of power to the attention of compo-
sitionists. In the process, however, they continue to refer to educational 
measurement theory and theorists for the “theory” part of their equa-
tion, leaving the theoretical power squarely in the hands of educational 
measurement.
Huot claims that “[f]ew important or long lasting changes can occur 
in the way we assess student writing outside of the classroom unless we 
attempt to change the theory which drives our practices and attitudes 
toward assessment” (2002, 94). Yet he implicitly argues that a significant 
part of that change comes in the form of compositionists’ recognition 
and understanding of contemporary validity theory as espoused by 
Messick and Moss. I am not convinced that this constitutes a sufficiently 
significant change, given the baggage that validity and reliability carry 
and their political influence in the practice of large-scale assessment. 
Granted, there is value in co-opting educational measurement theory. 
86 C O M I N G  TO  T E R M S
The principles have a long and established history, which gives them 
currency in the influential market of testing. This strategy might work, 
but co-optation has its limitations—in this case, mostly in the form assess-
ments take in the “real world,” as we can see by the use of state-level K-12 
writing assessments and many of our own college-level large-scale place-
ment and exit exam procedures. As long as compositionists continue 
to rely on validity and reliability, we leave ourselves open to charges of 
not using the principles correctly and demands that we reconfigure our 
large-scale assessments to meet the established requirements of the pow-
ers-that-be.
C H A L L E N G E S  W I T H I N  E D U CAT I O N
Thus far, I have constructed an us/them narrative, a story about how 
educational measurement theory has dominated writing assessment prac-
tices. But just as theories of writing are not monolithic in composition 
studies, neither are theories of educational assessment in that field. While 
the history of educational measurement has had decidedly objectivist 
foundations, not all current theory in that discipline continues the tradi-
tion, and there are a number of examples of theorists within the field who 
are challenging key concepts in the theory. In addition to Messick’s work 
in validity theory, those working in complex performance assessment in 
particular demonstrate the ways in which theorists within that field are 
dissatisfied with classical educational measurement theory. This work is 
important and may well help us work through our own difficulties with 
writing assessment.
Samuel Messick—considered perhaps the preeminent validity scholar 
in educational measurement theory at least through his death in 1998—is 
the author of the “Validity” article in the third edition of Educational
Measurement, the most recent definitive statement of accepted theory in 
educational measurement (Linn 1989). His is the standard definition 
of validity: “an integrated evaluative judgment of the degree to which 
empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support the adequacy and 
appropriateness of inferences and actions based on test scores or other modes 
of assessment” (Messick 1989b, 13), the definition that Huot cites as 
exemplifying the complexity and value of validity for writing assessment. 
Among Messick’s contributions was the move of validity away from its sta-
tus as a characteristic of a test, a property of the instrument, and toward 
an emphasis on the uses of the results of tests as a determination of valid-
ity. This shift means that no assessment procedure can be determined 
“valid” once and for all; determinations would be necessary for each use 
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of an assessment instrument. The complexity of validity as Messick defines 
it is more in keeping with the kinds of complexity that appear in writing 
assessment and provides solid justification for using complex perfor-
mances in testing situations.
Performance assessment deals with the evaluation of complex tasks: 
open-ended questions, portfolios, hands-on experiments, and the like. 
These kinds of tests produce results that are not easily reduced to sta-
tistically reliable numbers. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, articles on 
performance-based assessment began appearing in education journals, 
among them Robert L. Linn, Eva L. Baker and Stephen B. Dunbar’s 
“Complex, Performance-Based Assessment: Expectations and Validation 
Criteria” (1991). Linn, Baker, and Dunbar analyze existing educational 
measurement theory for the ways in which it in appropriately delimits 
performance assessments. They conclude that “[r]eliability has too often 
been overemphasized at the expense of validity; validity itself has been 
viewed too narrowly” (1991, 16), and thus, at least as they are tradition-
ally conceived, these principles are too limited to provide a strong set 
of criteria for the level of complexity in performance assessments. The 
authors’ purpose is to provide an expanded understanding of validity 
for evaluating assessments that is sensitive to the needs of more complex 
instruments. In this vein, they propose eight criteria: consequences, fair-
ness, transfer and generalizability, cognitive complexity, content quality, 
content coverage, meaningfulness, and cost and efficiency.
These criteria are worth defining briefly for the ways in which they 
complicate the concept of validity. Drawing on Messick’s work, “con-
sequences” focuses on the effect of the assessment on pedagogy in 
particular, and the authors make clear that this criterion is paramount. 
“Fairness,” while more complex here than in White’s configuration, is 
primarily focused on issues of bias and equity in terms of race and class, 
and the authors argue that “[t]he training and calibrating of raters is 
critical” in eliminating evaluators’ biases (1991, 18), reinforcing the his-
torical connection between fairness and objectivity. Reliability is largely 
subsumed under the criterion of “transfer and generalizability.” Linn, 
Baker, and Dunbar review the research to-date that demonstrates that 
performance is “highly task dependent” and performance-based assess-
ments offer only a “limited degree of generalizability” (1991, 19). They 
suggest that to meet this criterion, students might be assigned more tasks 
or evaluators could use sampling for statistical purposes, but their argu-
ment does not provide clear direction for how educators and assessors 
would deal with this problem.
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The authors spend much less time on the remaining criteria. “Cognitive 
complexity” examines the level of higher-order thinking skills assessed, 
and “content quality” analyzes the relationship between the content of the 
assessment and current best thinking in the relevant field. Analyzing con-
tent quality, they argue, requires subject matter experts, the only place in 
the assessment process where Linn, Baker, and Dunbar explicitly include 
such experts. Similarly, “content coverage” focuses on the comprehensive-
ness or scope of the assessment and serves to encourage breadth in the 
curriculum, given that what is not tested often is not taught or learned. 
The authors do not include experts here, but more interestingly, they 
argue that traditional testing may have an advantage over performance 
assessments in this area because of the ways that assessment drives the 
curriculum; performance assessments tend to produce depth rather than 
breadth. “Meaningfulness,” a term I will return to shortly, here deals sim-
ply with the relevance of the task(s) to students, and “cost and efficiency” 
deals with the practical realities of testing. Taken together, these criteria 
offer an expanded understanding of validity that, the authors argue, 
“more adequately reflect theoretical concepts of validity” (1991, 20).
These criteria did not move far from traditional educational measure-
ment criteria, at least as we currently understand them, but they were a 
bit of a stretch at the time. In 1991, Messick’s claim for the importance of 
evaluating the consequences of the assessment decision and for attaching 
validity to that decision rather than to the test itself was still a fairly new 
concept, though sufficiently established to be included in Educational
Measurement (Messick 1989b). Linn, Baker, and Dunbar acknowledge that 
they are only providing an expanded practical application of existing 
validity theory, but they do something a bit more radical with reliability. 
Buried in this piece is a fairly quiet challenge to that criterion: while the 
authors agree that “efficiency, reliability, and comparability are impor-
tant issues that cannot be ignored in new forms of assessment,” they also 
point out that these criteria “should not be the only, or even the primary, 
criteria in judging the quality and usefulness of an assessment” (1991, 
16). Given that reliability had been (and still is in most assessments) a 
precondition for validity, this attempt to shift it to secondary status is note-
worthy. The authors stop short, however, of repudiating these principles, 
and instead argue that “[n]onetheless, they [efficiency, reliability, and 
comparability] are issues that will require attention and careful design 
of procedures to assure that acceptable levels are achieved for the par-
ticular purposes of an assessment” (1991, 16). While they do not insist 
on reliable assessments, they do claim that the criterion will continue to 
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serve a useful—and limiting—purpose. This statement leaves the authors 
attached to educational measurement theory.
Pamela A. Moss’s challenges to reliability are more direct. Like Linn, 
Baker, and Dunbar, Moss comes at her challenges to reliability through 
both performance assessment and through contemporary work in validity 
theory. In “Shifting Conceptions of Validity,” she points out that current 
consensus dictates the primacy of construct validity and the need for 
consideration of the consequences of any given assessment (1992, 230). 
However, she also notes that “the practice of validity research typically has 
not done justice to the modern views of validity articulated by Cronbach 
and Messick. In fact, researchers still tend to rely on traditional sources 
of evidence—such as, evidence about content representativeness, internal 
consistency (and reliability), and correlations with alternative measures—
which [many validity scholars working in performance assessment] con-
sider insufficient for the evaluation of performance assessments” (1992, 
245). Her point is that while the theory has progressed, the practical 
application of it has not. Moss’s primary concern is that the demands for 
reliability and generalizability, which are excessively difficult to meet in 
complex performance assessments, dominate the field of assessment so 
that standardized testing has been and continues to be privileged over 
more complex instruments that often give more useful results.
In “Can There Be Validity Without Reliability?” (1994), Moss more 
fully explicates her hermeneutic alternatives to standardized assessment 
practices and thus deals more directly with the problem of reliability. 
Hermeneutics, she argues, provides an interpretation-based theoretical 
approach to the process of evaluation that stands in contrast to the quan-
tification and consistency demanded by the psychometric principle of 
reliability. She posits dialogue toward consensus among those with exper-
tise as an appropriate alternative to interchangeable, objectively oriented, 
and quantifiable assessments. In a hermeneutic assessment, experts would 
all read and interpret the assessment instrument, and then would discuss 
the results as necessary. This, she points out, is what educators already do 
with some of our more important decisions, such as hiring and tenure.
Moss is careful to point out, however, that she is not interested in over-
turning reliability as an assessment principle, but rather in offering anoth-
er theoretical possibility (1994, 5), a position she reiterates two years later 
in “Enlarging the Dialogue in Educational Measurement: Voices from 
Interpretive Research Traditions” (1996). Here, she argues that she does 
not want “to overturn the foundation of educational measurement, but 
rather to extend it by locating conventional theory and practice within 
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a broader field of possibilities” (1996, 20). Using the example of teach-
ing portfolios, she argues that a conventional psychometric evaluation, 
where readers assess each entry independently and without knowledge of 
other parts of the portfolio or the particulars of the teacher, results in a 
low-quality evaluation with consequences made questionable by the pro-
cedure. She asks whether “expert readers, familiar with the candidate’s 
capabilities across multiple performances, may not result in a more valid 
and fair decision” (1996, 25). Here, Moss clearly challenges the positiv-
ist underpinnings of assessment practice: evaluating the parts separately 
does not, according to Moss, result in a clearer or more accurate picture 
than evaluating the whole all together.
Much of the work in performance assessment in the field of education, 
including much of Moss’s, involves the assessment of teachers. Ginette 
Delandshere and Anthony R. Petrosky (1998) take up this process in 
“Assessment of Complex Performances: Limitations of Key Measurement 
Assumptions,” where they describe their development of a certification 
procedure for the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards in 
Early Adolescence/English Language Arts. For certification, at the time 
of Delandshere and Petrosky’s work, teachers were required to submit a 
portfolio documenting three teaching activities and to participate in “an 
assessment center” where they were interviewed, analyzed their teaching, 
and wrote essays on educational topics in a testing setting (Delandshere 
and Petrosky 1998, 14). The complexity and volume of the material made 
standard evaluation procedures difficult at best and, more importantly, 
made the standard numerical results of limited value.
Delandshere and Petrosky focus their work in this piece on the tension 
between an evaluation system based in measurement and one based in 
interpretation. The procedure they developed for National Board certi-
fication includes the use of interpretive summaries written by judges of 
the teachers’ work, based on those judges’ perceptions of teacher perfor-
mance. Delandshere and Petrosky chose this approach over the tradition-
al measurement approach, which would result in numeric scores, because 
they believe that the measurement approach produced results too limited 
to be of use. They argue that “[r]educing performances to a set of scores 
and generic feedback satisfies the needs of a certification decision but falls 
short of providing useful representations and analyses of actual teaching 
performances” (1998, 16). That is, while it is possible to meet the needs of 
statistical reliability and validity, the results are not particularly helpful.
The influence of measurement, however, is significant. Traditionally, 
educational assessment has resulted in numbers that can be generalized 
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and compared. Interpretive results complicate notions of generalizability, 
raising questions about the need for and use of generalizations from test 
results in complex situations. Delandshere and Petrosky point out that, 
because in complex performance assessments the tasks involved are con-
structed and context-bound, they are not generalizable in the same way 
that sampled tasks are. They acknowledge that educational assessment 
experts still want to be able to generalize, but they argue that there is an 
inherent “trade-off . . . between the universe of generalization and the 
complexity of the construct being assessed” (1998, 20). Generalization, a 
key principle in educational measurement theory and the driving force 
behind reliability, they argue, may be incompatible with useful assess-
ments of complex performances.
Because of the political and practical demands involved in developing 
procedures for a real high-stakes, national-level assessment, Delandshere 
and Petrosky could not walk away from generalization in their project, 
so to answer the need for reliability, they constructed rubrics that would 
translate the complex evaluative statements developed by the judges into 
scores. However, they “found the process contrived, somewhat arbitrary, 
and overly reductionist” (1998, 21). Not surprisingly, they also found the 
results of limited use, and they conclude that numerical results “are poor 
representations of complex events” (1998, 21). Of course, this is not news 
to the composition community. Peter Elbow, for example, has argued for 
some time that numbers do not provide students with any useful infor-
mation about their writing (1993; 1994), and the work on how best to 
respond effectively to student writing far outweighs the work on how to 
put a grade on it.
The pressure for numeric results, however, is systemic. Echoing Moss’s 
concerns about the way validity theory shows up in practice, Delandshere 
and Petrosky point out, as an aside, “that when presented theoretically, 
discussions of validity include both quantitative and qualitative summa-
ries. . . . When, on the other hand, the discussions turn to concrete 
examples of evidence (e.g., correlation, factor analysis, test variance) to 
be used in support of validity arguments, the same authors almost always 
refer to numerical scores or ratings” (1998, 16). Even contemporary 
validity scholars such as Messick, they claim, return to numeric examples 
to provide their evidence. Delandshere and Petrosky suggest that this 
reliance on numeric evidence continues because work outside the mea-
surement tradition—as opposed to the interpretative tradition—in edu-
cational assessment has not been developed. Without the development of 
practices and principles, interpretative approaches to assessment tend to 
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founder and are overlooked in favor of established quantifiable methods. 
This certainly has been the experience of many of those of us in large-
scale writing assessment, where we must provide numeric data to support 
our practices, whether we find the numeric data useful or not.
It has also been the experience of those in education. For example, 
the National Board revised its assessment for Early Adolescence/English 
Language Arts in 2002, the assessment Delandshere and Petrosky worked 
on. This “Next Generation” of assessment still includes the portfolio in 
largely the same form as the previous year; the directions ask for four 
entries: one based on student work, two on videotaped class sessions, and 
one on documentation of teaching accomplishments outside of the class-
room (National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 2003a, 9–13). 
The assessment center questions, however, are different, and the differ-
ences are not what I would call positive, at least from the perspective of 
someone trying to gain an understanding of how a teacher teaches. The 
“Original Format” questions asked teachers to answer four 90–minute 
prompts based on material provided in advance, including reading lists, 
professional articles, and student writing. These prompts asked teach-
ers to develop course materials, prepare for writing instruction, analyze 
student language use, and provide guidelines for text selection (National 
Board for Professional Teaching Standards 2003c), all activities a teacher 
would need to be able to do well. The “Next Generation” questions, on 
the other hand, ask teachers to answer six 30–minute prompts based 
on poetry, short text selections, and student writing, none of which are 
provided in advanced. In these short impromptus, teachers are asked 
to analyze literature, to discuss themes in an imaginative work, and to 
analyze non-fiction prose for audience and purpose. They are also asked 
to develop teaching strategies for correcting reading misapprehensions, 
continuing language development, and correcting weaknesses in student 
writing (National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 2003b). 
While these last three are “teacherly” activities, the first three are more 
the kind of exercise a teacher would ask a student to complete.
The purpose of the Next Generation assessment center questions is 
to determine a teacher’s foundational knowledge in the field—although 
it is not clear that these questions provide any more or better informa-
tion to the evaluators than the Original Format questions did. The 
shortened time frame and the removal of advance materials for prepara-
tion, however, indicate that the evaluators are more interested in seeing 
what a teacher can do on the fly than what they can do with thoughtful
preparation. Ironically, much of what they ask for in these impromptus 
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is material that a teacher would likely take more than 30 minutes to 
prepare.
It is also ironic that while Delandshere and Petrosky advocate more 
complex assessment to go with complex performances, the National 
Board makes the tasks less complex. And the scoring procedure has not 
changed. Each entry, both in the portfolio and from the assessment cen-
ter, is evaluated separately on a 4–point rubric that defines best practices 
according to National Board standards. This is the procedure that Moss 
suggested produces questionable results (1996, 25), and it remains the 
procedure, despite Delandshere and Petrosky’s findings that numeri-
cal ratings encouraged evaluators to play a kind of matching game, 
looking for surface evidence of particular features listed on the rubric, 
rather than evaluating the performance in depth and as a whole. When 
Delandshere and Petrosky asked raters to write interpretive summaries, 
on the other hand, they paid more attention to the performance as a 
whole, took more notes, and referred to more specifics in their summa-
ries, ultimately providing more useful feedback to the teachers seeking 
certification (1998, 21). Such practices would be in line with National 
Board goals and objectives, which focus on reforming education through 
specific attention to teaching (National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standards 2003d). Given the research and the fact that Delandshere and 
Petrosky’s procedure was developed specifically for the National Board, 
the Board’s decision to stick with the established, statistically safe route is 
particularly questionable.
All of these scholars—Linn, Baker, and Dunbar; Moss; and Delandshere 
and Petrosky—argue that more complex performances require more 
complex assessment procedures. Complex performances include writing 
in the manner compositionists teach it—complete with planning, drafting, 
and revision, time to consider ideas, and the opportunity to gather and 
respond to feedback from readers. But the messages from these scholars 
and the alternative practices they advocate have not been adopted by the 
establishment in K-12 education, where educational measurement theory 
has the greatest influence. For example, while most states do use direct 
assessment of writing in their state-level testing, they also still rely on a 
holistic or criterion-referenced scoring system that requires rater train-
ing and calibration, rather than the kind of interpretive or hermeneutic 
approach these scholars advocate (Profiles of State Education Systems 2001). 
And in these assessments, traditional reliability still functions a limiting 
condition in assessment; training and calibration of readers to produce 
reliability results is still a key (and explicit) issue in many of the state 
descriptions of their assessments. 
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Unlike Messick’s validity work, the work of these theorists, however, is 
on the cutting edge; it is not the norm, as it appears in the most recent 
Educational Measurement (Linn 1989), the authoritative text for defining 
and designing assessment procedures, or the most recent Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Testing (American Educational Research 
Association, American Psychological Association, and National Council 
on Measurement in Education 1999), or in current textbooks, such 
as Measurement and Assessment in Teaching (Linn and Gronlund 2000). 
The current norm in educational measurement is to force-fit tradi-
tional conceptions of reliability with validity and its “new” emphasis 
on construct—usually through some idea of “generalizability,” which 
is an attempt to deal with the increased error that appears as assess-
ment instruments become more complex. This process is awkward at 
best and becomes nearly impossible in performance assessments such 
as the direct assessment of writing in anything other than a holistically 
scored, timed impromptu form. State departments of education know 
this, and so they keep the holistically scored impromptus, despite evi-
dence that more complex assessments produce better and more useful 
results.
D E V E L O P I N G  T H E O R I E S
Despite its dominance in education and in composition studies, educa-
tional measurement theory is not the only framework available for evalu-
ating writing assessment practices, and compositionists have explored 
alternative theories for some time. Possibly the earliest instance appears 
in Anne Ruggles Gere’s “Written Composition: Toward a Theory of 
Evaluation” (1980), where she outlines a theory based on “communication 
intention” and formal semantics. References to this theory, however, are 
rare, and it seems that Gere’s ideas appeared too early to be taken up by 
compositionists. More recently, Deborah Holdstein (1996) uses feminist 
theory to challenge notions that holistic scoring and other instruments 
and procedures can be “value-free.” Even White, ultimately a staunch 
advocate of educational measurement theory, argues that reader-response 
theory supported of holistic assessment in his 1984 edition of Teaching and 
Assessing Writing —although he largely drops this argument in the 1994 
edition, probably because of the waning support for holistic assessment 
at the time and the pragmatic shift in the book’s emphasis. Most of these 
efforts, however, languish in obscurity, even in writing assessment circles. 
In the last few years, however, there have been some substantial challenges 
to reliability specifically, and two, in particular—Richard Haswell’s (1998) 
work in categorization theory, and Bob Broad’s (2000; 2003) work in
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support of hermeneutics—present significant alternatives to the domi-
nance of psychometric principles and are drawing some attention.
As part of his work on the WSU assessment program, Haswell explores 
categorization theory, which he explains most fully in “Rubrics, Prototypes, 
and Exemplars: Categorization Theory and Systems of Writing Placement” 
(1998). In this essay, Haswell outlines three types of categorization—clas-
sical, prototypical, and exemplar—which appear in current literature in 
psychology, social science, and language analysis. Classical categorization 
matches a new instance with a category defined by a pre-existing set of fea-
tures; we identify a book as a novel because we “determine that it is long, 
fictional, and prose” (1998, 245). Prototypical categorization matches a 
new instance to an idealized fictional representative of a category; we 
identify a book as a novel because we think of novels as being “about 300 
pages long” with plenty of action and dialogue (1998, 246). Exemplar 
categorization matches a new instance to a memory of a similar instance; 
we identify a book as a novel because it looks like a novel we have read 
recently (1998, 247).
Haswell argues that, although holistic assessment that relies on rubrics 
professes to rely on classical categorization, raters actually behave as 
if they were relying on the prototypical variety. While rubrics identify 
key features and the quality of those features, in actuality, no anchor 
essays—or actual essays for that matter—“are true to the scale of quality 
pictured by the rubric” (1998, 242). Essays that may be excellent in some 
areas are weaker in others, and it is almost impossible to find the kind 
of consistent rise in levels of quality across features that “true” holistic 
scoring requires. Since there is no such clear match to characteristics 
in actual holistic scoring sessions, instead Haswell finds that raters tend 
to look for indications of similarity with ideals (the prototypical variety) 
(1998, 247–48). He also argues that if left to their own devices—without 
norming and rubrics—raters use both prototypical and exemplar types of 
categorization (1998, 248).
Haswell’s use of categorization theory presents a strong challenge to 
reliability. A key premise behind reliability is that any assessment should 
be interchangeable with any other assessment, given appropriate training 
of raters. Categorization theory, on the other hand, suggests that those 
with relevant experience will be able to make better placement decisions 
than those with little or no expertise precisely because of their familiar-
ity with the context. In this way, he argues in favor of a kind of limited 
subjectivity in the process of assessment, which stands in stark contrast to 
the efforts at objectivity engendered by reliability. The replicability of the
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decision across raters is less important than the attention to experience. 
It is interesting to note, however, that while Haswell provides reliability 
data in this piece only to challenge it, he does attempt to provide reli-
ability data in Beyond Outcomes as part of his justification for the two-tiered 
method.
Categorization theory, as Haswell outlines it here, provides strong 
theoretical support for the two-tiered placement procedure at WSU, 
and Haswell makes no bones about the fact that he turns to this theory 
specifically to support the practice (1998, 232). But his theory supports a 
placement practice in which there are obvious or majority decisions: most 
students are placed in the mainstream composition course. It is not so 
clear how this theory would apply to situations where there is no clear 
majority decision—grading, for example—or where the instrument of 
assessment is more complex, as in portfolios. That is, it is not clear that 
categorization theory could work as an assessment theory that applies 
beyond limited placement situations, and further research is necessary to 
explore the scope of its application.
Some of the issues I am raising appear in Bob Broad’s development 
of grounded inquiry theory as a method for developing assessment pro-
cedures as well as researching assessment practices. In his work at “City 
University,” Broad outlines a theoretical approach that draws specifi-
cally on hermeneutic theory in assessment, which he characterizes as an 
“emerging paradigm” (2000, 231). Participants in the first-year composi-
tion program at CU wanted to standardize their assessments of mid- and 
end-of-term portfolios. Examining conflicts in their attempts to do so 
in their norming and communal, “live” trio evaluation sessions, Broad 
argues that the desire to be both fair and consistent on the one hand and 
sensitive to complexity and diversity on the other threw their evaluative 
conflicts into relief. He discusses how one group in particular worked 
hard to either identify a representative “C” portfolio or develop a list of 
characteristics of such a portfolio, so that they could then compare each 
of the actual portfolios. Theoretically, this work would clarify the pass/fail 
decisions the group needed to make. However, the group was unable 
to identify a representative portfolio because they could not agree on a 
selection, and they were unable to develop a clear set of characteristics 
because they kept turning up anomalous cases in the actual portfolios 
they were evaluating (Broad 2000, 234–36).
Although Broad does not use Haswell’s work on categorization theory 
to support his research, his work suggests its application, and consequently 
suggests a difficulty in applying this theory to more complex instruments. 
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In Broad’s descriptions of the work the groups did to reach consensus 
and standardize their assessments, the groups tried to use classical and 
exemplar categories to make their decisions: they tried both to develop 
lists of characteristics and to choose examples of a bare minimum “pass” 
to guide their assessments. The groups found, however, that neither pro-
vided the kind of guidance necessary. On the one hand, this would sug-
gest that the norming efforts were the point of failure, a conclusion that 
Broad explicitly addresses (2000, 232–34). However, would prototypical 
categorization have been any better? Fictionalized ideals generate their 
own problems, particularly when the real objects of assessment seem to all 
be “weird cases” that defy efforts at standardization (Broad 2000, 232–38). 
Broad’s work suggests that categorization theory would not have helped 
the assessment process at CU.
Broad’s efforts in this piece, however, are focused on challenging the 
use of norming to achieve standardization. He argues that what appear 
to be problems or errors from the psychometric approach—the one that 
provides the theoretical support for norming—are actually advantages 
and strengths from a hermeneutic perspective. For example, hermeneu-
tics supports the inclusion of dissent in the process of making judgments, 
an inclusion that psychometrics works hard to eliminate. Broad’s use of 
hermeneutics explicitly draws on contemporary assessment theory’s chal-
lenge to reliability, a challenge that, as I have argued, has largely been 
ignored in educational assessment. However, Broad’s use of grounded 
inquiry theory does provide a method for getting at the values that evalu-
ators hold, as well as providing a research methodology, that differs sub-
stantially from educational measurement theory, particularly in terms of 
methods for examining the content of an assessment.
Grounded inquiry provides a method for determining what evalua-
tors value, but Broad relies on hermeneutics as developed in educational 
assessment to support a method for the actual assessment—a reliance that 
would recommend Broad for membership in the co-optation group. In 
this way, like Huot, Broad ends up with one foot in each camp and the 
implicit argument that composition studies cannot do it alone. In his later 
work, Broad (2003) focuses much more on the contextually determined 
development of assessment criteria through a process he calls “Dynamic 
Criteria Mapping.” He uses DCM to pull together hermeneutics and 
grounded inquiry in a way that elides the traditional distinction between 
content (validity) and method (reliability or hermeneutics). But Broad 
does not intend DCM to provide the process for assessment. Instead, it 
provides a map of the criteria that instructors and/or evaluators actually 
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use in their assessment of student work. The result is a more honest sense 
of a program’s values, but not necessarily a process for assessment or the 
criteria for evaluating it.
Both Haswell’s and Broad’s work have a lot of potential, and both 
provide interesting alternatives to the dominant theory. While I return to 
both their practices and analyze them in a different theoretical framework 
in chapter seven, as they present the theories themselves, I think both sell 
themselves short. That is, I believe the theoretical models that each relies 
on provides only a piece of the picture, when a full image would do much 
more. Haswell overtly challenges reliability, but only in a limited situation. 
Broad’s challenge to reliability stays within educational measurement 
theory, but more importantly, I feel his “challenge” to validity does not 
provide criteria for evaluating an assessment, only for making explicit and 
expounding the values of a writing program. By only taking on parts of 
the theoretical problem, these approaches, whatever their merits, remain 
in danger of being reconnected to educational measurement principles, 
or of having little influence.
The composition studies community has yet to fully develop theoretical 
principles for writing assessment. Practices described by Haswell and Broad 
notwithstanding, the majority of current practices reflects an objectivist 
epistemology and remains more heavily influenced by educational mea-
surement theory than by compositionists’ own principled understanding 
of writing and learning to write. Theories of writing assessment informed 
by literacy scholarship would provide more relevant sets of standards by 
which to judge the value of specific assessment practices. Moreover, such 
theories would enable compositionists to present principled arguments 
about the demands of writing education and evaluation to governmental 
bodies, testing agencies, educational institutions, and other entities with 
an interest in assessment procedures and results. If composition scholars 
wish to align literacy theory and assessment practices, and if we wish to 
influence writing assessment practices beyond our individual programs’ 
walls, we need well-developed and grounded theoretical principles for 
writing assessment built on what we know about literacy.
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T H E  P O L I T I C S  O F  T H E O R I Z I N G
The work described in the last chapter, particularly that of Haswell and 
Broad, has a lot of potential. Part of that potential lies in the minimal 
use they each make of conventional educational measurement theory. I 
would argue, however, that the places where composition assessment the-
orists rely on or answer to educational measurement are less successful. 
When we try to think differently, our work has significantly more potential 
to engender a true paradigm shift.
At the moment, however, our writing assessments, particularly in 
large-scale and high-stakes situations, do not often show the mark of a 
contextual paradigm. The tests, for example, we see resulting from the 
requirements of the “No Child Left Behind” Act certainly do not reach 
the level of sophistication in assessment that we would hope to see from 
contextually aware assessment. And the forthcoming additional writing 
section to the SATs is hardly what most of us in composition would call 
a valuable writing test. These high stakes assessments are taking these 
shapes because the dominant paradigm still molds assessments according 
to objectivist principles that are ultimately incompatible with a contextual 
paradigm.
But perhaps this is our fault. We have not provided a viable alternative. 
It is not as if educators are actually satisfied with multiple choice tests and 
timed high-stakes impromptus that have the power to hold a child back 
for another year of fourth grade. Governing bodies want evidence that 
education works, and the tests they are currently using provide informa-
tion that is persuasive within an objectivist framework. The dominant 
paradigm thus far has defined what counts as evidence, but my guess is 
that if someone could provide an alternative kind of evidence—as long as 
it was persuasive—those bodies would be willing to hear it.
In this chapter, I make an argument that is, at first glance, paradoxi-
cal. In order for our theories to be more influential, we need to separate 
them from educational measurement theory. Considering the influence 
of educational measurement, this approach would seem counterintuitive. 
But a primary reason our theories are ineffectual beyond our own borders 
is that whenever we venture outside, we make the connection to educa-
tional measurement, and thus mark those principles as the ones to whom 
we must answer. I begin this chapter with a specific example of the para-
digm clash I have been describing: the release of NCTE and IRA Standards 
for the English Language Arts. The public reception of the standards shows 
us why those of us in post-secondary composition studies need to develop 
independent theoretical principles, and then to develop evidence that 
supports the use of those principles. Without this work, we run the risk of 
making our theories perpetually subordinate to conventional educational 
measurement theory rather than taking the chance that we could make a 
significant and substantive change to the way we do assessment.
S TA N DA R D S  A N D  VA L U E S
The development and release of the Standards for the English Language Arts,
sponsored by the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) and 
the International Reading Association (IRA) (1996) provides us with a 
clear example of a moment when ideals about literacy instruction and the 
conventions of educational measurement theory collided. The Standards
embodies a contextual literacy paradigm as I describe it in chapter two, 
treating literacy as an integrated and ongoing activity that cannot be dis-
sected into discrete skills and arguing explicitly for the necessary influ-
ence of local contexts in determining the specifics of any curriculum. 
Both before and after its release, critics directly challenged the theoretical 
ground on which the Standards rests, arguing that any “standards” deserv-
ing of the name require concrete, observable, and measurable marks of 
achievement. In their public statements, they argue that these standards 
are not “standards” because they fail to include benchmarks and thus pro-
vide no means for measuring success or failure. Such an objectivist posi-
tion stands in contrast to the contextually oriented theoretical position of 
the Standards. The release of the Standards and the ensuing criticism thus 
provide an example of the clash of paradigms, of a prolonged and public 
moment in which the values of contemporary literacy instruction fail to 
meet the requirements of objectivity exhibited in calls for assessment.
The Standards draws on the National Literacy Act of 1991, which calls 
for students to develop linguistic ability to “compute and solve problems 
at levels of proficiency necessary to function on the job and in society, 
to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s knowledge and potential” 
(NCTE and IRA 4). In response, the document presents a definition of 
literacy that encompasses far more than a technocratic emphasis on the 
ability to read and write and that relies explicitly on the contextuality 
of literate abilities and acts: “the capacity to accomplish a wide range 
of reading, writing, speaking, and other language tasks associated with 
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everyday life” (73). This definition, “both broader and more demanding 
than traditional definitions” (73), includes the ability to use language in 
written, spoken, and visual forms, reflecting a move away from the limited 
technocratic definition focused on reading and writing and toward the 
ideal of “educating” students within particular situations—the emphasis 
of the contextual paradigm.
The twelve content standards reflect this broad definition and empha-
size students as active learners in classrooms that implement the given 
guidelines. Figure 1 presents the standards, numbered as they are in 
the text, and although they appear lengthy here, they are considerably 
shorter than the standards produced in the other content areas.
F I G U R E  1
NCTE & IRA Standards for the English Language Arts
1. Students read a wide range of print and nonprint texts to build an understand-
ing of texts, of themselves, and of the cultures of the United States and the 
world; to acquire new information; to respond to the needs and demands of 
society and the workplace; and for personal fulfillment. Among these texts are 
fiction and nonfiction, classic and contemporary works.
2. Students read a wide range of literature from many periods in many genres to 
build an understanding of the many dimensions (e.g., philosophical, ethical, 
aesthetic) of human experience.
3. Students apply a wide range of strategies to comprehend, interpret, evaluate, 
and appreciate texts. They draw on their prior experience, their interactions 
with other readers and writers, their knowledge of word meaning and of 
other texts, their word identification strategies, and their understanding of 
textual features (e.g., sound-letter correspondence, sentence structure, con-
text, graphics).
4. Students adjust their use of spoken, written, and visual language (e.g., 
conventions, style, vocabulary) to communicate effectively with a variety of 
audiences and for different purposes.
5. Students employ a wide range of strategies as they write and use different 
writing process elements appropriately to communicate with different audi-
ences for a variety of purposes.
6. Students apply knowledge of language structure, language conventions (e.g., 
spelling and punctuation), media techniques, figurative language, and genre 
to create, critique, and discuss print and nonprint texts.
7. Students conduct research on issues and interests by generating ideas and 
questions, and by posing problems. They gather, evaluate, and synthesize 
data from a variety of sources (e.g., print and nonprint texts, artifacts, people) 
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to communicate their discoveries in ways that suit their purpose and audi-
ence.
8. Students use a variety of technological and informational resources (e.g., 
libraries, databases, computer networks, video) to gather and synthesize 
information and to create and communicate knowledge.
9. Students develop an understanding of and respect for diversity in language 
use, patterns, and dialects across cultures, ethnic groups, geographic regions, 
and social roles.
10. Students whose first language is not English make use of their first language 
to develop competency in the English language arts and to develop under-
standing of content across the curriculum.
11. Students participate as knowledgeable, reflective, creative, and critical mem-
bers of a variety of literacy communities.
12. Students use spoken, written, and visual language to accomplish their own 
purposes (e.g., for learning, enjoyment, persuasion, and the exchange of 
information).
© 1996 National Council of Teachers of English and International Reading Association 
Each of the standards tends to link written, spoken, and visual literacies 
so that the combination encourages ongoing student learning. Most of 
the standards suggest the integration of these literate abilities, and several 
incorporate all three explicitly. Even where one aspect of literacy is high-
lighted, the language of the standards frequently undercuts the bound-
aries by incorporating all three types of literate activities. For example, 
Standard 1 foregrounds reading but broadens the definition of “reading” 
by explicitly incorporating the reading of nonprint texts, drawing visual 
and even spoken texts into the domain of objects that can be “read.” The 
emphasis on integrated literate activity suggests that each literacy—spo-
ken, written, and visual—influences the others, and that literacy educa-
tion is not easily separated from the activities of daily life, certainly not as 
easily separated from daily life as a specific requirement for the reading 
of Hamlet, for example, would be.
Thus, the Standards ground literacy instruction in time and space, 
and both teachers and students purposefully engage with such locators. 
The authors of the Standards use such contextual terms as they define 
the intended purpose of the document: “to ensure that all students are 
knowledgeable and proficient users of language so that they may succeed 
in school, participate in our democracy as informed citizens, find challeng-
ing and rewarding work, appreciate and contribute to our culture, and 
pursue their own goals and interests as independent learners throughout 
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their lives” (1996, vii). This purpose or—perhaps more accurately—these 
purposes claim that literate ability is invaluable to students in their pursuit 
of goals in specific contexts: in school, in democracy, in employment, in 
culture. While these goals collectively imply a relatively broad context—
perhaps paraphrased as the idealized context of the United States—under-
lying them is the notion that literacy is meaningful not in some abstract 
sense, but in the specific situations that individual students encounter.
While the authors do not outline a context more specific than this, they 
do develop a theoretical position which would require individual teach-
ers and others who develop curricula to engage with their own particular 
contexts of instruction. The theme of contextuality runs throughout the 
Standards, appearing in two related forms. First, the authors insist that lit-
eracy instruction must take place in ways that are meaningful to students’ 
lives.35 This call for literacy instruction grounded in students’ lives is not 
particularly radical given even a limited understanding of contemporary 
literacy scholarship: language instruction is more effective and language 
ability improves more in contexts where the literate act is purposeful from 
the perspective of the student.
The second claim follows from the first but is more radical. According 
to the authors, just as literate acts must be purposeful, literacy instruction 
must be purposeful, and no national standard can determine specific 
purposes for all settings. That is, the authors argue that the Standards can-
not define the literacy benchmarks, curricula, or measures for individual 
schools, districts, or even states. They point out, for example, that stan-
dardized testing tends to divert classroom time away from “actual perfor-
mance” and that the prescribed use of particular textbooks “discourages 
teachers from using materials that take advantage of students’ interests 
and needs and that involve them productively in the curriculum” (1996, 
7). Beyond denouncing universalized multiple-choice tests and basal 
readers, the authors enact their own theory by refusing to provide any 
prescriptive lists of grade-level skills or texts with which students should 
be familiar. By contrast, all the other content area standards developed 
under the same federal impetus provide lists of skills and areas of knowl-
edge that students should possess by particular grade levels, usually 4th, 
8th, and 12th. The authors of the language arts standards, however, claim 
that such benchmarks for language arts education can be determined only
in the specific context of instruction.
In refusing to develop benchmarks, the authors were explicitly guided, 
in part, by the National Academy of Education’s principle of the purposes 
and limitations of content standards: “Content standards should embody 
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a coherent, professionally defensible conception of how a field can be 
framed for purposes of instruction. They should not be an exhaustive, 
incoherent compendium of every group’s desired content” (NCTE and 
IRA viii). This principle specifies the result of a standards project—frame-
work, not inventory—and that the framework should be grounded in 
principles recognized by the profession. The professional defensibility 
of the Standards stems substantially from the principles of the contextual 
paradigm that currently dominates literacy scholarship. When the peda-
gogical emphasis that adheres to the idea of standards is combined with 
the theoretical emphasis on context, the principles of the contextual 
paradigm emerge in practice: locally developed curricula and materials; 
locally determined needs and emphases; locally designed assignments 
and assessments.
The Standards demonstrates an admirable philosophical integrity. 
Perhaps motivated by the loss of governmental funding36—and its accom-
panying influence—the theoretical position that the document takes 
represents the best of contemporary literacy scholarship. Embracing 
what I have called the contextual paradigm of literacy scholarship, the 
Standards argues that local contextual factors are absolutely crucial to 
the development of specific language arts curricula and that fluency in a 
range of integrated rhetorical practices, not familiarity with a particular 
set of texts and skills, constitutes proficient literate ability. The authors of 
the Standards took this position in spite of the reception that they knew 
it would receive. Many criticisms appeared relatively early in the drafting 
phase; a significant contributor to the loss of DOE funding was the charge 
of “vagueness” exemplified by the lack of specific texts and skills which 
were provided in other content area standards. In a politically charged 
atmosphere, amid calls for “back to basics” and skill-and-drill education, 
the Standards embodies a philosophically responsible conception of the 
field of literacy instruction.
C L A S H I N G  PA R A D I G M S
However philosophically consistent and commendable, the Standards for 
the English Language Arts has been criticized by many people from teach-
ers to the President of the United States.37 Detractors charge the authors 
with equivocation, political correctness, relativism, and obfuscation. An 
often-quoted editorial in the New York Times entitled “How Not to Write 
English” claims that the standards are written “in a tongue barely recog-
nizable as English” and asks “Who can differ with them, since nobody can 
know what they mean?” (How Not to Write English 1996, A22).
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Most of the critics take the position that appeared in “Language Arts 
Standards Flawed, Says AFT”: what the NCTE and IRA have offered is 
not a set of “standards” but rather “a philosophical discussion” (1996, 
2). While the authors of the Standards probably would not disagree 
with this characterization—although they might question the distinc-
tion between “standards” and “philosophical discussion”—critics clearly 
intend “philosophical discussion” to be pejorative. Commentators’ 
opinions on this “discussion” range from considering it interesting but 
irrelevant to classroom instruction, to finding it entirely unclear and 
consequently worthless, to believing it dangerous to the educational 
health of the nation.38
Not surprisingly, the Standards has received the most negative criticism 
for delegating the development of specific criteria to the local context. 
Many critics argue that the absence of benchmarks renders the entire 
document at the very least inconsequential. For example, Albert Shanker, 
then-President of the American Federation of Teachers, argues that with-
out benchmarks, the standards “provide . . . only the vaguest advice on 
what [students] should know by the end of high school . . . ” (Language 
Arts Standards Flawed, Says AFT 1996, 2). Without specifics, according to 
Shanker, the Standards fails in its mission to provide national instructional 
guidance. Michael Cohen, a senior adviser to the Secretary of Education, 
concurs, contending that the standards “don’t tell parents or students 
what is important to learn and don’t tell teachers what is important to 
teach and by when” (Tabor 1996, A12). Shanker and Cohen are most 
concerned about the absence of benchmarks, which, they claim, would 
not only provide direction for educators, but which should also be used 
for judging the progress of individual students and the efforts of teachers 
and educational institutions. Their claim is that without such benchmarks 
the Standards are not “standards” at all.
Much of the problem seems to be definitional. According to the critics, 
the Standards does not provide actual standards, but rather some sort of 
spineless, self-serving professional statement. Their objections are based 
on certain expectations about what constitutes a “standard,” and clearly 
they are imagining something different. A “standard,” according to these 
critics, would offer a basis for comparison and measurement, “a measure 
of qualitative or quantitative value” as Shanker defines it (1996, E7). This 
denotation differs fundamentally from “a coherent, professionally defen-
sible conception of how a field can be framed for purposes of instruction” 
(NCTE and IRA viii). Where the critics want concrete marks of achieve-
ment, the authors of the Standards provide models for instruction. This 
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definitional problem exemplifies the paradigmatic clash I have been 
outlining. On the one hand, the definition of “standard” that the critics 
rely on takes an objectivist—and even positivist—edge in the integration 
of hierarchy and measurement. On the other hand, the authors of the 
Standards rely on a definition specific to instructional contexts drawn 
from the National Academy of Education, making no mention of mea-
surement or hierarchy and claiming that standards delineate professional 
positions. Benchmarks for student performance, they maintain, must be 
determined in local contexts.
The two primary concerns outlined in the criticisms discussed above—
hierarchy and measurement—run throughout most of the negative com-
mentary on the Standards. Both point to a desire to differentiate among 
levels of ability and performance in ways that can be numerically assessed. 
According to the critics, the Standards provides no method for assessment, 
no mark to measure against. J. Martin Rochester, for example, describes 
the Standards as “long on vague, semi-assessable ‘higher-order skills’ (critical 
thinking, construction of meanings, and so forth)” and short on “basics,” 
which presumably can be fully measured (1996, 35, my emphasis). Then-
President Clinton echoes this position when he claims that “you will 
never know whether your standards are being met unless you have some 
sort of measurement and have some sort of accountability” (1996). The 
implication of these positions is that if some quality or ability cannot be 
measured, it does not belong in the Standards. In addition to the need for 
measurability, the critics also claim that any standard should be applicable 
to all students in all locations, and that this is the only way to encourage 
national excellence in education. Their arguments are based, at least in 
part, on notions of equality and fairness that would universalize educa-
tional goals (within the United States), providing all students, at least 
ideally, with the same information, abilities, and opportunities by the end 
of formal schooling (Shanker 1996, E7). These arguments are consistent 
with an objectivist paradigm.
They are also consistent with the technocratic paradigm. Technocratic 
literacy argues for universalized instructional goals based on the dissec-
tion and sequencing of acts of reading and writing, and such a literacy can 
be effectively assessed by objectivist measures. Contextual literacy, howev-
er, cannot. When the critics apply a definition of “standard” that incorpo-
rates measurement of universal benchmarks, they have no means to judge 
the value of contextual literacy scholarship, much less the instructional 
products of such a theoretical approach, except by the standards of objec-
tivism—which ultimately do not apply to contextual literacy.
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The development and release of the Standards for the English Language 
Arts demonstrate the ways in which the prevailing objectivist paradigm of 
assessment and the contextual paradigm of contemporary literacy schol-
arship compete in educational policy. Effectively incompatible, these two 
paradigms collide in the assessment of literate ability, particularly when 
such assessment must satisfy public instructional goals. In the case of the 
Standards, the authors applied ideals of the contextual paradigm to a situ-
ation that, according to the critics, required an objectivist response.
Both positions are justifiable. From the authors’ standpoint, the sub-
title of the Standards—“For the Profession, By the Profession: A Guide 
for Discussion”—indicates not only that the document is intended for 
a particular and knowledgeable audience, but also that the authors 
never intended the standards to remain immutable. From the critics’ 
perspective, however, the Standards by definition should be a statement 
open to public scrutiny that would catalog the abilities and texts with 
which all elementary, middle and high school students in the United 
States should be familiar, just as all the other standards documents do. 
Both positions are reasonable from within their own perspectives. But 
to claim that both are justifiable does not mean that both positions are 
equally legitimate. All “justifiable” means is that someone can provide 
logical or other reasonable support for a claim. To say that something 
is “legitimate” is to give it the force of a relevant paradigm. The critics’ 
position is only legitimate within a framework that values quantification 
and objectivity. While a substantial portion of the public accepts this 
premise, a tyranny of the majority does not make the position somehow 
“correct” or “best.”
The authors’ position is stronger for two reasons. First—and more 
important from the authors’ standpoint—the document is born of disci-
plinary expertise, of knowledge gained and accepted by scholars in the 
field. The absence of public acceptance does not signal an equivalent 
absence of professional acceptance. Second, the authors’ position admits 
the public’s wishes. The Standards, for example, does not deny schools 
or districts the right to develop objective requirements or measures; it 
does, however, make the particular institutions responsible for those 
local decisions. The authors of the Standards, following their disciplinary 
contextual paradigm, declined to decide for those in contexts who, they 
would argue, should decide for themselves. The authors perhaps needed 
a better public relations manager, but they could not and should not have 
produced booklists and benchmarks. Such a set of standards would have 
been professionally irresponsible.
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To simply claim that one position is superior to the other, however, 
would miss the point that the distance between them reflects a paradig-
matic gap. The Standards attempts to put into practice the contextual 
paradigm of literacy scholarship, the prevailing theoretical position in 
literacy studies. This attempt fell flat in large part because the practical 
context in which the Standards must operate is currently governed by the 
objectivist paradigm of assessment, which requires valid and reliable mea-
sures of ability. It would be implausible for proponents of either position 
to move outside of their respective contexts without concrete reasons for 
doing so. Such a move is unlikely because each paradigm has its own com-
peting understanding of what constitutes acceptable claims and evidence, 
that is, what constitutes a valid argument.
The release of the NCTE and IRA Standards represents a particu-
larly public clash between the competing paradigms of contextuality 
and objectivism, and the result has been a public denouncement, not a 
debate. The outcry seems to have resulted in large part because of the 
indirect confrontation to assessment methods suggested by the Standards.
Without booklists and benchmarks to test against, the Standards chal-
lenged the “normal” means for assessing student ability, but without 
directly addressing why those methods should be altered and without 
explaining how to do so. Although the authors had little say in the tim-
ing—the Standards appeared in response to a national project developed 
on the DOE’s timetable—and although they produced a theoretically and 
professionally defensible document, their work appeared at the wrong 
moment. Their challenge to assessment was unheralded and, in the 
public eye, uncalled for. Before the public will accept the Standards—and
they have not yet—they will need to understand how and why assessment 
practices need to change.
O U R  FA I L U R E  A N D  O U R  WO R K
Developing a convincing explanation for why writing assessment practices 
need to change and making that explanation public is our job. Part of the 
tragedy of the Standards, I believe, is that we—post-secondary educators, 
assessment theorists, and compositionists—did not stand up for the educa-
tors who developed that document. Here was a moment when we could 
have thrown our weight behind a gutsy theoretical and political effort and 
made it clear both to K-12 educators and to political entities that there are 
principles worth taking seriously in this document. Instead, we were silent.
Yet, to be frank, even if we had spoken out, our influence would not 
likely have made much difference. Had we said, “These standards are 
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theoretically sound,” I feel fairly confident that we would have heard dis-
missive comments about the idealized world of the ivory tower. The tim-
ing of the release was off for us, too. Not only was the public not ready to 
hear what the authors of the Standards had to say, but those of us working 
in post-secondary writing assessment were also not prepared to defend 
them. At the time the Standards were released in 1996, even our cutting-
edge assessment efforts, as I discussed in chapter three, were either too 
impracticable to be taken seriously or still beholden to educational mea-
surement theory in ways that would have undercut our own arguments. 
Constructivist evaluation was (and is) too complex to explain quickly and 
clearly to non-experts, and it was not being used in ways that would pro-
vide the kind of evidence necessary to support the Standards. We might 
have been able to use the idea of stakeholders to support claims for the 
need for local curricular decision-making, but when faced with ques-
tions of about testing practices, we would not have had strong answers 
compatible with the theory of the Standards. Our expert reader model 
work at the time could have answered part of the testing question, but 
only part. Moreover, at the time it was too closely tied theoretically with 
objectivist principles. While we might have been able to use it to argue 
that experts could make the decisions about success or failure, the shape 
of the actual tests would still have been based on the objectivist principles 
that the expert reader model itself was relying on at the time. Most likely, 
we would have been accused of simply doing assessment “wrong.” I doubt 
that either of these could have provided the theoretical support the 
authors of the Standards needed at the time.
The battle over the Standards shows us how deeply normal the objectiv-
ist paradigm has been and still is in assessment situations. Without specifi-
cally referring to theory, critics of the Standards challenged the principles 
on which the document was based, demanding objectivist principles in 
place of the contextual ones offered. Those challenges focused on how 
the Standards deviated from accepted practice. The document was wrong-
headed, critics argued, because it did not provide universal benchmarks, 
because it relied on local contexts for specific decision making, because 
it refused to privilege one discourse over another. And these failures were 
seen as failures of the obvious: failures of convention and failures of what 
everyone knows that standards, as a matter of course, must do.
This is the public’s opinion—and here I am including the govern-
ment as a representative of the public—but public opinion should not 
control theory, not even when such assessments are accountable to the 
public. The public has and should have influence; it is, after all, one of 
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the stakeholders in education. But the public’s opinion in this case—and 
certainly in a few others—was based on partial or out-dated information. 
The public claims normalcy for instructional practices like standardized 
testing and common benchmarks because they know of no reasonable 
or viable alternative. The Standards was premature, sent to a public that 
was not ready for it. And while the document was elegantly simple and 
direct, it did not have the weight of evidence behind it. Without the evi-
dence and without the appearance of normalcy, it was doomed from the 
start—precisely because it was a public document, regardless of its claims 
to be “For the Profession, By the Profession.”
Such a negative reaction and subsequent relegation to obscurity is 
the probable fate of any efforts toward significant change in assessment 
begun at the K-12 level. K-12 public education is, by definition, very 
public and very much tied to governmental bodies. Those to whom K-12 
education is accountable require proof that methods are working, proof 
that their money is well spent and productive. And they will require proof 
in forms that are well understood and familiar. Educators at this level will 
not likely be able to make the kind of significant changes in theory that 
will support meaningful changes in practice precisely because everything 
they do is subject to public and governmental scrutiny that bases decisions 
on accepted practice.
Post-secondary education, on the other hand, has the luxury of theoriz-
ing apart from public demands. Not that we never come under the public 
microscope, but given the structure of higher education and the freedom 
afforded those of us working in it, we can explore alternative approaches, 
take the time to theorize the assessments we do, and gather evidence to 
support those practices we find sound without having to answer to public 
scrutiny at each step. Public K-12 education has to fight the front line 
battles with the “No Child Left Behind” Act and similar mandates. We at 
the post-secondary level do not—at least not to the same degree. We need 
to use this insulation to our advantage—and ultimately to theirs.
S E PA R AT I S M
One way to press our advantage, the way I am specifically advocating here, 
is to separate ourselves from objectivist principles and try out alternative 
models. This means thinking separately. The historical analysis I offered 
in the first two chapters explains how historically, writing assessment came 
to be tied to objectivist principles and continues this connection despite 
changes in literacy theory. As long as our theories remain tied to objectiv-
ist principles, our assessments will continue to be dominated by objectivist 
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thinking whenever we bring them to the public’s attention. That is, if we 
rely on objectivist principles, we open ourselves to the criticism that we 
are not doing educational measurement “right,” even if our methods are 
deliberately based on a reshaping of those principles. Validity may have 
value, as may reliability, but because these terms are inseparable at this 
moment from the objectivist paradigm that has dominated their use for 
nearly a century, we are unlikely to be able to co-opt them successfully. We 
need to think about assessment without this baggage.
I know full well I am arguing for separation at a moment when dis-
ciplinary boundaries are blurring, but the separation I am arguing for 
is theoretical, not specifically disciplinary. Educational measurement 
theory in general may be mired in an objectivist paradigm, but this does 
not mean that all educational measurement theorists are, as I indicated 
in the last chapter. There is a lot of promise in the work of Moss and 
Delandshere and Petrosky, for example, when that work is treated sepa-
rately from the objectivist leanings of the discipline. To do so from within 
educational measurement is their job. To do so for writing assessment is 
ours. And, perhaps, as we go about this work, we can help each other. 
My own thinking about theories of writing assessment generally and 
about the principles I develop in the next chapter has been significantly 
influenced by my reading of educational measurement theorists as well 
as compositionists.
The first four chapters of this study have been archaeological in the 
Foucauldian sense of the word. By treating writing assessment as a scene 
in which struggles are played out, I have been able to explore the incon-
gruities and tensions in this part of our field. What we have is a set of 
difficult issues, of very real problems that require our attention, but our 
attention is frequently diverted by the conventional theoretical demands 
of assessment. Whenever this happens, we traditionally have returned to 
validity and reliability, putting more radical criteria on hold while we jus-
tify our work according to conventional methods. Haswell does this, for 
example, when he provides reliability data for an assessment process that 
he justifies in its own right with categorization theory. If categorization 
theory had sufficient support, would the reliability data be necessary? As 
a result of this kind of justification, the majority of our theorizing is dilut-
ed, if it is not outright undermined by our perceived need to meet the 
demands of those operating from more traditional assessment theories.
When writing assessment is understood as a Foucauldian scene, we 
see it a place of paradigmatic struggle. Archaeology exposes the struggle 
and the knowledges that are subjugated in the process of that struggle. 
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In the case of writing assessment, our knowledge, for example, of how to 
value writing with contextual sensitivity has been subjugated in favor of 
more universal evaluation. Work such as Broad’s and Haswell’s and much 
of what has been done at Washington State suggests what our theoriz-
ing might look like if we bracket educational measurement theory. I will 
return to these studies in chapter seven, but for now, it is important to 
note that these assessments can be understood without relying on edu-
cational measurement theory for justification. This is the genealogical 
part of my study: One way to deploy our understanding of subjugated 
knowledges tactically, to a different advantage, is to reject the claims of 
educational measurement theory and to proceed without it. What might 
writing assessment theory look like if we ignored the principles of educa-
tional measurement? What if, instead, we develop models that speculate 
about the purpose and shape of assessment on our own terms, and then 
we test those terms out? 
This does not mean a total separation; I am not suggesting that we 
go to our corner and play with our own toys, never to return. That way 
lies obscurity. Instead, I am advocating a suspension of the connections 
between our own theories and traditional educational measurement 
theory, particularly where those connections are of our own making. This 
will not always be possible; it is not possible at the K-12 level presently, for 
example. But in places where we study assessment, where we develop pilot 
programs, and where we think through methods of valuing and evaluat-
ing, we should allow ourselves the separation and see what develops.
We need to do this because we have questions that the current domi-
nant paradigm in writing assessment cannot answer. Conventional edu-
cational measurement theory cannot satisfactorily answer our questions 
about context or about the role of expertise in evaluation. When this 
kind of theoretical gap exists, the possibility of a paradigm shift appears. 
Paradigm shifts, for Kuhn, are partly political—or, perhaps more accu-
rately, rhetorical. When one set of theoretical approaches becomes more 
persuasive than another, the paradigm changes. The old is not lost and 
the new does not completely take over, but the balance of power shifts, 
and what is accepted as normal changes. Kuhn, however, is primarily 
talking about paradigm shifts within the same field, and the upheaval is 
localized. Perhaps because the paradigms I am talking about come from 
two different fields, the configuration of the shift is somewhat different. 
In this case, we have a very generalized dominant paradigm, as the public 
outcry over the Standards indicates, and even the President feels justified 
weighing in on the issue. We have a kind of David and Goliath scenario, 
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except that instead of picking up the stones we know how to use, we keep 
trying to use Goliath’s own sword against him, sometimes at the same 
time we are trying to push it aside. This is because we have not yet taken 
the time to develop our own evidence to support our own theoretical 
approaches. I believe it makes sense to separate ourselves and gather our 
evidence so that our challenges to the dominant paradigm are stronger.
However, separatism cannot be a way of life. To adopt it would be to 
leave those in K-12, for example, as high and dry as we did when the 
Standards were released. Going off in our own corner and developing a 
paradigm by ourselves will not result in a shift that matters to anyone but 
us, and in most cases, when we talk about the limitations of educational 
measurement theory within our own discipline, we are already preaching 
to the converted. Separation without recombination will merely result 
in two circles of influence, one of them significantly larger and more 
influential than the other. The separation I am advocating is and should 
be temporary. But if we take the time to think through theories on our 
own—and at the post-secondary level, we have the luxury of doing so—we 
will come back to the scene with evidence enough to challenge the domi-
nant paradigm and change the larger dialog.
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T H E O R I Z I N G  W R I T I N G  A S S E S S M E N T
In “Toward a New Theory of Writing Assessment,” Brian Huot contends 
that “it is premature to attempt any full-blown discussion of the criteria 
for newer conceptions of writing assessment” (1996b, 561), a position 
he reiterates in 2002. I am not sure this was true, even in 1996, and I am 
even more convinced that it is not true now. Huot, like many composi-
tionists, chooses to support contemporary validity theory on the belief 
that contemporary educational measurement theory will work for writing 
assessment. And it is possible. It is certainly the safer and surer route. If 
we do what the establishment is saying is a “good thing,” we cannot go 
wrong—at least not very far.
But safe is not necessarily best or most productive. Pressures for 
assessment are rising as a result of legislation such as the “No Child Left 
Behind” Act, and traditional theory is supporting assessments that most 
of us find at least questionable. For example, local elementary schools in 
my county are switching to a numeric “grading” system where students 
receive 4, 3, 2, or 1 based on “whether students have met state standards 
and are ready to go to the next grade” (Hui 2003). This system bears a 
striking and chilling resemblance to the 4–point holistic system used to 
evaluate portfolios as an exit from first-year composition at some universi-
ties. It is a system being used to cut out the credit students get for effort 
that appears in letter grades, and to better reflect “the scale used on the 
state’s end-of-grade tests” (Hui 2003).
I think we are finding, like those educational measurement scholars 
working in complex performance assessment, that existing theoretical 
structures in educational assessment do not provide the kind of support, 
justification, and direction that we need as we evaluate the work our stu-
dents do. As I have tried to show thus far, existing approaches tend to rely 
too heavily on existing terminology that carries far too much baggage. In 
educational assessment theory, validity is still trailing reliability in its wake, 
in spite of well-supported calls for hermeneutics. In composition studies, 
alternative approaches so far end up largely ignored, or contorted to 
conform to the norms of validity and reliability. I believe we need a new 
set of principles, not simply a re-configuration or a re-articulation of the 
old ones.
I would further argue that Huot’s work, in part, makes possible just 
such a discussion by contributing both a preliminary set of principles and, 
more importantly, a methodology. His methodology—extrapolating prin-
ciples from existing practices—persuasively suggests that the tools needed 
for theoretical work in writing assessment already exist within composi-
tion studies. Yet, contrary to what his methodology would suggest, he 
chooses to revert to validity for theoretical support for his efforts. This 
chapter continues the work Huot’s essay begins, but it begins at this point 
of contradiction. Instead of adopting a theoretical vocabulary, I want us 
to begin the work of developing such a vocabulary for writing assessment 
that is grounded in and responsive to theoretical principles already at 
work within composition studies.
Developing an alternative theoretical vocabulary has precedents, even 
within the limited review of contemporary practices I offer in this text. 
Guba and Lincoln’s use of “fairness” and “authenticity,” and Smith’s use 
of “adequacy” have contributed significantly to my thinking about the 
lexicon of writing assessment. While these criteria have merit, they are not 
ultimately satisfying; the former pair of terms tends to shape assessment 
as a research project, and the latter term tends to function as a sort of 
minimalist validity rather than as a step away from educational measure-
ment theory. I find “hermeneutics” somewhat helpful, but because it has 
been framed as an alternative to reliability rather than a reconceptualiza-
tion I find it too limiting. Adopting criteria has the advantage of build-
ing on what comes before, but developing criteria has the advantage of 
fresh perspective. What if, instead of looking at what historically has been 
required of assessment practices, we look at what we want when we evalu-
ate writing?
Ultimately, I think composition studies would be better served by 
criteria that arise from the values implicit in theories about composing 
and learning to compose. In chapter two, I argue that those working 
in literacy instruction and scholarship are more interested in the varia-
tions among those who can read and write and the material conditions 
that influence and result from these differences; I also argue that these 
variations and conditions are often the result of power differentials. An 
assessment designed to describe and explain these variations would need 
to take into account a broad understanding of the context in which the 
literate ability is learned and tested, and it would need to be carried out 
in the interests of those affected by the assessment with an awareness of 
how power shapes decisions. The names I have chosen to represent these 
two qualities are “meaningful” and “ethical.”
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I offer these terms in place of “reliability” and “validity.” While there is 
a rough correlation between “meaningful” and “valid” on the one hand 
and “ethical” and “reliable” on the other, the terms I am proposing have 
the advantage of looking outward and inward at the same time. Instead 
of focusing primarily or even exclusively on assessment methodology—as 
“validity” and “reliability” do, at least in the traditional configuration—the 
criteria of “meaningfulness” and “ethics” highlight the context of assess-
ment and the relationships among those involved in the assessment. Such 
an outward turn would counter the myopic tendencies of educational 
measurement theory that, I would argue, have led to an unhealthy obses-
sion with technicalities. “Meaningfulness” and “ethics” provide a broader 
view and would, at least potentially, address the primary assessment con-
cerns of compositionists: that, for example, assessment be substantive, 
purposeful, responsive, and fair. These terms, I believe, provide a lexicon 
for theorizing writing assessment dependent not on inappropriate objec-
tivist epistemologies, but on principles accepted within the composition 
community.
In this chapter, I explore the merits of these terms as principles 
around which a theory of writing assessment might take shape. 
“Meaningfulness,” as I am developing the term, describes the signifi-
cance of the assessment, its purpose and substance, and draws attention 
to the object of assessment. In addition to the more obvious object-
oriented questions—“what is the assessment about?” and “what does it 
mean?”—“meaningfulness” raises a series of related questions, including 
“meaningful to whom?” and “for what purpose?” The answers to queries 
of this sort tie evaluation explicitly to the situation in which literacy 
instruction takes place, to the parties involved and the location in which 
it is conducted, that is, to assessment in context. “Meaningfulness,” 
therefore, structures the relationships among the object(s) of writing 
assessment, the purposes of that assessment and the circumstances in 
which the assessment takes place.39
While “meaningfulness” highlights the object of assessment, “ethics” 
focuses on the effects of evaluation practices, the means of assessment, 
and the uses of the results—all of which draw attention to the participants 
in and processes of assessment projects. The inclusion of “ethical” here 
comes from the initial impulse that led to objective testing: the desire to 
be fair. Whether or not reliability in the statistical sense is moot, as Huot 
argues, the impulse to be fair remains. The concept of “ethics” poten-
tially provides a set of conceptual tools for organizing, analyzing, and 
describing the relationships among participants in assessment situations, 
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which would incorporate ideals of fairness. For contemporary writing 
assessment, what is needed is a formulation of “ethics” that depends not 
on abstractions and absolutes such as reproducibility, which would rep-
licate the aims of objectivity, but rather on social or community values. 
The principles of communicative ethics in the work of Jürgen Habermas 
and Seyla Benhabib in critical theory, with some modification due to the 
particular situation of assessment, sufficiently parallel current thinking 
in composition studies to provide a basis for organizing the relationships 
among participants in writing assessment situations.
Figure 2 summarizes the objectives of meaningfulness and ethics as 
principles for writing assessment. Each term is discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter.
F I G U R E  2
Objectives of Meaningfulness and Ethics
Meaningful Assessment
• Defines the significance of the assessment
• Structures the relationships among the object(s) of writing assessment, the 
purposes of that assessment and the circumstances in which the assessment 
takes place.
Ethical Assessment
• Addresses the broad political and social issues surrounding assessment
• Organizes and provides principles for understanding the conduct of the 
participants and the procedures for evaluation
These terms begin the work of theorizing writing assessment in compo-
sition’s terms. Theories provide explanatory schemes: systematic state-
ments of principles that constitute a perspective, not unlike a Burkean 
terministic screen, more or less insightful depending on the context. 
Composition studies has labored for the better part of a century with an 
explanatory scheme for writing assessment that has little to do with what 
we know about literate ability and that does not or cannot acknowledge 
the value of commonplace practices in the discipline. The vocabulary I 
offer here draws from theories and practices valued within composition 
studies. The terms “meaningful” and “ethical” suggest one possible way to 
structure and analyze writing assessment that coincides with what compo-
sitionists already know about writing and learning to write.
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P R I N C I P L E S  I N  P L AC E
“What compositionists already know about writing and learning to write” 
covers an extensive and disputed territory, and I do not pretend that 
the principles I am exploring here could thoroughly address such an 
expanse. Within the discipline, however, there exist a limited number 
of principles about which, I would argue, compositionists agree. One 
such, as I discuss in chapter two, constitutes the heart of the contextual 
paradigm of literacy: context is integral to the meaning and value of any 
literate act. This contextual paradigm is arguably a subset of the broader 
paradigm of social constructionism—an epistemological position influ-
encing disciplines throughout the academy and one generally accepted 
by compositionists.40 Social constructionist thought is based on the notion 
that knowledge is constructed in social settings, by persons in context. 
Although this epistemology is hardly uncontested, scholars in composi-
tion studies generally accept its central tenet. Because of this widespread 
endorsement, it serves as a reasonable starting point for developing theo-
retical principles for writing assessment.
For those unfamiliar with the concept, here is a quick summary. Social 
constructionist thought was introduced to composition studies primar-
ily through the work of Kenneth Bruffee in the mid-1980s. In a series of 
articles and interchanges in College English, Bruffee argues that
A social constructionist position in any discipline assumes that entities we 
normally call reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves, and so on are 
constructs generated by communities of like-minded peers. Social construc-
tion understands reality, knowledge, thought, facts, texts, selves, and so on 
as community-generated and community-maintained linguistic entities—or, 
more broadly speaking, symbolic entities—that define or “constitute” the com-
munities that generate them. (1986, 774)
Social constructionism is first and foremost an epistemological position, 
offering “assumptions about the very nature of the known, the knower, and 
the discourse community involved in considering the known” (Berlin 1987, 
3). Social constructionism stands in primary contrast to objectivist and sub-
jectivist epistemologies. Where social constructionism foregrounds the ways 
in which understanding is shaped and assembled by those doing the under-
standing, an objectivist or positivist epistemology finds knowledge and real-
ity to be outside of the knower, independent and immutable. The objective 
knower’s job is to find—not make—knowledge, and Truth is the ultimate 
goal. The subjective knower finds Truth inside herself or through introspec-
tion, and its correlation with an external reality is largely immaterial.
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This idea that knowledge is constructed and not discovered—either 
externally or internally—has had a significant impact on writing instruc-
tion. Early work on the consequences of social constructionism was 
undertaken by James A. Berlin, most notably in his 1987 monograph 
Rhetoric and Reality. Berlin argues that an objectivist epistemology results 
in a “current-traditional rhetoric” where Truth exists prior to language 
and thus language is at best a transparent medium and at worst a distor-
tion. Writing in a current-traditional model, then, is a matter of proper 
precision, clarity, and form so as to reveal Truth. This paradigm, he points 
out, has dominated the twentieth century. A subjectivist epistemology is 
no less troubling for composition studies. If all knowledge is gained inter-
nally, writing cannot be taught. Writing in this model becomes largely a 
matter of empowering the authentic voice within each student, the suc-
cess of which only the writer herself can judge. The result is “writerly” 
prose, prose that may be meaningful to the writer, but which ignores the 
needs and wishes of the audience.
A social constructionist epistemology, which results in what Berlin 
calls “transactional rhetoric,” “sees truth as arising out of the interaction 
of the elements of the rhetorical situation” (1987, 15). Berlin favors the 
“epistemic” variety of transactional rhetoric, which argues that truth is 
constructed in the interaction among writer, reader, language, and mate-
rial reality. Of these elements, language is paramount; the other three 
elements are considered “verbal constructs” (1987, 16). Writing in this 
paradigm is a means of fostering this interaction in the construction of 
situated and contingent meaning. While I am necessarily oversimplifying 
Berlin’s work, which itself has been accused of oversimplification, his 
descriptions of the differences among these three epistemological posi-
tions provide a reasonable overview—or construction—of the primary 
paradigms affecting writing instruction in the twentieth century.
Social constructionism has been the dominant paradigm for more than 
a decade (and nearly two), in composition scholarship if not in practice.41
That is, scholars more readily accept the notion that knowledge—and by 
extension, writing—is socially constructed, than that knowledge resides 
in material reality apart from human and linguistic perception or that 
knowledge is the property of the autonomous individual. Instead of chal-
lenging the idea of social construction, scholars argue about what the 
construction looks like, how community works, and the consequences of 
such an epistemology. Kurt Spellmeyer for example, challenges Bruffee’s 
version of social constructionism on a number of grounds, from its avoid-
ance of the problem of dissent to its inherently contradictory assertion 
that community-developed knowledge is disinterested (1993, 155–92). 
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Spellmeyer does not, however, reject the basic premise that knowledge is 
socially constructed.
In my own development of theoretical principles for writing assess-
ment, I rely on this same premise at the same level of generalization. 
While there are a number of complications and directions for further 
research suggested by the complexities of social constructionism in 
composition, some of which I briefly discuss in my conclusion, this point 
of disciplinary agreement provides an appropriate starting location for 
establishing principles for writing assessment. Social constructionist 
thought provides a bridge between the concepts of “meaningfulness” and 
“ethics” on the one hand and the discipline of composition studies on 
the other. While neither term in and of itself bears a distinctive mark that 
would tie it to composition studies, both suggest a relational or collective 
value structure indicative of the same social constructionist impetus that 
gave rise to the contextual paradigm of literacy. “Meaningfulness” and 
“ethics,” that is, bespeak social values: the terms suggest neither objectiv-
ity nor subjectivity, but social reality constructed by persons in concert 
and in specific settings.
And certainly, the application of social constructionism to writing 
assessment is not without precedent. Social constructionist thought 
already serves as the epistemological base for the development of the 
more progressive guidelines for assessment. The authors of the NCTE 
and IRA Standards, for example, draw attention to the number of educa-
tors, researchers, parents, and legislators who participated in the develop-
ment of the final document. While the authors never claim full consen-
sus, they state that in “reflect[ing] the many different voices, interests, 
and concerns of these diverse contributors” the Standards “captures the 
essential goals of English language arts instruction at the turn of the cen-
tury in the United States of America” (NCTE and IRA viii). The process 
of integrating the positions of numerous participants derives from social 
constructionist principles about the ways in which knowledge develops via 
collaboration and exchange, a process that makes little sense in an objec-
tivist or subjectivist epistemology. Similarly, both the CCCC Committee on 
Assessment (1995) and Brian Huot (2002) argue that evaluation occurs in 
a social context, that reading and writing are social acts, and that meaning 
is made through social engagement. Both Haswell (1998; 2001b; 2001a) 
and Broad (2000; 2003) take the social nature of reading and writing as a 
basis for their work; they almost take it for granted.
Beyond precedent and beyond correlation with existing paradig-
matic influence, there is at least one more compelling reason to actively 
adopt social constructionism as an epistemological base for principles of
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writing assessment: social constructionism promotes radical contingency. 
If knowledge is dependent on community and context, as it is in social 
constructionism, whenever either of these elements changes, knowledge 
must be reconstituted. Changes occur inevitably as faculty, curricula, and 
programmatic goals evolve; moreover, the specific contexts of differing 
institutions also require assessment methodologies to differ. Contemporary 
writing assessment practice, however, has been founded on the criteria of 
validity and reliability, which tend to either erase or ignore differences in 
context. In a social constructionist paradigm, assessment principles and 
procedures—including those I am advocating here—could not be simply 
codified once and for all; they would be entirely contingent on context 
and community. Moreover, should social constructionism lose viability, 
the entire basis for writing assessment would require reconsideration, 
a rethinking that an objectivist paradigm has not been able to accom-
modate. The radical contingency of social constructionism encourages 
revisionary practice such that all assessment procedures should be con-
tinually under review to ensure that they are productive, necessary, and 
appropriate, that they are meaningful and ethical.
M E A N I N G F U L  A S S E S S M E N T
To say that an assessment is “meaningful” is to claim that it has signifi-
cance. In an objectivist paradigm, the significance of an assessment would 
be tied to (ostensibly) universal ideals of writing ability. In a contextual 
constructivist paradigm, however, significance would be dependent on 
the scene in which the assessment takes place. That is, an assessment 
would be meaningful in relation to the needs and values of those within 
the assessment context. Those needs would, at least ideally, direct the 
“purposes” of the assessment and the values would shape the object or 
“substance.”
Thus, the term “meaningful” as I am developing it begins with notions 
of purpose and substance. The idea of purpose as an element of meaning-
fulness draws attention to what evaluators expect an assessment to accom-
plish and for whom. Substance serves as a partner term, focusing on 
the content or subject matter of an assessment. These qualities shift the 
evaluator’s gaze away from the means of testing—which has historically 
been the focus—and toward the reasons for and the object(s) of assess-
ment which, I would argue, constitute a more appropriate center of atten-
tion for assessment. In relying on these terms, I am implicitly arguing 
that before any assessment takes place, those developing the procedure
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need to understand as thoroughly as possible why they are assessing 
and what information they are attempting to gather, or more accurately, 
to construct. Without this understanding, assessment practices easily 
become meaningless.
Of the two, purpose seems the more fundamental issue. Because it 
focuses attention on the intention of the assessment, on why the assess-
ment is productive or necessary or appropriate, purpose generates 
questions about why evaluators want to know the information that the 
assessment will ostensibly produce. Since assessments provide informa-
tion about the subject at hand (in both the person and subject matter 
senses of the word), the reasons for assessment should first be grounded 
in the need for information about the subject: which course, for example, 
the student should be placed in; whether the student is ready for second 
semester composition; if the student has shown progress and the nature 
of that growth. Without a purpose, there is no reason to assess in the first 
place, so questions about the substance—what to assess—never arise.
There are also secondary purposes for assessment practices, such 
as faculty development and curriculum reform, which should also be 
explicit and integrated into any given assessment project. The distinction 
I am making between primary and secondary purposes has to do with the 
difference between necessary information and positive side effects. While 
both are important, the need for information is the direct purpose for 
assessment and should take precedence over anticipated or desired ben-
efits. One way to think about this difference is to consider the effect of the 
assessment on various participants, and students stand a greater chance 
of being harmed by any particular assessment procedure than do faculty. 
For example, in the large-scale proficiency assessment at the University 
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee described by Mary Louise Buley-Meissner and 
Don Perkins (1991), students who fail the proficiency exam—a number 
which includes a high percentage of minority and ESL students—can-
not achieve junior standing and cannot graduate.42 Those who fail suffer 
immediate negative consequences, and thus the assessment holds the 
potential to materially harm students. Because they can be immedi-
ately and directly harmed, assessment purposes that address their needs, 
such as proficiency requirements or placement, should be paramount. 
Purposes that center on faculty, such as faculty development, would be 
supplementary.43 The purposes affecting those with more at stake in the 
results of any specific assessment should take precedence over the pur-
poses affecting those with less.
Theorizing Writing Assessment            123
F I G U R E  3
Questions of Purpose Raised by the Principle of Meaningfulness
Purpose: Why the assessment is productive or necessary or appropriate
Primary Purpose
• What reasons are there for assessing? Why evaluate?
• What effects should the assessment to have on students, at least ideally?
Secondary Purpose
• What effects should the assessment to have on the curriculum, at least
ideally?
• What effects should the assessment to have on the faculty, at least ideally?
Purpose—the reasons for assessment—may be logically prior, but sub-
stance is likely the more complex and difficult issue.44 When evaluators 
develop the substance of an assessment, they are determining what they 
want to know and what they need to do to satisfy their defined purpose(s). 
The former, I would argue, should be a function of disciplinary knowl-
edge; that is, the subject matter of an assessment should draw on an estab-
lished body of knowledge, particularly in the case of large-scale assess-
ments, which draw together multiple local contexts such as classrooms. 
Substance, then, would include the subject matter to be assessed and the 
assessment format(s) that will best yield the necessary information. These 
substantive elements focus explicitly on the relationships between the 
information to be constructed (the results desired and produced) and 
the subject producing the information (the student). These elements 
constitute primary substance.
It is also possible to think about a category of secondary substance that 
would focus on what the evaluators need to do in order to achieve their 
secondary purposes. If, for example, curriculum reform is a secondary 
purpose, the evaluation designers should ask how the assessment could 
contribute to the desired changes. For example, in a move from a modes-
based first-year curriculum to a rhetorically based one, a change in the sub-
ject matter of the test from forms to rhetorical principles will encourage a 
concomitant change in course design. While some of the concerns about 
what an assessment does or should do are ethical—a subject I will con-
sider in the next section—some are substantive. That is, I am suggesting
that the substance of the procedure is an appropriate concern for those 
developing assessments.
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F I G U R E  4
Questions of Substance Raised by the Principle of Meaningfulness
Substance: What assessors want to know and what they need to do to satisfy 
their defined purpose(s)
Primary Substance
• What is the subject matter students should know or what abilities should 
they be able to demonstrate?
• What disciplinary knowledge supports this choice of subject matter and/or 
abilities?
Secondary Substance
• What secondary effects or changes are desired through assessment?
• What assessment processes will achieve these effects or changes?
These questions of purpose and substance, both primary and second-
ary, are not independent of one another. I have already suggested ways 
in which primary and secondary substance might address primary and 
secondary purposes, respectively. In addition, I would argue that for 
meaningful assessment, purpose and substance, taken together, should 
exhibit consistency. Take, for example, a portfolio assessment designed 
both to evaluate students for university requirements of proficiency and 
to evaluate the writing program’s effectiveness. While the same object of 
assessment—student portfolios—can be used for both, the assessments 
themselves have different purposes—determining student achievement 
and determining writing program achievement—and, consequently, 
should have different substances. In the case of establishing student 
achievement, the substance of the assessment should focus on the work 
of individual students and thus would include judgments about stu-
dents’ abilities to work with concepts like rhetorical awareness, academic 
conventions, and critical thinking. In the case of program evaluation, 
the substance should focus on the program as a whole and thus would 
include determinations about the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
the criteria for judging student abilities in relation to the university’s goals 
for student writing ability. Students might only produce one portfolio, but 
the evaluation of the individual student’s work and the evaluation of the 
program using that portfolio should generate separate assessments. One 
assessment procedure would be hard pressed to simultaneously address 
both sets of purposes; the teachers who might read the portfolios, for 
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example, would have difficulty, in the same assessment, judging the legiti-
macy of the criteria they are using. The two purposes, that is, require 
inconsistent, though not necessarily conflicting, substances and should 
thus require different assessment designs.
Continuity, however, cannot ensure meaningfulness. For example, 
the use of multiple-choice tests for placement purposes can easily be 
described as consistent. Their purpose is to place students according to 
their needs, and the correlation between grammatical knowledge and 
writing ability has been well documented. While there are arguments 
that counter the existence and value of the correlation, such assessments 
exhibit an internal consistency. Internal consistency among purposes 
and substances, without reference to some relevant body of knowledge 
independent of the assessment, is insufficient by itself to establish a 
meaningful assessment. I see this as a primary weakness in educational 
measurement theory. The attempt to develop universal principles for 
assessment ignores the particular demands and values that adhere to 
particular subject matters. For some disciplines under some conditions, 
the principles of educational measurement might adequately reflect the 
demands and values of the discipline (e.g., objectivity and universality), 
or alternately, the discipline might hold enough institutional power 
to ensure that its demands and values are addressed whether or not a 
correlation exists with educational measurement theory. Historically, 
however, neither has been the case for composition studies at any level 
of schooling.
My point here is that in large-scale writing assessment, and indeed in 
any assessment that claims broad significance, meaningfulness should be 
a paradigmatic function. In general, the “meaning” of any concept—and 
even whether or not something is considered “meaningful”—can be deter-
mined only with reference to some set of assumptions about what is valu-
able, knowable, reasonable, and so on. Where the application of meaning 
is broad, as in large-scale assessment, those assumptions would need the 
status of paradigm in order to carry weight beyond the local context. 
Because large-scale assessments are widely applicable to a large number of 
people whose immediate contexts differ somewhat (such as the individual 
classes in a first-year writing program), the current dominant paradigm 
relevant to the object of assessment should determine the meaningfulness 
of the assessment. Moreover, because paradigmatic shifts in disciplinary 
knowledge require substantial agreement among the members of disciplin-
ary community, they do not occur often. Paradigmatic knowledge, then, 
provides a reasonably stable, but not immutable, reference point outside 
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any given assessment, as a sort of reality check in the form of primary 
substance. In addition, paradigmatic knowledge is sufficiently flexible to 
allow a wide range of assessment practices. Instead of prescribing a specific 
agenda, such knowledge provides a conceptual framework that guides the 
work in a particular field, including the assessment of students.
The need for paradigmatic correlation between scholarship and assess-
ment that I am advocating here helps explain the troubled reception of 
the NCTE and IRA Standards for the English Language Arts, even beyond 
the problem of defining a “standard.” As I argue in the last chapter the 
two professional groups relied on the contextual paradigm of contempo-
rary literacy theory to develop their standards. Critics of the Standards,
however, relied on a technocratic notion of literacy, as indicated, for 
example, by their calls for benchmarks that would enumerate skills and 
consequently atomize literate ability into teachable and testable units. In 
relying on an older paradigm of literacy, unsupportable in light of cur-
rent disciplinary knowledge, critics called for standards and implicitly for 
assessments that would ultimately be meaningless for evaluating literate 
ability according to those with expertise in the field of writing instruction. 
In order to develop meaningful assessments, those designing procedures 
should be familiar with the relevant current literature and responsible for 
applying that scholarship.
In the case of writing assessment, the object is written evidence of 
literacy, and as I argue in chapter two, the body of contemporary lit-
eracy scholarship evinces a contextual paradigm. For a large-scale writing 
assessment procedure to be meaningful, as I am developing the term, the 
primary substance—what evaluators want to know—would draw on that 
scholarship. For example, contextual literacy attaches meaning in writ-
ing to the location and purpose of that writing, so contextual assessment 
would involve evaluating writing for its ability to respond to rhetorical 
situations. The paradigm also claims an integrated view of writing and 
consequently would encourage the assessment of whole writing tasks 
which treat literate ability as a situated act rather than as discrete skills or 
pieces of information, as would be preferred in a technocratic paradigm. 
The CCCC Committee on Assessment and Brian Huot suggest several 
other assessment “content” issues in line with a contextual view of lit-
eracy—although neither explicitly characterizes them as such—including 
the need for a variety of texts that address a variety of contexts (CCCC 
Committee on Assessment 1995, 432) and the reliance on situated judg-
ments about the success of a piece or pieces of writing without reference 
to abstractions such as “writing quality” (Huot 2002, 102).
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In addition to shaping the content—or primary substance—of assess-
ment, the specific context in which the assessment occurs organizes the 
meaningfulness of the particular assessment practice, serving as a sort of 
container that both shapes its form and limits its scope. Context influ-
ences the form of any particular writing assessment in some obvious ways. 
The requirements of the program and the curriculum, for example, 
should determine both purpose and substance, so that an assessment 
aimed at determining proficiency with conventions of academic writ-
ing should look different than one aimed at determining facility with a 
range of rhetorical situations, both academic and non-academic. So, too, 
should assessments differ depending on the experience and qualifica-
tions of the assessors. A program in which first-year composition is taught 
entirely by tenured and tenure-track English department faculty, regard-
less of scholarly expertise, for example, is likely to result in a different 
set of evaluative criteria than one in which the faculty consists entirely of 
adjuncts and teaching assistants.45 When I say that context shapes assess-
ment, I am referring to the ways in which the pedagogical and practical 
demands of the specific situation influence the form and the meaning of 
the assessment. This connection between literacy instruction and assess-
ment means that the instructional needs and goals of the context define 
the substance of the assessment and consequently its meaningfulness. 
Moreover, as the features of this context change, assessments should be 
reconsidered in light of those changes.
Just as the context shapes assessment, it also contains it. Contexts, that 
is, are boundaries as well as locations. This would explain why assessments 
do not migrate well from context to context. No two contexts are identi-
cal; what would be meaningful in one would not necessarily remain mean-
ingful in another. This is not to say that each assessment must reinvent the 
wheel, but rather that no assessment should be indiscriminately grafted 
onto a different context. Models from other contexts can serve as guides, 
but they should be considered in light of the requirements specific to 
the current context. Nor can a single assessment procedure successfully 
serve multiple purposes. As purpose changes, so does the substance of the 
assessment, making it a different evaluation that is subject to the influ-
ence and limitations of its own context.
If context shapes and limits assessment as I am suggesting, then control 
of any assessment procedure should remain within that context as well 
in order for the results to be meaningful. Only those within the specific 
literacy instruction context can understand the situation sufficiently to 
ensure the continuity among purpose, substance, and instruction and 
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assessment. This means that specific assessment procedures should not be 
mandated from without, although general requirements for assessment 
certainly can be. The authority over assessment, however, is not without 
obligation. Those in charge of the local scene have a responsibility not 
only to apply principles from the relevant scholarship, but also to consult 
those outside the immediate context who have a stake in the assessment 
both to gather information about their needs and expectations and to 
communicate their principles and criteria. For example, writing program 
directors have a responsibility to explain their criteria for assessing exit 
portfolios to the relevant institutional committees and administrators 
when that assessment serves a university-wide requirement for writing 
proficiency. Control does not mean autonomy.
The need to address the concerns of extra-contextual stakeholders 
points to one final issue in making assessment meaningful. As I men-
tioned earlier, the idea that assessment must be meaningful begs the 
question “meaningful to whom?”—the answer to which influences both 
purpose and substance. For example, the reconsiderations of assessment 
of the last decade I have been discussing all argue—either explicitly or 
implicitly—that writing assessments must be meaningful first to students 
and then to teachers. The CCCC Committee is particularly adamant that 
writing assessments at the post-secondary level serve pedagogical ends 
first. Huot also places pedagogical purposes before those further from 
the classroom, and this claim is implicit as well throughout the NCTE and 
IRA Standards. Meaning, however, can vary according to the stakeholders’ 
relationship to the assessment, so that what teachers and students find 
meaningful will not necessarily translate to administrators or to funding 
agencies. This variation has real consequences for design and imple-
mentation of assessment practices and for use of results. The intended 
meaning of an assessment—pedagogical or otherwise—should be under-
stood as thoroughly as possible prior to the assessment itself. Moreover, 
its meaningfulness within the immediate assessment context needs to be 
accessible to those outside of that situation, too.
That is, in order for an assessment to be “meaningful” as I am describ-
ing it here, its purposes should be clear and its substance defined so 
that those involved in the assessment—especially those who could be 
harmed by it and those who need to use it—fully understand it. Students 
and deans alike need to be able to understand not only the assessment 
procedure but also the reasons an assessment is necessary and what it 
consists of. Moreover, all parties, but most particularly those making the 
assessment judgments, need to understand how the assessment stands 
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in relation to what is known and accepted about writing and learning 
to write. Paradigmatic knowledge balances meaningfulness within a par-
ticular context with the predominant thinking of the larger community 
of experts. The balance, however, is not stable. Paradigmatic knowledge 
changes; contexts change far more rapidly. Both conditions reinforce the 
contingency of meaningfulness. Without reference to disciplinary knowl-
edge and without consideration of the particular context—without refer-
ences to contingencies—assessments lose their meaning. Those respon-
sible for assessments should continually reevaluate their procedures, 
particularly in terms of the goals and objects of assessment—its purposes 
and substance—to ensure that their assessments remain meaningful.
E T H I CA L  A S S E S S M E N T
“Meaningfulness” as an organizing term provides direction for develop-
ing purposeful and substantive assessments, but it only indirectly suggests 
how to conduct them, either practically or ethically. Practical concerns, 
such as funding, affect the conduct of assessment primarily at the level of 
local administration and are perhaps best addressed through policy state-
ments such as the CCCC Committee’s (1995) or by procedural guides 
such as White’s Teaching and Assessing Writing (1994c). Ethical issues, 
however, are matters for theoretical consideration where a conception of 
“ethics” can suggest systematic criteria for addressing the broad political 
and social issues surrounding assessment. As I see it, an ethics of assess-
ment ideally would focus on the relationships among those affected by 
the assessment: students, teachers, administrators, legislators, parents 
and so on. Ethical principles would then provide a way of organizing 
and understanding the conduct of the participants, not only in terms of 
their behavior or the procedures for evaluation, but also in terms of the 
broader social and political implications for writing assessment.
The concern for ethics has most frequently appeared in the narrowed 
guise of “fairness.” White, in particular, treats the desire to be fair as a 
paramount concern in writing assessment: “Reliability is a simple way of 
talking about fairness to test takers, and if we are not interested in fair-
ness, we have no business giving tests or using test results” (1993, 93).46
Historically, “fairness” has indicated a desire on the part of teachers and 
test administrators to be just and impartial in their treatment of students. 
“Reliability” has provided a set procedural criteria for ensuring that all 
students would be treated equally, and thus has been roughly equated 
with “fairness” in the literature on writing assessment.47 Arguably, most, if 
not all teachers and administrators want to be fair in their assessments: it 
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would be difficult to find any educator who would say otherwise. Fairness 
was, after all, one of the impulses that led Horace Mann to praise written 
examinations as “impartial” and “just” and to implement them in the first 
place (1845, 330–31).
However, “fairness” seems too limited to provide a sufficiently articu-
lated set of principles for conducting writing assessment projects. While 
the ideal of fairness does succeed in drawing attention to the effect of 
assessment on students and on the relationship between teachers and 
students, this is not the sum-total of the social and political relationships 
at work in evaluative situations. Limiting the relationships to these two 
parties would ignore a great deal of the context, particularly for large-
scale assessments. Perhaps more importantly, “fairness” implies a decon-
textualized even-handedness indicative of an objective epistemology. To 
be fair is to be “unbiased” and “impartial.” Instead, I am suggesting the 
term “ethics,” which would encompass the motivation behind the use 
of “fair”—assessment that treats all individuals as equitably and justly as 
possible—but which would add an emphasis on the responsibilities and 
accountabilities among all parties involved. The project of assessment 
generally is to establish norms by some means and to evaluate some object 
in terms of those norms. While “meaningfulness” governs the properties 
of the object and the goals of the project itself, “ethics” governs the rela-
tionships among participants, including the process of establishing and 
revising such norms and the responsibilities entailed in any assessment 
project. Thus, ethics draws attention to assessment in practice.
Under the rubric of “meaningful” and “ethical” assessment, once the 
purpose and object of assessment have been determined, those develop-
ing an assessment would turn their attention to the evaluative procedure 
itself, and early on to the development of criteria for evaluation.48 These 
criteria, as should be clear from my discussion of meaningfulness, would 
derive from the dominant paradigm and should adhere to the purpose 
and substance of the assessment. The process for developing them should 
also derive from that paradigm, and specifically would reflect a relevant 
epistemology. That is, the manner in which criteria for assessment are 
determined within any given paradigm should reflect corresponding 
theories about how knowledge is made within that paradigm. In a positiv-
ist paradigm, for example, norms are established through reference to 
“facts” and other empirical evidence treated as if they were objective. This 
is why “reliability” could function as an ethical proxy in positivist assess-
ments. The best way to be “fair” in such situations would be to treat every-
one the same, and the best way to do that would be to refer all decisions 
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to objective reality. If the reality were indeed objective, the results would 
be reproducible, and reproducible results would ensure that everyone 
was treated objectively. Insofar as ethics would focus on consistent and 
principled conduct, this principle would require theoretical consistency 
between the paradigm governing the object of assessment and the epis-
temology governing the procedure by which the process of assessment 
occurs. The social constructionist paradigm at work in composition 
scholarship would encourage the development of norms and procedures 
for assessment by those in the community and context at hand which are 
relevant to their specific situation. I look at some of these models in the 
next chapter.
Scholarship in critical theory during the last decade or so suggests an 
ethical structure which relies on a social constructionist epistemology and 
which is suitable to a contextual paradigm of large-scale writing assess-
ment. Communicative ethics, as associated primarily with the work of 
Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, focuses on the process by which 
ethical and/or moral norms are established. According to Habermas, 
communicative ethics—also called “discourse ethics” or “communicative 
action”—focuses on how moral norms attain validity through a dialogic 
process of “moral argumentation” (1990b, 197).49 Benhabib describes 
communicative ethics in terms of the central question it asks: “Instead 
of asking what an individual moral agent could or would will, without 
self-contradiction, to be a universal maxim for all, one asks: what norms 
or institutions would the members of an ideal or real communication 
community agree to as representing their common interests after engag-
ing in a special kind of argumentation or conversation?” (1990, 330). 
Communicative ethics is premised on the notion that communities can 
(and should) reach agreement about ethical judgments through discursive 
or, I would suggest, rhetorical means. In the context of an “ideal speech 
community” where all parties have equal authority and opportunity to 
speak—a problematic notion which presents some of the same difficulties 
as Guba and Lincoln’s work and which I will return to in a moment—
community members develop their normative ethical principles through 
motivated argumentation. Within such a structure, Habermas claims, 
“one actor seeks rationally to motivate another” rather than “to influence the 
behavior” through threats or promises (1990a, 58).50 Theoretically, the 
process of argumentation in communicative ethics provides each person 
with the opportunity to participate fully; moreover, such participation 
necessarily entails reflection not only on the individual’s own position(s), 
but also on the arguments of other participants. Thus, communicative 
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ethics is an intersubjective rational engagement via language in which all 
parties understand all other parties to have the same participatory obliga-
tions, opportunities and rights (Benhabib 1986, 333).51
Because “the theory of communicative ethics is primarily concerned 
with norms of public-institutional life, or with institutional justice”
(Benhabib 1986, 283), it is particularly appropriate for a theory of writ-
ing assessment. Communicative ethics focuses on the process of justifying 
norms, such as standards and criteria for evaluation, in structured, public 
discourse communities, which would include universities, departments, 
districts, and classrooms. Other theories ground ethical decisions in the 
thought-experiments of autonomous individuals or in empirical data, 
and consequently move ideals of ethical behavior outside of intersubjec-
tive rhetorical consideration and community action and toward universal 
and formal principals that stand outside any given communicative act. 
Communicative ethics, however, makes the development of ethical norms 
part of a dialogic process and thus offers the opportunity for participants 
to shape the principles at work in a discourse community. Benhabib sug-
gests that communicative ethics can be understood as “a procedural eth-
ics”: “In fact the very thrust of the theory of discourse is to show that the 
idea of truth entails that of rational consensus, but that such rational con-
sensus can only be explicated procedurally by defining the strategies and 
modes of argumentation through which it can be arrived at” (1986, 288). 
Communicative ethics, that is, treats norms in process and focuses on the 
means by which agreement is reached. Instead of dispensing personal 
or empirical foundations that leave little room or reason for discussion, 
communicative ethics actively incorporates the process of establishing of 
intersubjective norms into the overall process of developing assessment 
projects.
Communicative ethics is not without its critics and its conceptual dif-
ficulties. Most criticisms seem to have been leveled at two areas. The first is 
that communicative ethics tangles moral judgment with rational argumen-
tation, and thus ignores independent will. The criticism is not particularly 
relevant to my use of communicative ethics. Writing assessment, as I am 
conceiving it, already accepts the slippage between rationality and moral-
ity that results in values and judgments following from those values, so 
whether or not there is confusion on this front in communicative ethics is 
not particularly a sticking point here.
The second criticism, however, is. In communicative ethics proper, 
the notion of the ideal speech community is both key and problematic. 
For Habermas, the ideal speech situation necessitates the possibility of 
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full, equal and unfettered participation by all concerned (1990a, 89), a 
description not unlike that offered by Guba and Lincoln in their calls for 
all stakeholders to participate as equals in evaluation (1989, 40–41, 51–57, 
267).52 The problems with this ideal leap off the page. The certainty 
that consensus should be the goal of such dialogue and the pretense 
that power differentials could evaporate—two primary difficulties—are 
already familiar to those in composition studies through discussions in 
the mid-1980s about the value of consensus and through more recent 
discussions about the training of evaluators to reach consensus in holistic 
scoring. Benhabib—who favors Habermas’s position—reviews the criti-
cism from within critical theory and argues that the ideal speech situation 
is actually an illustration of communicative ethics and not a precondition 
for it (1986, 289). That is, it “describes a set of rules which participants 
in a discourse would have to follow . . . and a set of relations . . . which 
would have to obtain between them, if we were to say of the agreement 
they reach that it was rationally motivated, dependent on the force of 
the better argument alone” (1986, 285).53 Habermas and Benhabib are 
theorizing about the dialogic construction of ethical decisions at the level 
of the general populous. And when Guba and Lincoln apply their similar 
structure to qualitative research, they bring all stakeholders to the table 
under theoretical conditions that substantially resemble Habermas’s ideal 
speech community.
In both cases, the dialogic situation under consideration aims at a 
decision that differs fundamentally from that made in writing assessment 
situations. Neither moral dilemmas nor research designs require that the 
end result be a definitive answer delivered in a limited time frame. Guba 
and Lincoln acknowledge this in the idea that fourth generation evalua-
tion is only “paused” and not concluded (1989, 74). Habermas, instead, 
differentiates between the justification of general ethical principles and 
the application—or “contextualization”—of such principles and reaf-
firms that his focus remains on general principles (1990b, 206–07). The 
assessment of writing is a case of the latter, contextualized situation, and 
because of the nature of the decision to be made, the situation calls for 
an explicit and expeditious conclusion rather than a pause.
Habermas and Benhabib both argue for the universalism of ethical 
principles, which Benhabib defines as “the principle that all human 
beings, by virtue of their humanity, are entitled to moral respect from
others, and that such universal moral respect minimally entails the enti-
tlement of individuals to basic human, civil, and political rights” (1994, 
173). My guess is that most of us in composition studies would accept such 
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a universal condition—in spite of its acontextuality—but note that this 
is a moral principle. There is a division between the search for morality 
taken on by Habermas and Benhabib and sound principles for develop-
ing assessment procedures that I am taking on here. Universalizing the 
meaning of writing assessment has had damaging consequences for writ-
ing instruction; universal ideals of ethical conduct, I would argue, do not 
carry the same repercussions: people do not fail out of being human.
These differences of condition prompt me to argue that the situa-
tion of writing assessment is not an ideal speech situation, but rather a 
limited speech situation. That is, because of the nature of the decision to 
be made and the time constraints of assessment—if only in the form of 
the date grades must be turned in—the situation of writing assessment is 
sufficiently restricted in scope and purpose to warrant limitations on the 
conditions of communicative ethics proper. Specifically, I would argue 
that participation be grounded in expertise and accountability. Those 
who have expertise regarding the specific decision and who are respon-
sible for performing the assessment itself are the ones who should hold 
authority in the decision-making process and in the evaluation itself. This 
means that at the level of classroom assessment, teachers should be the 
primary participants, while at the level of program assessment, writing 
program administrators, faculty and other officials should take part.
This does not exclude other participants, but rather relegates them to 
a secondary role. Those who are not directly accountable for assessment 
results but who are affected by those results should participate in assess-
ment design where appropriate—a condition determined by contextual 
constraints—and should be entitled to explanations about the actual 
assessment process, but they should not have undue influence. One way 
to think about the distinction I am suggesting is that those to whom evalu-
ators are accountable (including deans and students) are limited par-
ticipants, while those who are accountable are full participants. Limited 
participants need to know that the assessment is meaningful, that is, what 
purpose(s) it serves and what substance(s) it addresses. Full participants 
also need to know how to perform the actual assessment, and consequent-
ly need to participate in the day-to-day dialogue.
In limiting the ideal speech situation, I am, admittedly, circumventing 
the very practical problem of inclusiveness. However, it would be neither 
possible nor productive to fully include all stakeholders in every assessment
decision from the conceptual design through the final evaluations. Right 
now, as a result of our national push for testing, we are seeing plenty of 
inappropriate decisions made by those without appropriate expertise. 
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If nothing else, these decisions and their effects provide us with good 
reasons to limit authority in assessment situations. I have argued that 
context serves as a boundary on meaningfulness; I would now add that 
context also serves as an ethical boundary. Not everyone who has a stake 
in an assessment will be held equally accountable for the norms and the 
decision-making process; so, I would argue, not everyone should have the 
same authority. Procedural questions about whether or not everyone has 
equal opportunity to speak and act in ethical dialogue are not as signifi-
cant in writing assessment situations as are the appropriateness and value 
of the decisions. The principles of communicative ethics are applicable 
to writing assessment if we add the caveat that speech communities are 
grounded in specific contexts. Norms for conducting writing assessment 
arise from dialogue within a situated community. Consequently, as that 
community and/or its context change, norms are subject to change. The 
process is thus contingent, always subject to reconsideration and revision.
There are, however, more compelling reasons to apply the principles 
of communicative ethics in developing ethical writing assessment. For 
example, its practice reflects a social constructionist epistemology, struc-
turing value judgments without resorting to either objectivity or subjectiv-
ity. Instead, ethical conduct is determined dialogically by the community 
in concert as part of the process; we see precursors of this work in Broad’s 
study of City University (2003). Moreover, intersubjectivity, the condition 
of dialogue, functions reflexively: in the process of argument, the parties, 
at least ideally, continually reconsider their own positions in the light of 
the others’ arguments. Thus, the self-reflective nature of communicative 
ethics parallels the emphasis on self-reflection in contemporary composi-
tion pedagogy.54
The focus on and function of dialogue in determining ethical conduct 
restructures the ideal of “fairness” in writing assessment. Under positivism, 
fairness is ostensibly ensured through reproducibility. I would like here 
to examine Brian Huot’s argument about this equation a bit. Writing is 
necessarily a varied act and consequently so is writing assessment, which is 
at least in part, an act of reading. Because writing is a contextually depen-
dent interchange among writer, reader, language and subject matter, 
changes in any one of these elements effect the entire structure of read-
ing. This is why judgments about writing ability change from time to time. 
Fluctuations in an evaluator’s perceptions about the relative importance 
of certain rhetorical features, for example, can easily influence her judg-
ments of a particular essay, even if she has evaluated it before. The restric-
tions necessary to establish reproducible results in writing assessment are 
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an attempt to prevent such changes, and they narrow the range of writing 
and reading so much so that they do not result in a fair product, that is, in 
a legitimate representation of student work or the reading of it.
In communicative ethics, the ideals of “fairness” would be based, not on 
reproducibility, but rather on full consideration—that is, on as complete 
an analysis as necessary to reach a decision, with the understanding that 
there are restrictions on time and resources. The principles of communi-
cative ethics—with the caveat of a limited speech community—as applied 
to writing assessment provide that the process for assessment be dialogic, 
that the goal be consensus about the assessment decision, and that ratio-
nal argumentation be the means by which such consensus is reached. The 
conditions of dialogue and rational argumentation promote assessment 
decisions based on extensive attention to and reflection on not only the 
principles of meaningfulness—purpose and substance—as determined 
by the community, but the relationship between those principles and the 
actual piece(s) of writing to be assessed. This full consideration can take 
into account the variety of writing—including multiple pieces of writing 
or multiple drafts—and the distinctiveness of particular contexts without 
being unfair because all assessments would receive the same full consid-
eration, even though the specifics considered might vary from assessment 
to assessment.
An ethical assessment, as I am developing the term, would occur 
first and foremost in dialogue. Evaluators would ideally develop criteria 
through argument and discussion about the needs of the program and the 
purposes of the specific assessment. Limited participants, such as deans 
and legislators, would be invited to join or to forward their concerns and 
priorities, but the final decisions would rest with the full participants, 
particularly teachers and program administrators. The application of 
these criteria would also occur in dialogue. Evaluators would discuss each 
student’s work as thoroughly as is necessary to reach a community assess-
ment decision. The procedures I am describing here stand in stark con-
trast to holistic scoring, where evaluators read quickly and independently, 
without discussion, except in “norming” situations where individual read-
ers who deviate from the norm are expected to modify their decisions.
Here I am positing a dialogue that is in many ways as idealistic as 
Habermas’s inclusive ideal speech community. Like Benhabib, however, 
I would argue that this is an illustration of what ideal ethical assessment 
might look like. I am arguing for a limited speech community, not because 
the ideal version is too utopian, but rather because I find the inclusive-
ness of the ideal version both unnecessary and counterproductive to the 
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context of writing assessment. In addition, such inclusiveness strips com-
positionists of their expertise, a consequence I have underscored before 
and to which I will return shortly.
A limited speech community, however, would require increased attention 
to accountability. As I have argued, those parties who assess other parties 
have a responsibility for conveying the meaningfulness of the assessment. 
This includes articulating the procedural principles, particularly when all 
parties do not have equal access to the dialogue. Students, for example, 
should have access to information about the criteria for assessment and 
the substance of the dialogue surrounding the evaluation of their writing. 
Similarly, administrators should be informed about the particulars of pur-
pose and substance most applicable to the assessment process as a whole. 
In principle, heightened accountability means that those privy to specific 
dialogues should be able to explain the salient and relevant aspects of those 
dialogues to those who are affected but who are not full participants.
F I G U R E  5
Questions Raised by the Principle of Ethics
Community: Who is involved in the decision-making?
• Who has a stake in this assessment?
• How accountable is each party for the assessment decisions?
• Based on their accountability, what role should each play in the design of 
the assessment?
• What can each party contribute to the assessment? What is their area of 
expertise?
• Based on their potential contributions, what role should each play in the 
design of the assessment?
Process: What procedures will the assessment requirement?
• What is the decision to be made?
• What procedures will result in the fullest consideration possible for all con-
cerned?
• What limitations and restrictions inhibit full consideration?
Ethics governs the relations among participants as they apply the 
principles of meaningfulness in concrete assessment situations. It is, 
thus, a function of assessment in practice. Ethical assessment, through 
the ideal of dialogic argumentation in a limited assessment community, 
I have argued, gives students full consideration and remains accountable 
not just to those students, but to all stakeholders. Like the qualities of
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meaningfulness, however, the procedures for ethical assessment are 
subject to revision as the context changes. This is one of the functions 
of accountability, which includes not only the notion that an evaluator 
should be able to explain herself, but also that her decision should be 
a responsible one in her own estimation. Ethics in writing assessment, 
then, refers as well to purpose and substance, linking these qualities of 
meaningfulness to specific persons in specific contexts with specific rela-
tionships to one another.
T H E  I M P O RTA N C E  O F  T E R M S
In the vocabulary I am developing here, meaningful writing assessment 
would be purposeful and substantive, while ethical assessment would 
be discursive and would work toward full consideration of the object 
of assessment. It would be easy to argue that there is little innovative or 
radical about what I am proposing here. Neither term is particularly pro-
vocative when understood within the framework of social constructionist 
theory. Like Huot’s work, my own extrapolates principles, but I am draw-
ing more from theoretical work in literacy and composition studies than 
from contemporary practice in writing assessment. Furthermore, argu-
ably, the basis for some of the general principles I have outlined here can 
be found as well in literature in educational testing, particularly Samuel 
Messick’s work on validity, as Huot’s arguments suggest.
However, if the imposition of “validity” and “reliability” has taught 
those in composition nothing else, it has taught us that power and 
paradigm adhere at the level of lexicon. Composition studies and writing 
instruction at all levels of schooling have suffered as a result of the deploy-
ment of these educational measurement criteria in writing assessment 
contexts. The changes, for example, in the definitions of and the quali-
fiers added to “validity” have not translated to actual practice, despite 
being the “norm” for well over a decade, nor has hermeneutics been 
accepted as an alternative to reliability, despite work on this principle in 
assessment circles since at least the early 1990s. Moreover, it is still the 
norm for educational measurement experts and not composition profes-
sionals to define the majority of writing assessment procedures, in spite 
of exceptions such as Washington State. Yet “validity” and “reliability” 
provide little meaningful support and have regularly proven damaging 
for those in composition studies charged with designing large-scale writ-
ing assessments.
I believe these principles, or something like them, can find a home 
in post-secondary composition studies, and from there—with sufficient 
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research, solid results, and strong arguments—can work their way into 
other forums, as I suggest in chapter five. My hope is based in part on 
the fact that the theory I present here does not produce readily quantifi-
able results, a key difference between the dominant and the alternative 
I offer here. Within the field of educational measurement, as Moss and 
Delandshere and Petrosky point out, even those who advocate more com-
plex validity determinations still resort to numbers to justify their work. 
But writing does not easily or effectively reduce to numbers. When we 
force that reduction, we end up with information useful by legislatures 
and governing boards for quick comparisons, budget decisions, and pub-
lic influence—none of which compositionists would consider a primary 
purpose of writing assessment. As Elbow (1993) has argued—persuasively, 
if not successfully—quantification does not help provide any truly useful 
information to the writer, the teacher, or even writing programs. I agree 
and, I believe, so would many compositionists. But we have not had a 
strong theoretical alternative to psychometrics that would result in quali-
tative judgments. The problem with using validity, even in its more com-
plex and radical forms and even without reliability, is that its justification 
has been attached to quantification, and quantification does not provide 
what students, writing instructors, and writing programs need. It does 
not provide what legislatures and governing bodies need, either; they just 
don’t know it . . . yet.
My development and presentation of “meaningfulness” and “ethics” is 
not, however, the end of the theoretical yellow brick road. We need the 
research. “Meaningfulness,” in particular, is a seriously underdeveloped 
concept in composition studies, as I have argued. The majority of pub-
lished work on writing assessment focuses on how we assess, not what we 
assess or why we (should) do so.55 Some projects have begun this work, 
including the NCTE and IRA Standards, the “Outcomes” developed by 
the Council of Writing Program Administrators (1999), and most recently 
Bob Broad’s study (2003). However, a need for research remains, particu-
larly into the substance of writing assessment. Nor are ethical consider-
ations settled: few writing assessment projects exhibit the principles of 
full consideration and communicative engagement I have outlined, and 
interactions among evaluators need further study. There is a lot of work 
to be done.
What I offer here is a starting point, a set of terms that draw from and 
are compatible with the paradigmatic principles at work in literacy and 
composition studies scholarship. As such, they are steeped in contextual-
ity: context in this model is a primary defining quality for developing the 
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particulars of any given writing assessment situations. Moreover, these 
terms are dependent at the level of principle on their context. That is, 
because they are contingent on the contextual paradigm of literacy, they 
are subject to revision according to changes at the level of paradigm. 
Should the paradigm change entirely, as it has in the past, the entire con-
ceptual project defined here is up for reconsideration. The kind of recon-
sideration I am suggesting is what has not happened even as the literacy 
paradigm has shifted from a technocratic orientation to a contextual one. 
Consequently, I am arguing for the contingency of these terms. They 
are only valuable as long as literacy scholarship espouses the primacy of 
context and as long as composition studies accepts the principles of social 
constructionism.
Composition studies needs theoretical work in writing assessment 
that, in turn, requires a vocabulary that embraces the values of literacy 
scholarship and instruction. To date, assessment theory has been grafted 
onto writing situations as if the terms did not matter—although compo-
sitionists certainly know otherwise. The terms I offer here—meaningful-
ness and ethics—continue the project of developing theories of writing 
assessment founded not in educational measurement but in composition 
studies.
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 7
T H E O RY  I N  P R AC T I C E
In the previous chapter, I presented examples of what meaningful and 
ethical assessment might look like. These examples, however, have been 
somewhat disjointed, pieces of practices rather than practices as a whole. 
Moreover, they have been for the most part hypothetical, albeit drawn 
from my own and others’ experience. In this chapter, I analyze actual 
practices for the ways in which they reflect the theory I am presenting 
here, and for the ways in which they extend our understanding of it. 
First, I look at published accounts of practices at two institutions: the 
University of Cincinnati and Washington State University. The former 
provides a relatively early example of how a university implements a port-
folio system in ways that respect the expertise of the program participants. 
I start with this one both because it is one of the earliest examples and 
because the description of the process is sufficiently detailed to allow 
for a fairly detailed analysis. Then I turn to Washington State’s program, 
which I have already analyzed using different lenses each time in chapters 
three and four. In both cases, I argue the theory is the problem, but I do 
not believe the practice is. There are other ways to understand the same 
practice that, I would argue, are more productive. In this chapter, I look 
at the Washington State example through yet another lens; here I analyze 
it in terms of meaningfulness and ethics.
Both analyses point to strong ethical practices, as I am using that term, 
but my analysis also shows a lack of attention to the criterion of primary 
substance, part of meaningfulness, in the literature about these programs. 
To extend my analysis of the use of primary substance, I then examine two 
studies that look at what teachers value when they assess student work. The 
first is Bob Broad’s (2003) development of Dynamic Criteria Mapping to 
examine the particular values of the faculty at “City University.” The sec-
ond, a pilot study I ran at North Carolina State University, uses decision 
logics to analyze the conversations of teachers during mid- and end-of-
term evaluations. In both cases, the studies find that what teachers talk 
about when they are evaluating writing is not necessarily what appears in 
program standards.
It is interesting to note that all of these models use portfolios in some 
fashion. I have chosen these descriptions not for their use of portfolios—
although portfolios, I would argue, lend themselves more readily to theo-
retically sound types of meaningfulness than do many other assessment 
instruments. Instead, I have chosen them for their attention to the process 
of developing a specific assessment praxis that (however unintentionally) 
illustrates the principles I am developing here.
P O RT F O L I O S  AT  T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  C I N C I N NAT I
The account of the process of establishing portfolio assessment at the 
University of Cincinnati—published by Marjorie Roemer, Lucille M. 
Schultz, and Russel K. Durst in two essays—provides an early example 
that demonstrates in a more comprehensive way some of the key ele-
ments of the principles of assessment I am outlining here. The first essay, 
“Portfolios and the Process of Change” (Roemer, Schultz, and Durst 
1991), briefly describes the decision-making process that led the authors 
to consider program-wide portfolio assessment and then discusses in 
more detail three pilot studies using portfolios with different groups of 
instructors. The second essay, “Portfolio Negotiations: Acts in Speech” 
(Durst, Roemer, and Schultz 1994), describes the on-going process of 
negotiation that portfolio assessment requires.
In 1987, Roemer, Schultz, and Durst introduced the idea of portfolios 
and by 1989, after a series of pilot studies, had decided to adopt them 
program-wide to replace a single-sitting impromptu exit exam. This deci-
sion to change procedures was a committee effort, including “both writ-
ing and literature specialists, full- and part-time faculty, and a graduate 
assistant,” a respectable cross-section of primary evaluation participants. 
The desire for change was based on a combined dissatisfaction with 
the existing exit examination and interest in the value of portfolios as 
described by literature in the field. Among the primary purposes they 
articulate for exploring and finally establishing a portfolio assessment, 
the authors focus on pedagogical value. Portfolio assessment at the end of 
the first quarter of their three-quarter sequence provides “remediation” 
for those students who need it at the beginning rather than at the end of 
the sequence (Roemer, Schultz, and Durst 1991, 456–57). In addition, the 
mid-semester dry run they implemented provides students with feedback 
on their overall performance and ability (Durst, Roemer, and Schultz 
1994, 287). Instead of serving the purpose of determining proficiency or 
competence, then, the portfolios as designed provide interim informa-
tion for both students and teachers that allows for additional instruction, 
practice, and effort as needed. The pedagogical purpose of this assess-
ment is specific to the context; there is nothing wrong with proficiency or 
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competency examinations per se. Shifting to portfolios alone would not 
have fulfilled the authors’ pedagogical purpose. Moving the assessment 
from the end of the sequence to the end of the first quarter made the 
pedagogical goals of the evaluation primary.
The authors are also explicit about their secondary purposes. While 
they discuss several, the most significant of these for my purposes is the 
value of dialogue or “speech” for “teacher training and professional 
development” (Roemer, Schultz, and Durst 1991, 467). Their portfolio 
assessment procedure is structured around trios: discussion groups of 
three teachers—with larger meetings in groups of twenty for “norming” 
purposes (Durst, Roemer, and Schultz 1994, 288). In the discussions, 
teachers tend to focus on criteria; the authors see this faculty develop-
ment as a significant advantage, considering that their teaching staff 
consists of teaching assistants and adjuncts as well as full-time faculty. New 
teachers gain experience in evaluation while experienced teachers can 
spend more time discussing complex, recurring issues such as “dialect 
interference” and overly writer-based prose (Roemer, Schultz, and Durst 
1991, 467).
While the authors began the process of changing assessments with the 
primary purpose explicitly in mind, the secondary purpose of teacher 
training emerged during the course of the pilot studies. They developed 
the pilot studies in an attempt to ameliorate the effects of a “top-down 
imposition” which discourages rather than encourages teacher invest-
ment (Roemer, Schultz, and Durst 1991, 463). Between the pilots and 
the continual solicitation of teacher input, dialogue emerged as a central 
theme, so much so that by the second essay, the value of negotiations in 
speech surrounding portfolios becomes the central point of the essay. 
Dialogue, the authors suggest, not only promotes discussion about stan-
dards, but also ownership of the program (457).
Although the authors spend significantly more space on the “purposes” 
of their program, they do briefly address what I have called “substance.” 
They argue that portfolios better reflect the philosophy and curriculum 
of their writing program, “fitting [their] emphasis on process, multiple 
drafting, the development of self-reflective powers and encouraging stu-
dents to take more responsibility for their own growth as writers” (Durst, 
Roemer, and Schultz 1994, 287). They argue that the procedure “pro-
moted high standards” (Roemer, Schultz, and Durst 1991, 467), although 
they do not explain what those standards are. Overall, while a few sub-
stantial specifics are offered at various points throughout the essays, the 
authors do not focus on “content” issues, so the primary substance of the 
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assessment remains vague. They do, however, tie the process of negotia-
tion, a secondary substance, to their secondary purpose of teacher train-
ing. That is, negotiation is integrated into their assessment procedure as 
a substantive way to arrive at their secondary goal of faculty development 
and teacher training.
While the discussion surrounding what I would call issues of meaning-
fulness is minimal, the procedure described by Roemer, Schultz and Durst 
exemplifies ethical assessment as I am using that term. In both essays, the 
authors mention that their primary reason for adopting portfolios was to 
focus on students’ writing development over time, which they claim is the 
appropriate emphasis for assessment in their program (Roemer, Schultz, 
and Durst 1991, 456; Durst, Roemer, and Schultz 1994, 287). In “Process” 
they expand on this idea: “Students would be judged on their best work. 
The extent of a student’s strengths and deficiencies would be more fully 
documented and explorable in the portfolio, and judgments would be 
more defensible” (Roemer, Schultz, and Durst 1991, 456). Although “con-
sistency”—the hallmark of reliability—is offered as a consequence of the 
procedure in the earlier essay (467), the characteristics of the portfolio 
assessment described here point to an intention to give each portfolio full 
consideration. Consistency, then, would be less a result of training than 
of thorough discussion.
The documentation, exploration, and defensibility of the assessment 
decisions that the authors describe are not simply an automatic conse-
quence of portfolios, and indeed they point out that portfolios could 
easily become as rigid as impromptus had at their institution (Roemer, 
Schultz, and Durst 1991, 457). Instead, it is group negotiation of assess-
ment decisions that offers depth and complexity of information about stu-
dent writing. The authors conclude that assessment is reading, and that 
group negotiations “can lead to new interpretations, changed positions, 
or . . . ‘attitude entrenchment’” (Durst, Roemer, and Schultz 1994, 297). 
The goal of these negotiations is not consensus in the sense that “norm-
ing” suggests, where all must come to agreement. Negotiations here allow 
for differences, and while the authors wonder about the resulting “inde-
terminacy of the freshman English grade,” they suggest that judgments 
about writing—like anything else in a postmodern world—do not obtain 
the status of Truth (Durst, Roemer, and Schultz 1994, 298). What is “ethi-
cal” about the procedure described here is that polyvocality is integral to 
the process and to developing a full consideration of student writing.
The procedure outlined by Roemer, Schultz, and Durst is not a full 
illustration of the theoretical principles I am advocating. I have already 
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noted the limited attention to substance. Furthermore, although there is 
some mention about the possibility of including students in the evalua-
tion process, it appears without much discussion as part of a transcript; 
ultimately the procedures were negotiated between the administrators of 
the writing program and the teachers only. This may be a step in the right 
direction for developing a limited speech community, but the absence of 
student voices renders it rather too limited. There is also no discussion of 
other stakeholders: deans, employers, teachers of more advanced writing 
courses, and the like.
Still, this program illustrates many of the most important principles of 
meaningful and ethical assessment that I have outlined above. The pro-
cedure develops through community discussion and integrates dialogue 
into the process of assessment. The purposes and the procedure are inter-
nally consistent with one another, and the substance of the assessment 
appears to reflect a social constructionist paradigm (although discussion 
is too limited to be clear). This procedure, more than fourth generation 
evaluation and more than the expert reader model, moves beyond the 
principles of educational measurement theory toward an assessment 
drawn from the values at work in composition studies.
A S S E S S M E N T  AT  WA S H I N G TO N  S TAT E  U N I V E R S I T Y
The Washington State University’s system consists of a sequence of assess-
ments and instruction designed to guide students through writing at 
the university from their general education coursework through their 
major. The process begins with an impromptu placement exam for first 
year composition, followed by writing instruction in introductory com-
position and in the general education curriculum, followed in turn by 
a mid-career portfolio assessment to determine if students are prepared 
for Writing in the Major courses. Subsequently, students take at least two 
Writing in the Major courses, with tutorial support and additional course-
work as needed, before they submit to a final assessment within their 
major department(s).
For the purposes of my analysis in this chapter, the two-tiered assess-
ment used for placement and for the mid-career portfolio is the most 
germane part of this system. I describe this process in chapter four, but 
I will briefly summarize it here. In the two-tiered process, the object of 
assessment is read first very quickly to see if the assessment indicates an 
“obvious” placement in either English 101 (in the case of placement) or 
in the “Pass” category (in the case of the portfolio). As Haswell puts it 
(talking specifically about placement), “[t]he emphasis was on obviously.
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If the reader found any reason to question placement of the student into 
[regular freshman composition], wavered in any way, then the sample 
passed on to the second tier for a different kind of reading” (2001b, 42). 
While the first reading is quick and focused on a single decision, second 
tier readings are “deliberate,” with an emphasis on thoroughness (2001b, 
43). As many readers as necessary read each object, they use all available 
information, including knowledge of the students’ backgrounds, and the 
readers consult with each other about their decisions as they feel neces-
sary. Instead of the blind, trained readings of holistic scoring sessions, 
both tiers in this procedure rely on the expertise the readers already have 
to arrive at an appropriate judgment. The primary purpose of the place-
ment exam is assigning students to the best course for their instructional 
needs, arguably the primary purpose of any placement exam. And the pri-
mary purpose of the mid-career portfolio is to determine if students need 
additional support in their writing as they do the upper division writing in 
their majors. These purposes are obviously first and foremost.
The assessments in this program as a whole are designed specifically 
to identify what kinds of instruction and assistance students need in their 
writing throughout their college careers, not only at the freshman level. 
Thus, the program as it stands is inherently cross-disciplinary. The mid-
career portfolio, for example, requires that students do a great deal of 
writing throughout their general education coursework in their first two 
years. This writing cannot and does not occur only in English courses, 
nor is it pushed off until students take upper division WAC courses. 
Consequently, students at WSU produce a significant amount of writing; 
Condon estimates between 100 and 300 pages of writing per student dur-
ing their careers (2001, xv). 
Primary purposes are those that affect students most directly. One of the 
explicit purposes of the WSU assessment, however, crosses between what I 
have called primary and secondary purposes. As Condon describes it, the 
assessments serve as an integral part of the curriculum, which “features 
an alternation between assessment and instruction, and the assessment is 
designed to flow from the instruction and, in turn, to support it” (2001, 
xv). That is, each assessment is specifically connected to instructional 
plans and goals for the student. Students do not “fail” the mid-career 
portfolio, for example. Instead, they are designated as needing work on 
their writing and required to take a support course (Gen. Ed 302) in 
addition to the normal two Writing in the Major courses (2001, xvi). And 
the instruction in the general education curriculum is designed so that 
students produce ample writing to demonstrate their current educational 
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status and needs as of the mid-career portfolio. This purpose bridges the 
distinction I have made between primary and secondary purpose because, 
while it does serve curricular goals primarily, it has a significant and clear 
effect on students and their progress through the program. 
There are a number of other secondary purposes that Condon, 
Haswell, Wyche, and others identify throughout the book. Condon points 
out how the program brings faculty together from all over the univer-
sity (2001, xv). Haswell and Wyche talk about the need to use teachers’ 
expertise “rather than just their obedience to a holistic rubric” (2001, 15). 
Richard Law, a director of general education at WSU and a member of 
the original oversight committee for this program, discusses the ways in 
which the program encouraged and supported reforms in undergraduate 
education (2001, 11). These secondary purposes focus on the effects that 
the assessment has on faculty and the program of education.
The authors of Beyond Outcomes spend more time than most talking 
about the primary substance of their assessment. Specifically, Haswell and 
Wyche emphasize the need for the exam to be linked to the content of 
the course, which they describe as follows:
In the last three years, [English 101] had been revamped to focus on academic 
writing, with emphasis on critical thinking, college-level reading and library 
skills, and computer literacy. It had also acquired a multicultural slant with 
its integration into the new general-education requirements. English 101 was 
conceived as a mainstream course for the great majority of freshmen. There 
they would face instructors, almost exclusively graduate teaching assistants, all 
using the same multicultural reader and giving three common assignments: 
responses to readings, critiques of cultural events on campus, and essays utiliz-
ing secondary sources. The placement exam would have to allow us to judge 
whether students were ready for such a course. (2001, 17)
In identifying the course content and objectives, and specifically tying 
those to the assessment, Haswell and Wyche define the primary substance 
of the exam: academic reading and writing, use of source material, com-
puter literacy, and so on. These objectives echo the outcomes developed 
by members of the Council of Writing Program Administrators (1999), 
adapted for the particular student body at WSU. And the prompts and 
procedures used in the placement exam seem to do much of the work 
that they describe here, clearly linking the course and exam (with com-
puter literacy an exception). Because the authors of the program wanted 
to look for complex abilities, they developed a complex prompt which 
relies on interchangeable readings and rhetorical frames that each ask for 
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a somewhat different and sophisticated approach to the reading (Haswell 
2001c, 212–13). Moreover, the exam encourages at least some level of 
planning because students are given the prompt first and the bluebooks 
15 minutes later (Haswell and Wyche 2001, 20).
Haswell and Wyche define the course and describe the content of 
exam that feeds into that course, but it is not a clear match. Aside from 
the absence of computer literacy (an absence more likely due to logisti-
cal constraints more than anything else), the exam does not clearly test 
academic reading and writing and use of source material; the students 
read only short passages, and there are no directives to cite anything, for 
example. What it does do, according to Haswell and Wyche, is provide a 
“diagnosis of future writing potential. While the holistic forces a compari-
son of an actual student piece with an ideal and, therefore, highlights the 
negative, our diagnostic reading would force a prediction of a student 
writer’s success given several different future paths of instruction” (2001, 
19). In other words, the primary substance that WSU’s placement exam is 
not the existing ability to do academic reading and writing, for example, 
but rather the potential for students to do that work. The question that 
the assessment addresses is not “what abilities is this student lacking?” but 
rather “what is this student ready to take on?”
The dominant paradigm in composition studies, social construction, 
is not as clearly present in the substance of this exam or the assessment 
program. While there clearly is collaboration in the assessment proce-
dure, there is no specific mention of principles or practices such as the 
social construction of knowledge (is the use of source material taught 
and assessed in terms of how the student is making knowledge with the 
sources?), or collaborative writing (are students encouraged to do/sub-
mit collaborative projects in any of their portfolios?). The absence, how-
ever, is hardly damning and is more likely a result of the focus of the text 
on the development of the program and its processes, rather than on the 
content of any given examination. And, as I will discuss in a moment, we 
do see these principles at work when we look at the principle of ethics.
If secondary substance can be thought of as the content that supports 
secondary purposes, the programmatic support for faculty seems key to this 
principle. By relying, for example, on the expertise of the teachers in the 
placement exam rather than on norming, the assessment supports the ped-
agogical values those faculty members hold. This kind of connection helps 
ensure that the test will not subsume the course, since those who are teaching 
the course are those who make the judgments in the assessment. Moreover, 
the inclusion of faculty from disciplines throughout the curriculum,
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particularly in the mid-career portfolio assessment, provides campus-wide 
faculty development through on-going conversations about writing.
WSU’s program of assessment and instruction illustrates the idea of a 
limited speech community, as I have outlined the concept, in more detail 
than the Cincinnati program does. The initial oversight body responsible 
for developing the assessment was the “All University Writing Committee,” 
which included faculty members from all over the campus, and which was 
chaired by a former composition director (Haswell and Wyche 2001, 14). 
However, Haswell and Wyche argue that this committee “seemed distant 
from those who would ultimately maintain the [placement] exam and be 
most affected by it” (2001, 22–23). In response, they brought together “the 
director of the Writing Center, the administrators of the undergraduate 
composition program, the leader of the Writing Across the Curriculum 
(WAC) program, and several writing teachers” to explore the courses, 
the students, and the possibilities for placement (2001, 23). In so doing, 
the program leaders established the kind of distinction between full and 
limited participants that I describe in the previous chapter. That is, they 
put those most responsible—those who would be held accountable—at 
the center of the planning and development, relegating those who were 
interested stakeholders to a supporting role.
Beyond Outcomes also includes a description of the roles of these lim-
ited participants in the fourth section, which focuses on the mid-career 
portfolio assessment. Covering students, faculty, and administrators, the 
chapters in the section demonstrate how these various groups participate 
in the maintenance of the program, usually through providing feed-
back, participating in the assessments and spurring reflection.56 These 
stakeholders do not have the power or authority, however, that the full 
participants do. Their feedback helps initiate and support decisions about 
changes to the program; for example, student feedback led to the require-
ment that Gen. Ed 302 be taken concurrently with a Writing in the Major 
course (Nelson and Kelly-Riley 2001, 157). But those at the center, the 
program administrators and teachers, made and continue to make the 
key decisions and to perform the assessments themselves. Central to the 
way that community works in this assessment is the role of and reliance 
on expertise. The use of teacher expertise reinforces the value not only 
of the assessment decisions themselves, but also of the teachers’ knowl-
edge. Moreover, the program includes teaching assistants in this group, 
allowing TAs to make low-stakes decisions, such as the first tier placement 
decisions. In both these features, the program bases full participation first 
on expertise, rather than on status within the university.
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Earlier I argued that disciplinary knowledge and principles of social 
construction do not appear in a significant way in the substance of the 
assessment. They do, however, appear in the process. Tier-one readings 
are quick and involve make a single decision, based on the readers’ 
expertise: does the student belong in English 101? The tier-two readings, 
however, are “deliberate”; decisions are made by “as many [readers] as it 
takes” as part of a “group consultation” (Haswell 2001b, 43). The process 
for both readings is social, and the decisions are reached as a part of a 
community. At the second tier, this is obvious: teachers talk freely about 
the decisions they are making. But the use of expertise in both tiers indi-
cates a reliance on communal knowledge; expertise is born of knowledge 
of the discipline and experience teaching in the program.
The development of the program similarly reflects social construction-
ist principles. Haswell and Wyche talk about the influence of assessment 
literature in the design of the program and its instruments and proce-
dures (2001, 18–21). Locally, limited participants from a range of disci-
plines participated in the program’s development and are involved in its 
continued support. And ongoing program review depends on those out-
side the program as well as inside. More importantly, the authors in Beyond
Outcomes recognize the significance of context to their project. They claim 
that assessment must be local (e.g., Condon 2001, xiv; Haswell and Wyche 
2001, 14), and Haswell and Wyche identify one of the guidelines for any 
assessment program as “let the local scene shape the examination, not 
the other way around” (2001, 16), echoing principles raised by Huot and 
the CCCC Committee. For example, they describe the influence of their 
own student population on the exams: primarily traditional students at 
a residential university in a rural location with few students with “severe 
writing problems” (16). This would not describe the institution where I 
currently work, nor where I finished my doctorate. Nor do they assume 
the context is static. Haswell explains that “[j]ust as the test arose out of 
mutable local conditions and was shaped by them, it should continue to 
be shaped as those conditions change” (2001b, 40).
This acceptance of the contingency of the project perhaps marks 
this program most clearly as reliant on social constructionist principles. 
Nowhere in the text does the reader get the sense that the authors are 
offering the solution to the problem of assessment. Bill Condon calls it 
an example of “third-wave” and “fourth-generation” assessment, refer-
ring to Yancey’s and Guba and Lincoln’s work respectively (2001, xvii). 
This claim seems warranted to me, but I would go further, to claim that 
this program is a strong example of meaningful and ethical assessment. 
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Using this lens, I believe, we can better understand the workings of the 
assessment program as a whole and its relation to contemporary thought 
in composition studies than we can through the lens of psychometrics or 
even through Haswell’s own justification via categorization theory.
L O O K I N G  F O R  S U B S TA N C E
Both the previous examples provide strong examples of ethical assess-
ments, but both also point out the need for research into the primary 
substance of writing assessment. On the one hand, it seems odd that our 
discipline is lacking in this area; after all, it would seem logical that one of 
our primary concerns would be the content of our courses. On the other 
hand, we have this knowledge, in part. It appears in our course objectives, 
our scoring guides, our standards, and our rubrics. It just is not often part 
of our scholarly record.
Bob Broad makes this point in What We Really Value: Beyond Rubrics in 
Teaching and Assessing Writing (2003), where he describes his research 
into what I am calling the primary substance of writing assessment. Broad 
argues that the values typically defined by standards and rubrics—usually 
some variation on “ideas,” “form,” “flavor,” “mechanics,” and “wording” 
(2003, 6)—do not match what teachers actually value as they actually 
assess student writing. To get at these actual values, he proposes a process 
he calls Dynamic Criteria Mapping (DCM), in which members of a writ-
ing program can record and analyze their own values as they appear in 
communal evaluation sessions, such as “norming” or, more appropriately, 
“articulation” sessions. “Articulation” is the name that Broad suggests 
both here and in “Pulling Your Hair Out” (2000), because, he argues, 
“norming” and its synonyms focus only developing agreement among 
graders, while articulation allows for both agreement and disagreement 
(2003, 129; 2000, 252). Evaluators, he rightly points out, do not always 
agree, and their disagreements are often as useful in understanding an 
assessment as their agreements.
Through his analysis of assessment at “City University,” Broad identi-
fies 47 textual criteria, consisting of 32 textual qualities (“aspects of the 
reading experience”) and 15 textual features (“elements of text”), 21 
contextual criteria (aspects of the assessment situation and the students’ 
work in class), and 21 other factors, including relations, comparison of 
texts, the evaluation process, evaluating teaching, and so on. He is able to 
flesh out concepts that appear in rubrics, such as “significance,” through 
synonyms used by the evaluators, in this case “complexity,” “heart,” “goes 
somewhere with it,” and “depth” (2003, 40). His process also brings to the 
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fore concepts that influence our evaluations, but do not usually appear 
in our rubrics, such as a student’s progress over the course of a semester. 
The result is a much richer understanding of the values than “the stan-
dard, traditional, five-point rubric, by some version of which nearly every 
large-scale assessment of writing since 1961 has been strictly guided” 
(2003, 6).
DCM also helps Broad identify elements on which the program needs 
to work. In the case of City University, for example, Broad finds that 
teachers in the program do not have a clear understanding of the role 
that fulfilling the assignment should play in the assessment (2003, 133). 
He also finds that mechanics dominated the discussion, in spite of the 
fact that the program’s documents indicate that it is merely one value 
among many others (2003, 62). Rather than obscure or smooth these 
disagreements over as a rubric-based assessment would, Broad’s method 
highlights the disagreements so that the program can decide how to man-
age them. Leaving them open as disagreements is implicitly one of the 
options.
Broad argues that the purpose of rubrics is to simplify and standardize 
assessment, that they serve the purposes of efficiency and convenience in 
what is and what should be a complex and messy process. Broad chose 
City University in part because the program did not use a rubric. Instead, 
the program relied on a combination of mid-term and end-term norm-
ing and “trio” sessions. In the norming sessions, members of the program 
debated reasons for passing or failing student work, while in the trio 
sessions, groups of three instructors evaluated all C or below work for 
their actual students, what Broad calls “live” student work. Because the 
program did not use a rubric and instead relied specifically on conversa-
tion, Broad felt he was able to get a better representation of the teachers’ 
actual values. Those values represent the primary substance of writing 
assessment.
In a pilot study at North Carolina State University, Dr. Jane Macoubrie 
and I found results similar to Broad’s.57 The pilot was designed to test the 
waters for portfolios in the first-year writing program at NC State and to 
explore the possibilities of a dialogic assessment procedure based on the 
theory I am espousing here. Two groups of three teachers participated 
in the project, assigning portfolios in their classes and commenting on 
individual papers without grading them. To evaluate these portfolios, the 
groups exchanged materials, read them in advance, and met to try to 
reach agreement about a grade for each of them. The teachers were told 
explicitly that there was no set procedure for performing the evaluation, 
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and that they would set their own plan and pace—although, of course, 
they had to complete the work in time for final grade submission. They 
were given instructions to try to reach consensus on the grade range (e.g., 
A-range, B-range) if not the actual grade of each portfolio, but because of 
the exploratory nature of the pilot, they were also told that if they could 
not reach agreement, the classroom teacher would have the final say.
The group sessions were videotaped, and the data analyzed using 
Macoubrie’s concept of decision logics. Much of Macoubrie’s research 
has been on the decision-making process of juries—a situation analo-
gous to dialogic grading, in that juries are required to reach consensus 
in a finite amount of time, and that they talk about their reasoning and 
their decisions as a normal part of the process.58 Specifically, Macoubrie’s 
process analyzes dialogue for two things: (1) patterns in the discussion of 
substantive issues—called “decisional topics”—and (2) patterns in the jus-
tifications used to support particular decisions regarding those substan-
tive issues. In a decision logics analysis, taped dialogue is transcribed and 
the transcriptions are coded according to local topics and justifications. 
The local topics are then grouped into more global, decisional topics. For 
example, in the case of our pilot, the global topic “development” consist-
ed of local topics such as use of examples, definitions, support, evidence, 
illustrations, anecdotes, contextualization, and so on. The complete list 
of decisional and local topics appears in Table 1. I directed the pilot and 
served as one of the teacher-participants; Macoubrie coded the data and 
tabulated the results, a process I did not participate in.59 We both worked 
on interpreting the results.
Like Broad, we found decisional topics that did not appear on the 
list of program standards. While our list of topics is certainly shorter 
than Broad’s, ours includes topics different from those raised in the City 
University study: e.g., the quality of the student’s research and the student’s 
ability to understand their source material, which is a significant part of 
the curriculum in the course. Some of these topics are certainly familiar 
territory and much of the list draws from the existing program standards: 
focus, development, organization, style, and grammar and mechanics 
(Freshmen Writing Program 2002). Even though teachers were given no 
instructions to do so, most—myself included—referred to the standards 
during the grading process. One of the two groups used them explicitly 
throughout in their decision making, treating them expressly as a rubric. 
But even with reference to the standards, teachers still used criteria not 
explicitly part of the program to make their decisions: “I gave it an A 
because he was well focused on causes and effects. A brief proposal at the 
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TA B L E  1
Decisional Topics, All Teacher Groups, with Local Topic Information*
*Table developed from tables originally developed by Dr. Jane Macoubrie, North Carolina State 
University, Dept. of Communication.
†Does not add to 100% due to rounding.
end. He’d done much revision of his introduction and documentation 
was much better and his conclusion was clear.” This kind of mingling of 
standards-based topics—focus and organization—with topics not on the 
list—improvement—was common. And this level of explanation was also 
common, a point I will return to in a moment.
This “deviation” from standards intensified when it came to reaching 
consensus on difficult cases. For most of the decisions, discussion was 
brief and grades for each of the group members were within a letter grade 
of each other. Reconciliation was easy in these cases. But for about 17% 
of the decisions (26 out of 152), the grades were more than one letter 
apart. Ultimately, both groups were able to reach consensus on all port-
folios, but when they could not immediately do so, they did not simply 
return to the original decisional topics. Instead, they added discussion 
about their own differences in approaches to assignments (as opposed to 
the student’s understanding of the assignment as in the initial decisional 
topics), the student’s improvement over the term, and the use of grades 
for motivational purposes, among other factors. The complete results 
appear in Table 2.
TA B L E  2
Reconciliation Means Across Grade Levels, By Case*
Reconciling Decisional Topics Number of Cases Percentage of Cases
Assignment Clarification 6 23
Improvement, Self Evaluation 6 23
Grammar, Style, Technical 6 23
Argument, Thought 3 11
Motivational Grades 3 11
Attendance 1 4
Repeated Plagiarism 1 4
Total 26 99%†
*Table developed by Dr. Jane Macoubrie, North Carolina State University, Dept. of 
Communication.
†Does not add to 100% due to rounding.
Beyond the original decisional topics (Improvement, Self-Evaluation; 
Grammar, Style, Technical; and Argument, Thought), teachers added 
what Broad would call “contextual criteria.” For example, in one recon-
ciliation, when the two non-teachers graded the portfolio harsher than 
she had, the teacher revised her grade down, acknowledging that “this 
student is one of the few students in this class who was there all of the 
time, and actually read the material in advance, and actually participated 
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in the class as opposed to most of the students. I know that I’m pushing 
it here. I don’t have any trouble dropping it down to a C+.” In another 
instance, the non-teachers successfully argued that the student was not 
ready for the next course in the sequence, and the teacher agreed to a 
lower grade than he had initially given the portfolio. Non-teachers also 
served as a counter-force in the other direction. When one teacher had a 
problem because of a student’s behavior in class and was grading incon-
sistent with the other two evaluators, she raised the grade based on the 
textual reasons provided: “some good audience awareness . . . style’s okay, 
but not good.” In several cases, instructors, sometimes at the suggestion 
of their group members, raised or lowered a grade, particularly at the 
midterm evaluations specifically to motivate a student.
More often these difficult cases resulted in prolonged discussion about 
broader issues. For example, one instructor used a personal experience 
assignment that the others did not, and both other instructors com-
mented on their difficulty in evaluating the portfolios that included these 
assignments:
“I gotta say, one of the problems I have with the entire set of portfolios from 
yours is I can’t do personal experience. I don’t assign it and I don’t like read-
ing it. I feel very much like a voyeur in students’ lives. . . . On my notes here 
it’s like I’m back and forth on grades. Because I really, I just, how do you tell 
somebody who’s . . . ”
“Pouring out their guts . . . ”
“Yeah, that this is a D. Your guts are only worth a D.”
Evaluators had similar conversations about summary/response assign-
ments and papers where the student’s thinking was strong, but the lan-
guage was weak and the paper did not meet the traditional expectations 
of the course as a result of a teacher’s assignment.
More interesting, however, is the fact that regardless of the criteria 
used, the evaluators did not often give each other concrete reasons for 
their decisions. They said things like “The summaries are detailed, some-
times too detailed. Does demonstrate knowledge of the text. There are 
grammatical problems and responses underdeveloped.” And everyone 
nodded and went on to the next person’s list of topics to support their 
grade. Sometimes, evaluators said little more than the grade they had 
tentatively assigned. But, upon occasion, the comments would become 
more detailed:
“And I said the first five sentences of paragraph two were awkward.”
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“I got paragraph two, yeah.”
“I said some sentences should be separated into two, and others need 
smoother transitions between the text and the articles. But I thought it was 
well researched.”
“I thought the content was very strong. And the only thing I have in this 
category, and I was mostly on the first one, so . . .”
“The only comment I have on number three is I agree, it’s hard to keep 
from bouncing back and forth and I felt that she did do some of that.”
In the first two comments here, the evaluators point to a specific prob-
lem in a specific location, but this kind of specificity is rare in the data, 
and even when they do get this specific, the groups quickly drop back 
into general statements, in this case about research and content. When 
the evaluators return to general comments, their justifications become 
obscure. In this case, one reading of the transcript could indicate that 
the two evaluators were talking about two different criteria: research and 
content. A different reading, however, could argue that research and 
content refer to the same thing. The comments following this point in 
the transcript do not help determine the meaning; instead, they take up 
the topic of organization. Even where the evaluators were using the same 
words, they did not seem to be communicating about their values, par-
ticularly when they listed criteria. I was there, and I am not sure that we 
all understood each other, even though we appeared to.
This problem with justification and reasoning becomes glaringly 
obvious when someone from outside the discipline listens in on our 
conversations and reflects them back. Because my colleague was from 
Communication, she and I share some of the same vocabulary. She 
requires writing of her students and talks to them about the importance 
of audience and purpose; she expects their grammar to be reasonably 
correct. But when she listened to and watched the taped sessions, she 
pointed out that while everyone was nodding, even about something as 
concrete as grammar, they may not have meant the same thing. She could 
not tell. And the problem was worse in more complex categories. One 
teacher’s “organization problems” could have been issues with the struc-
ture of paragraphs, while another’s could have been a mismatch between 
the thesis and the rest of the paper. But the evaluators rarely provided 
the kind of detail that would help her decide. Nor, in my review of the 
transcripts, could I.
As a result, there was not enough data for Macoubrie to develop the 
second part of her decision logics analysis: patterns in the justifications 
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used to support particular decisions regarding decisional topics. All she 
had from us were the decisional topics, but not the justifications, and 
without the justifications, she could not thoroughly analyze our reason-
ing during the decision-making process. In part, the logistics of the pilot 
got in the way. What we recorded were the midterm and final grading 
sessions, when each group was trying to get through all the portfolios 
for all the classes in a reasonable amount of time. Unless there was a dis-
agreement about the grade, evaluators frequently did not see a reason to 
elaborate on their decisions; they were trying to move the process along.
But I do not believe this is the whole problem. I have seen similar 
results in group grading sessions where there was plenty of time; we were 
all going to be there until the meeting was over anyway. One evaluator 
says that the portfolio or the paper should pass because there are lots of 
good details and analysis, even though the organization is weak, and lots 
of people nod. But unless someone disagrees, the conversation rarely gets 
more specific.
This lack of discussion seems indicative of a larger problem. Because 
the process of assessment is messy and complex, and because we generally 
do not talk about what really value in the situations where we apply those 
values, we are driven to abstraction. “Focus,” even “problems with focus,” 
is an abstraction. Abstractions are not, in and of themselves, bad—they 
are actually quite useful. But they can be troublesome when they replace 
more thorough conversation in situations where complexity and thor-
oughness are necessary. In small group grading situations, using “live” 
student writing, such complexity may not be desirable, if only for the sake 
of the teachers’ sanity as they try to finish grading in a reasonable amount 
of time. But complex conversation is certainly necessary, it seems to me, at 
the level of programs, whether that occurs in “norming” sessions, “articu-
lation” sessions, or periodic faculty re-evaluations of grading criteria.
This is where I feel Broad’s study (2003) provides a stronger and more 
systematic approach to articulating the substance of an assessment than 
any other method we currently have. City University’s Dynamic Criteria 
Map is so complex that it requires a separate insert in the back of Broad’s 
book. More important than the particulars of this map is the fact that 
each institution, each assessment—each scene, if you will—will produce 
a different map. There will likely be some overlap where programs value 
similar qualities; both Broad’s and my own study include focus, organiza-
tion, style, improvement or growth, and intellectual quality, though the 
language is not precisely the same. But as much significance lies in the 
differences: in my study, there were no decisional topics that covered 
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whether students demonstrated “heart” or authority in their writing, 
just as there is no reference to the quality of research or use of source 
material in Broad’s. These are places where the programs we examined 
differ, but they are also indications of differences in what we value when 
we read student writing. Of course we value different things; the context 
is different.
Although we both began with the idea of challenging accepted 
process—in my case by adopting trios and in Broad’s by questioning 
norming and studying actual evaluative conversations60—we found, in 
addition, results that point at the substance of our assessments and how 
that substance differs from accepted standards in our programs. As with 
the theoretical principles that I have offered, it matters less if institutions 
adopt Broad’s specific procedures for DCM than it does that we have seen 
the potential for examining the substance of our assessments beyond his-
torically accepted norms. These two studies outline some of the possible 
results and suggest further work for programs and for researchers.
T H E O RY  A N D  P R AC T I C E
The theory I am positing in this text helps us see the lack of discussion 
about primary substance in studies such as those at the University of 
Cincinnati and Washington State. The assessment process in both looks 
strong, both theoretically and practically, but work on substance specifi-
cally would more clearly indicate areas in need of additional work. The 
work in Broad’s study and in Macoubrie’s and mine gives us more infor-
mation about what teachers actually value in student writing, and either 
DCM or decisional logics could help programs determine what substan-
tive issues and changes they might explore. It is certainly likely that there 
are other methods for exploring this content, as well.
But more importantly, these last two studies in particular demonstrate 
the interconnectedness of meaningfulness and ethics. Broad would not 
have gotten the results he did if there had been no communal grading; 
without conversation, his method is all but impossible. The same is true 
for our study, and in that case, the limits of the conversation visibly lim-
ited our ability to understand how teachers made meaning during their 
evaluations. In both cases, silent and/or individual evaluation, even with 
reflection, would not likely have generated a sufficient level of detail and 
complexity to flesh out the substance of the evaluation.
Ethical assessment without attention to meaningfulness will tend to 
lead to assessment disconnected from context. At an extreme, this could 
mean a return to a focus on the instrument of assessment to the exclusion 
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of the purpose and content or to the exclusion of disciplinary principles. 
More likely, it would result in an emphasis on the instrument or the pro-
cess in ways that suggest, against the advice of assessment scholars, that 
instruments can be ported from one locality to another without careful 
consideration of the local scene. The process may be good and the par-
ticipants may be treated well, but ethical assessment without meaningful 
assessment runs the risk of replicating recent large-scale assessment his-
tory, in which test-makers have looked for more and more reliable meth-
ods (in this case, ethical) without paying attention to the point of the test 
in the first place.
Meaningful assessment disconnected from ethics runs a different set 
of risks. Attention to content without concurrent attention to the pro-
cess and the community is likely to result in assessments that resemble 
what we have had from ETS, if not in form at least in practice. In this 
scenario, meaningfulness would be determined by those in positions of 
power—WPAs, if we are lucky—without consideration for those in the 
classroom. This sounds a bit far-fetched, but how many of us have had 
our practices in first-year composition scrutinized and challenged by 
those in other disciplines who tend to disregard our expertise? In a per-
haps kinder form, we may have this problem of meaningfulness without 
ethics under a standards system, particularly when those standards have 
remained the same, without reconsideration, for extended periods of 
time. Stagnant standards imply a kind of objectivity that is antithetical 
to the social constructionist principles that composition studies accepts. 
When those standards resemble the five developed by ETS in the early 
1960s, the risk is greater.
This is not to say that an emphasis on one or the other is in and of 
itself counterproductive. Programs that have attended productively to the 
content of their assessments without looking at the ethics may well need 
to attend to the process for a while, and vice versa. But an emphasis to the 
exclusion of the other is potentially very damaging. We have been there 
before. And, in general, we are not satisfied with the results.
The work that has been going on during the last decade, as evidenced 
by the studies in this chapter, indicates changes in our approaches to 
assessing writing. Meaningfulness and ethics as a set of principles offers 
an alternative framework in which to evaluate those assessments—in 
which to understand the work we do when we evaluate student writing, 
particularly in large-scale assessment situations—and provides us with a 
variety of ways to develop alternatives more in keeping with our expertise, 
our disciplinary knowledge, and our values.
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C O N C L U S I O N
Coming To Terms
In “Theory and Practice,” Charles I. Schuster analyzes the connections 
between these two “sides” of scholarship and concludes “that theory is a 
form of practice and that practice is the operational dimension of theory” 
(1991, 43). They function in tension, he claims, each grounding the other 
in ways that make them effectively inseparable. Not surprisingly, he finds 
the most compelling work in composition studies “positioned on that 
ambivalent threshold shared by both theory and practice,” not readily 
categorizable as one or the other (1991, 46).
Schuster’s analysis helps explain my own dissatisfaction with composi-
tion studies’ scholarship on large-scale writing assessment. While there 
has been a great deal of work produced by compositionists on the subject, 
the majority of it falls squarely in the category of practice. Current litera-
ture abounds with pragmatic advice, procedural descriptions, and case 
study analyses of the process of developing new assessments. As a whole, 
this body of work is thoughtful and perceptive, aware of the complexities 
of assessing writing, familiar with other scholarship on the topic, and 
attentive to the material limitations within which writing programs oper-
ate. It is, nonetheless, overwhelmingly—almost exclusively—practical.
Not without good reason. Scholars, administrators, researchers and 
teachers tend to take up the literature on assessment to address very 
immediate and practical situations—the need to reconsider current prac-
tice because of the real or perceived failure of existing instruments, for 
example, or the need to respond to new assessment mandates. These are 
material needs centered in actual practices; they favor pragmatic, “real-
world” solutions over theoretical analyses. The practical emphasis in writ-
ing assessment scholarship, then, constitutes an appropriate response to 
the needs of its audience.
These practical needs explain the practical emphasis in the literature, 
but not the way in which compositionists have limited our engagement 
with the theory of large-scale writing assessment. It is not that composition-
ists function as if we have no theory—in the final analysis, an impossible 
condition—but rather that we have done precious little theorizing of our 
own on the subject. Within our discipline, even scholarship on pedagogy, 
our most practical of practicals, has a strong theoretical bent—consider 
the work on collaborative learning or critical pedagogy, for example. Not 
so with assessment. The majority of writing assessment scholarship pub-
lished by compositionists in the last decade either gestures in the direc-
tion of educational measurement theory or simply never addresses the 
question of theory at all. Even Assessment of Writing, the volume published 
by the Modern Language Association—a veritable mecca of theory—maps 
writing assessment according to the pragmatic concerns of its subtitle: 
Politics, Policies, Practices (White, Lutz, and Kamusikiri 1996). By and large, 
scholars in composition seem to have been content to leave assessment 
theory to educational measurement specialists.
This does not mean, however, that compositionists have been pleased 
with the results. Time and again, as I have emphasized, compositionists 
writing about large-scale assessment have argued that reliability and validity 
are troublesome criteria, inadequate and too limited for the distinctive task 
of evaluating writing. Yet rarely do these scholars propose alternatives. If 
theory indeed provides systematic statements of principles that in turn pro-
vide explanatory schemes or models—as I use the term in this study—then 
composition scholars have operated and continue to do so, for the over-
whelming most part, with an explanatory scheme for writing assessment 
that has little to do with what we know about writing and learning to write. 
That is, with a few notable exceptions, composition scholars act as if “valid-
ity” and “reliability” constitute the best—or perhaps the only—theoretical 
lexicon by which assessment practices can be described and judged.
This acceptance strikes me as both uncharacteristic and unproduc-
tive. Compositionists have been actively proclaiming the limitations of 
educational measurement theory for at least two decades yet continue to 
employ the principles of validity and reliability as justification for large-
scale assessment practices. This persistent reliance on objectionable prin-
ciples is atypical of compositionists. For a variety of reasons, composition 
scholars tend to appropriate theories from other disciplines, to import 
them, reshape them, even domesticate them; the relative merits of this 
practice are a perennial subject of debate. We have not even accepted 
postmodern theory from within our own departments without some 
serious adjustment, limitations, and caveats. Rarely do we simply grant 
authority to some other discipline’s principles without modification. In 
the case of educational measurement principles for assessment, however, 
we are doing just that; even those who would co-opt the principles are not 
really proposing changes to them—merely the use of the more applicable 
parts of the original.
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Practical necessity explains some of the reliance on external prin-
ciples; historical precedent provides additional justification, particularly 
for the authority these principles maintain. But, during the last quarter 
century, and particularly in the last decade, theories of composition and 
composition pedagogy have diverged sharply from those of assessment; 
the former have taken a social constructionist turn while the latter have 
stayed the objectivist course. The distance between social constructionist 
principles in composition and objectivist principles in assessment is now 
sufficiently great so as to have exacerbated disagreements about literacy 
assessment; the controversy surrounding the NCTE and IRA Standards for 
the English Language Arts provides one particularly public example.
In spite of this disjunction, educational measurement principles con-
tinue to frame compositionists’ understanding of large-scale assessment, 
and when the educational measurement frame and compositionists’ 
expectations for writing assessment are at odds, compositionists have 
generally had one of three responses. The first calls for a (re)turn to prac-
tices consistent with the rigors of educational measurement principles; 
this is Edward M. White’s career-long argument. The second type of 
response, more frequent than the first, attempts to push the frame aside 
entirely by arguing directly against the principles and claiming we can do 
without them. Elbow (1994) and Broad (1994) both take this approach 
in an effort to claim authority for compositionists in writing assessment 
situations; both, however, acknowledge that practical constraints cause 
them to return to practices compatible with educational measurement 
principles.61 The third approach—far and away the most common—is 
to co-opt them. This is Huot’s tack in (Re)Articulating Writing Assessment
(2002), and it is the rhetorical strategy of choice in descriptions of pro-
gram development where authors are interested both in claiming their 
own authority and legitimating their efforts according to established 
norms. The last two types of response assert—implicitly or explicitly—the 
distance between educational measurement theory and composition 
studies theory, but they simultaneously tend to accept the authority of 
educational measurement theory to explain, define and justify writing 
assessment. None of these positions, in my opinion, presents an alterna-
tive to the frame itself.
The absence of such an alternative is hardly a failing on the part of 
composition scholars. Part of the work of this study has been to dem-
onstrate the ways in which educational measurement principles have 
been a normalized part of large-scale writing assessment discourse for 
most of the last century and how at one time they coincided with what
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writing teachers knew about literacy. The divergence between composi-
tion theory and assessment theory is a fairly recent phenomenon; only 
within the past decade or so have scholars really begun to challenge 
assessment practices justified solely by educational measurement con-
cepts. Given composition’s pedagogical imperative, it is scarcely surpris-
ing that we focus our challenges at the level of practice.
This method of confrontation at one time provided compositionists 
with a strong challenge to objective testing. When the issue was whether 
writing would be evaluated according to direct or indirect measures, com-
positionists’ practically motivated arguments about the effect of assess-
ment on pedagogy were relatively influential. Now, however, the focus 
on assessment practices either directs our attention toward procedures 
and methods, or results in assertions about institutional authority, both 
of which divert attention from the theoretical principles that shape prac-
tice. The former implicitly claims that educational measurement theory 
is a suitable framework for explicating and evaluating writing assessment 
practices. The latter approach takes sides regarding which faction—com-
position studies or educational measurement—has the institutional 
power to define assessment procedures. This is the shape of the Elbow-
White debate that has often focused on composition’s authority relative to 
that of organizations such as the Educational Testing Service.
“Validity” and “reliability” function as a terministic screen that obscures 
the theoretical disjunction between educational measurement and com-
position. With these principles in place, compositionists tend to treat 
writing assessment theory as a fait accompli, particularly when practical 
concerns are predominant. These principles, however, derive from an 
objectivist epistemology, and they bring a corresponding objectivist pres-
sure to bear. Throughout much of the twentieth century, this has not 
been a problem; literacy education and educational measurement have 
shared an objectivist orientation. This is no longer the case, and for those 
working in composition studies, the effect has been a discursive object—
writing assessment—that emerges within the scene of composition studies 
but according to the objectivist paradigmatic tenets and constraints of 
educational measurement theory. In other words, educational measure-
ment theory delineates the model for large-scale writing assessment, even 
though that theory is incongruous with contemporary theories of writing 
and learning to write. 
This theoretical imposition would not be possible without a substan-
tial power differential between composition studies and educational 
measurement. In the academy, educational measurement shares in the 
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prestige (and funding) attached to the relative objectivity of the social 
sciences, while composition studies falls into the “softer”—and poor-
er—humanities category. The lack of scientific stature carries over to the 
public domain in the United States, where scientific results are frequently 
equated with “facts” and “reality” while other research produces merely 
“opinion” or, more kindly put, “interpretation.” Founded on educational 
measurement principles, the Educational Testing Service has built an 
assessment empire by foregrounding the scientific nature of its operation, 
and in so doing, instruments such as the SAT and GRE have become the 
publicly accepted model for “real” or “serious” assessment. As a result, 
organizations like ETS have secured not only public backing, but also 
the funding with which to continue their efforts in ways that composition 
studies professionals have not. While several of the most recent tests and 
revisions include essay sections, their mainstay is still the multiple-choice 
format that produces “objective” results. Next to such scientific rigor, 
social constructionist theories of knowledge appear relativistic to say the 
least; there simply are no thoroughly constructionist principles for large-
scale writing assessment. This power imbalance reinforces the notion, 
even among compositionists, that in high stakes, large-scale assessments, 
objectivity is paramount. Consequently, compositionists have no assess-
ment lexicon compatible with the discipline’s social constructionist para-
digm, even if only for their own use.
In large part, the problem is political. The dominance of educa-
tional measurement principles continues in part because of the public 
response to and desire for quantification, even if the results in numeric 
form are nearly meaningless—or certainly less meaningful than a more 
qualitative result would be. First-year numbers for the No Child Left 
Behind Act Adequate Yearly Progress are being released all over the 
country at this writing. Saying that my daughter’s high school met 15 
or 71.4% out of 21 target goals does not tell me what goals were missed 
or why—or, more importantly, why those goals are important and what 
the school is doing to meet more goals. My other daughter received 
a 2.5 on her yearly writing test two years ago, a result that stays in her 
academic file, and that tells future teachers that she barely passed the 
test. That result does not tell her future teachers that she passed by the 
skin of her teeth because she does not like to elaborate on her ideas in 
writing, that she prefers drawing and working with clay but will respond 
well when given projects that allow her to couple her artistic interests 
with writing. It also does not explain that prompts that pull on her prob-
lem solving abilities and inventive ways of thinking will get much better 
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results than prompts that ask her to tell a story. I know this because I 
know my daughter, and as a writing teacher, I pay attention to her writ-
ing. My daughter’s teacher from last year figured it out, but it took her 
about a quarter of the year. Just think how much further ahead teachers 
would be if the results they saw, if students’ academic records were at 
least partly discursive, particularly in areas where the discursive provides 
so much more information.
“Meaningfulness” and “ethics” are not going to take the K-12 world by 
storm today. Public opinion and educational practices at that level are 
currently too wedded to quantifiable results, which is what “validity” and 
“reliability” produce; the fiasco over the Standards gives us a fairly clear 
sense of how discursive and qualitative results would be received at that 
level of schooling. But at the post-secondary level, we have more autono-
my, and we can make decisions about our practices that are not quite so 
beholden to public opinion and quantification. Washington State is doing 
this. Their placements and mid-career portfolios result in a decision, not 
a number, and the form seems quite adequate to the task and to the needs 
of the students and the program. In other words, at the post-secondary 
level we do have the power to dictate our assessment practices, as Elbow 
(1991) argues. But not if we continue to rely on validity and reliability. 
Educational measurement principles put constraints on our assessment 
practices that limit the range of what we can do. WSU’s program as a 
whole does not meet the full technical criteria of reliability; if it had to, I 
cannot see how the program could exist. Educational measurement prin-
ciples require that we reduce our results and the value of the assessments 
to numeric form. Yet our most interesting and useful results often do not 
come in the form of numbers, however, and sometimes we do not need 
numbers at all.
The terms I am offering here—or other principles like them if these 
are found wanting—would give us the tools to develop different kinds of 
assessments that provide results that we find useful. We will still need to 
justify and legitimate those results. We will still need to be able to explain 
the value of assessments both to the students and to our programs. But 
if we can start with principles that help us think through what we really 
want in an assessment, about what any given assessment is for, we are 
more likely to develop truly satisfying assessments, the kind that provide 
valuable information to guide our programs and our students.
Large-scale writing assessment is conflicted at the level of theory. 
The two paradigms—objectivism and social constructionism—are effec-
tively irreconcilable. More importantly, the clash of paradigms situates
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large-scale writing assessment in an unproductive tension so that while 
the surface features of the assessment change, little of substance does. 
Portfolio assessment procedures, for example, look different from those 
for single-sitting impromptus, but ultimately, they are very similar; the 
training and calibrating demands of reliability via holistic rating proce-
dures sees to that. “Validity” and “reliability” are the theoretical linchpins 
suspending writing assessment between objectivism and social construc-
tivism.
I recommend pulling those pins because we need alternatives as we 
carry out the kind of “threshold” work that Schuster recommends. Terms 
such as “meaningfulness” and “ethics” outline the shape of assessment 
once its theoretical principles exhibit paradigmatic consistency with 
principles already prevalent in composition studies. While these specific 
terms and the principles they signify will likely be revised, they nonethe-
less demonstrate possibilities for composition scholars to theorize assess-
ment according to our own understanding of what it means to write and 
to learn to write.
Underlying my development of these terms is the implicit argument 
that composition studies professionals should claim the authority to 
define the principles by which to describe, evaluate, and reimagine what 
evidence of literate ability—as well as assessment itself—looks like. As 
social constructionist principles have become dominant within the dis-
cipline, compositionists have reconceived the development of literacy, 
but we have only begun to discuss how indications of such develop-
ment appear in students’ work. Moreover, as a discipline, we have yet to 
consider seriously and systematically the possibilities and consequences 
of social constructionist assessment. Theorizing writing assessment in 
this manner would encourage compositionists to explore previously 
un(der)researched aspects of evaluating writing. For example, as long 
as “reliability” functions as a theoretical principle for writing assessment, 
assessment procedures cannot abide dissent. Yet dissent persists, even in 
“communities of like-minded peers” (Bruffee 1986, 774). The ideal of 
“reliability” presupposes that dissent is counterproductive, and histori-
cally, both compositionists and educational measurement specialists have 
worked to eradicate disagreement in assessment situations. Consequently, 
we know very little about what dissent may contribute to our evaluative 
capabilities and to our students’ resultant understandings of literacy. We 
need research in order to find out what dissent might contribute and 
how we might better accommodate it or even encourage it, should we 
find out that it is valuable. Scholarship of this type, difficult to justify in 
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an objectivist paradigm, becomes possible as compositionists claim the 
authority to theorize writing assessment.
Such a claim suggests a redistribution of power—most particularly a 
shift in disciplinary authority in favor of composition studies—that likely 
would be both controversial and uncomfortable. This reallocation implies 
that writing professionals have expertise more appropriate for evaluating 
written literacy than do educational measurement professionals. On the 
one hand, this seems self-evident. On the other hand, compositionists 
have tended historically to turn over procedural decisions about assess-
ment to the testing community. Huot points out that “English teachers’ 
justifiable distrust of writing assessment has given those without knowl-
edge and appreciation of literacy and its teaching the power to assess our 
students. The ability to assess is the ability to determine and control what 
is valuable” (2002, 107). Relinquishing the procedural decisions, that is, 
also results in conceding the authority to define what is valuable about 
writing and assessing writing. Reclaiming assessment, then, also means 
reclaiming this definitional work, which, in turn, implicitly argues for the 
priority of discipline-specific theories.
Although I am calling, in part, for a clearer demarcation of disciplinary 
boundaries at the same moment as many are calling for border-crossings, 
I do not mean that composition studies should ignore work in other 
fields, including educational measurement. I am arguing, however, for 
the acceptance of our own expertise, and for appropriate and necessary 
disciplinary boundaries. My own familiarity with educational measure-
ment and with methods for evaluating processes, for example, does not 
give me the expertise or authority sufficient to evaluate laboratory proce-
dures in chemistry or biology in any meaningful way. There is a curricu-
lum-specific knowledge that I cannot demonstrate without becoming a 
member of the relevant community. The theoretical work I am proposing 
here argues that composition studies entails such disciplinary expertise 
as well, and that the value of such expertise goes well beyond the role of 
expert consultant.
The power to theorize is the power to define, to influence, to organize, 
to limit. Currently, we are limited by educational measurement principles. 
At the level of theory—though not yet at the level of practice—composi-
tion studies no longer needs to accommodate these principles; we con-
tinue to do so at the risk of widening the rift between what we know about 
learning to write and what we encourage our students to believe through 
our assessments. “Meaningfulness” and “ethics”—or any other principles 
we choose to develop that are based on social constructionist tenets—can 
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provide compositionists with the theoretical tools to make assessment 
work as an integral and integrated part of our discipline.
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N OT E S
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1. The term “scene” better connotes a sense of (discursive) action and 
struggle than does “surface,” which implies a certain level of serenity. 
The term “surface” also implies that there is something hidden, some 
depth, a connotation that Foucault’s work would seem to reject. For 
these reasons, I privilege “scene,” the term from “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History” (1977) over “surface,” the term from The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1972).
C H A P T E R  O N E
2. Prior to the Boston report, writing instruction had been treated as a lit-
erary endeavor, involving reading and imitating “masters” of literature. 
The Boston tests shifted this literary emphasis toward an expository 
one in the way they used writing to describe and analyze. Literacy stan-
dards, however, did not change at the same time, and the Boston report 
ignores the fact that the writing most valued at the time was literary or 
creative, and not the kind asked for in the written tests (Witte, Trachsel, 
and Walters 1986, 17–18).
3. The report, authored by the examiners who implemented this experi-
ment in written examination, provides data about the number of stu-
dents assessed and the types of questions asked; Horace Mann, the edi-
tor of the Journal comments more broadly on the scholarly and practical 
benefits of these exams. Since the section that concerns contemporary 
writing scholars appears to be authored by Mann, the article is regularly 
attributed to him—although different parts appear to be written by dif-
ferent authors. In crediting Mann, I am following suit.
4. Frederick James Kelly (1914) summarizes a number of studies that dem-
onstrate the range of variation in teachers’ comments and provides his 
own study which concludes that composition scales used in conjunction 
with training narrow the range considerably. C.C. Certain (1921) uses 
studies such as these to argue that teachers should forego all elements 
in tests that require subjective judgments about value. A.A. Roback 
(1921) takes an alternative position, arguing that while the variability is 
well documented, it is also inevitable and not entirely undesirable.
5. See, e.g., Ballou (1914); Breed and Frostic (1917); Certain (1921); 
Dolch (1922); Hudelson (1916); Johnson (1913); Kelly (1914); Trabue 
(1917); and Willing (1918).
6. Trabue (1917) circumvents this problem by remaining silent on the 
subject of what his scale is supposed to measure. Ballou (1914) provides 
fairly lengthy summaries of raters’ comments on each essay in the scale 
in an attempt to describe “merits” and “defects,” but he provides no 
clear definition of these terms.
7. A search through the Education Index from the 1930s on reveals a dearth 
of research in direct assessment until approximately the mid-1960s 
when activity picks up again.
8. See Mary Trachsel’s Institutionalizing Literacy: The Historical Role of College 
Entrance Examinations in English (1992) for a detailed account of the his-
tory of the College Board and its examinations.
9. There are multiple kinds of validity evidence, some of which I discuss 
later in this chapter and in chapter four. The distinctions among them 
are not relevant here, but some good sources exist that explain the dif-
ferences. For a basic overview of testing theory, see Howard B. Lyman 
(1991). For a more thorough introductory discussion, see the textbooks 
by Anne Anastasi (1982) and Robert L. Linn and Norman E. Gronlund 
(2000). For specific discussion about the issues surrounding the con-
cept of validity, see the essays in Howard Wainer and Henry I. Braun’s 
collection Test Validity (1988) and Samuel Messick’s “Validity” (1989b).
10. White presents his position in a number of other articles and books 
chapters, including “Holisticism” (1984), “Pitfalls in the Testing of 
Writing” (1986), “An Apologia for the Timed Impromptu Essay Test” 
(1995), and Chapter 13 of Teaching and Assessing Writing (1994c), enti-
tled “The Politics of Assessment: Past and Future.” I have used “Holistic 
Scoring” (1993) because I find that he makes his case most clearly, fully, 
and elegantly here.
11. There are also practical problems: “Essay tests can be read holistically 
. . . at an average rate of 25 or more an hour (for 45–minute essays). But 
portfolios can, and often do demand, an hour or more apiece” (White 
1993, 101–2). The problem is cost. If nothing else, portfolios cost more, 
and in ages of downsizing and budget cutting, the bottom line directly 
influences choices about procedures.
12. The essays by Pat Belanoff (1994), White (1994b), Elbow (1994), James 
A. Berlin (1994), and Brian Huot (1994a) in the New Directions (Black 
et al. 1994b) collection are notable exceptions, as are the Foreword by 
Elbow in Belanoff and Dickson’s Portfolios (1991) and the essay by Huot 
and Williamson (1997) in Situating Portfolios (Yancey and Weiser 1997). 
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However, these essays represent a small fraction of the contents of each 
of these collections.
13. Guba and Lincoln’s text was published in 1989. There is only one ref-
erence to it in Williamson and Huot (1993) and only eight in the first 
eight volumes of the journal Assessing Writing. There are a few refer-
ences to it in Yancey and Weiser (1997), Haswell (2001c), Huot (2002), 
and Broad (2003). There are no references at all to it in the essays in 
New Directions in Portfolio Assessment (Black et al. 1994b) or in the second 
edition of Teaching Writing (White 1994c). Yet Guba and Lincoln’s text 
is probably the best known text from outside composition on alternative 
assessment paradigms.
C H A P T E R  T WO
14. Given the parallels, it is interesting to note that Trachsel does not cite 
Street even though, his work was originally published in 1984.
15. De Castell and Luke limit their study to North American literacy and 
deal with both the United States and Canada in this article, arguing that 
literacy instruction in both followed largely parallel lines. They point 
out the distinctions between these cultures as necessary, and where they 
have, I have relied only on their arguments regarding literacy instruc-
tion in the United States since that is the context for my study.
16. Ironically, the reference argues that “[s]tatistics show that literates con-
tribute a larger percentage of their class to the criminal ranks than do 
the illiterates.”
17. See Luke (1988) for a thorough discussion of the development of basal 
readers.
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
18. It is ironic that this research appears in Williamson and Huot’s collec-
tion, entitled Validating Holistic Scoring for Writing Assessment (1993).
19. In Beyond Outcomes, Susan Wyche-Smith appears as Susan Wyche.
20. Guba and Lincoln rely heavily on italics throughout their text. All italics 
are theirs unless otherwise noted.
21. They also occasionally use “naturalist,” a term from their earlier work 
which they dropped in favor “constructivist” because of both the 
unwanted connotations of the former and the greater appropriateness 
of the latter. From time to time, “naturalist” or some derivative appears 
in the more recent texts, usually when the ideas and/or the text are 
pulled directly from the earlier work.
22. Specifically, they offer “trustworthiness” as a category of criteria paral-
lel to the criteria of “rigor” under positivism, which includes internal 
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validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity. In place of internal 
validity, they offer “credibility” which becomes a level of correlation 
between the stakeholders’ constructed realities and the reconstruction 
of those realities as represented by the evaluator to the stakeholders 
(235–36). Such a correlation, they argue, can be obtained through 
techniques—such as “prolonged engagement,” “persistent observa-
tion,” “peer debriefing,” “negative case analysis,” “progressive subjec-
tivity” and “member checks” (237–39). In place of external validity, 
Guba and Lincoln offer “transferability” which correlates “the degree 
of similarity between sending and receiving [evaluation] contexts,” and 
the level of similarity is the responsibility of the stakeholders wishing to 
apply the study to some other context (241–42). In place of reliability, 
they offer “dependability,” which requires that the process, complete 
with changes, be thoroughly documented so that shifts in constructions 
can be tracked and examined by outside reviewers. Finally, in place of 
objectivity, they offer “confirmability,” which tracks data to its source 
and which traces “the logic used to assemble the interpretations into 
structurally coherent and corroborating wholes” through the case study 
narrative that results from a fourth generation evaluation (242–43).
23. This essay is a slight revision of “Issues and Problems in Writing 
Assessment,” White’s essay in the first issue of Assessing Writing (1994a). 
I use the one from Assessment of Writing (1996)—the collection of essays 
he co-edited—because in the anthology, the journal article is acknowl-
edged as the earlier version. There is, however, no substantive differ-
ence between the two. Although Guba and Lincoln are cited in both 
versions, they are cited as an additional reference for challenges to 
positivism within assessment scholarship and not credited with the term 
“stakeholders.”
24. This is a variation on a theme for White. He has been arguing—as 
either a primary or a secondary point—that writing teachers need to 
understand the positions of administrators and testing agencies since 
at least 1986 with his essay “Pitfalls in the Testing of Writing” in Writing
Assessment: Issues and Strategies. He has argued explicitly that if writing 
teachers do not develop assessment procedures which satisfy testing 
experts and agencies, those entities will take over writing assessment 
entirely (see, e.g., 1996c; 1994b; 1994c).
25. Camp has since retired from ETS; as of this writing Breland is still 
employed there as a senior research scientist.
26. See White’s “Response” (1996b) in the same volume for more on the 
response of the composition community.
27. The audience is listed on the front cover of each issue.
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28. The current editor, Liz Hamp-Lyons, took over in volume 8 and is 
actively encouraging a more international perspective, as the adjusted 
title suggests (Hamp-Lyons 2002). Her focus may be even less likely to 
draw in educational testing agency scholars whose work focuses primar-
ily on testing U.S. students.
29. See, e.g., Miller (1991) and Slevin (1991) for discussions about compo-
sition as remediation and the effects of that designation on post-second-
ary composition professionals.
C H A P T E R  F O U R
30. Huot’s “Toward a New Theory of Writing Assessment” (1996b) is argu-
ably the first overtly theoretical text on writing assessment to come out 
since Anne Ruggles Gere published “Written Composition: Toward a 
Theory of Evaluation” in 1980. Gere argues that “[e]ffective evaluation 
requires scrutiny of our concept of meaning; anything less will merely 
tinker with externals” (1980, 58) and outlines a theory based on “com-
munication intention” and formal semantics. It is difficult to find any 
reference to it in contemporary assessment literature; it is, apparently, 
a case of premature theorization.
31. In the text of the policy statement, the assumptions I am quoting here 
appear in italics, which distinguishes the assumption from the explana-
tion which follows it. Since I am only quoting the assumptions, I do 
not use the italics. I have also omitted the explanations, which are not 
germane here.
32. In “Power and Agenda Setting in Writing Assessment,” White’s list, in 
order, is writing teachers, researchers and theorists, testing firms and 
governmental bodies, and students, especially those marginalized.
33. For an overview of contemporary validity theory, see Moss (1994) and 
Messick (1989a). For a full, technical discussion, see Messick (1989b). I 
discuss these texts in more detail later in this chapter.
34. The italics appear in Messick’s article; Huot removes them in his chapter.
C H A P T E R  F I V E
35. The Standards includes vignettes that provide examples of this instruc-
tional emphasis, including one class where students choose texts based 
on their individual interests from among more than 100 young adult 
novels, and another in which the students—who come from 18 differ-
ent countries—interview family members about their immigrant experi-
ences and publish their resulting stories in a collaborative portfolio.
36. Originally, the project was financed by the Department of Education’s 
(DOE) Fund for the Improvement and Reform of Schools and 
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Teaching as part of a nationwide effort to articulate content area stan-
dards for elementary- and secondary-level education. This funding was 
withdrawn after eighteen months, however, based on the finding that 
“there has not been substantial progress toward meeting the objectives 
in any of the approved applications” (Diegmueller 1994a, 1). The DOE 
decided against soliciting proposals for the same project from any other 
organizations in the wake of a letter-writing campaign prompted by the 
NCTE and IRA, which argued that these two literacy organizations were 
the most appropriate to draft the standards, and the NCTE and IRA 
subsequently decided to fund the project on their own (Diegmueller 
1994b, 9). Two years after that decision, the Standards was published, 
along with a series entitled Standards in Practice, which illustrates class-
room and curricular activities designed to meet high achievement stan-
dards, broken down by grade level. The history of the development of 
the Standards is traced in a number of journal articles and in Appendix 
B of the Standards itself. See, e.g., “IRA/NCTE Standards Project Nears 
Completion” and Diegmueller 1994a.
  The DOE sponsored content standards in multiple subject areas, but 
no other group had its funding pulled, not even the National Center 
for History in Schools at UCLA, which had originally developed con-
tent standards loudly denounced nationwide as too politically correct. 
Although the history standards received financial support for revisions, 
the language arts project lost funding, and while there are likely multi-
ple reasons, one in particular stands out. The history standards, in spite 
of their PC content, still looked like standards, as the critics understood 
that term. The original history standards—released in 1994—followed 
the same pattern as those that had come before: laying out specific 
requirements for content information attached to particular grade lev-
els. The language arts standards did not.
37. Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley and then-President William 
Clinton were a bit kinder, or at least more politic, than some of the 
critics. Riley noted, just prior to their release, that the standards had 
“run into difficulties” (1996), and Clinton pointed out afterwards that 
attempts to develop standards in both history and language arts were 
“less than successful” (1996). Before he was justifiably drawn away by 
the events of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush looked as 
if he were going to raise the issue again. At this writing, whether he does 
or not remains to be seen.
38. The Standards has also been subject to criticism from a radical stand-
point that challenges the movement for national standards altogether 
(Shannon 1996). This criticism, however, constitutes only a very small 
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portion of the negative commentary on the Standards and does not 
reflect the opinion of the more influential respondents.
C H A P T E R  S I X
39. This definition of “meaningfulness” is far more complex than the one 
used by Linn, Baker, and Dunbar (1991), which focuses only on the 
ways in which the assessment is meaningful for students in ways that 
motivate them.
40. Anthologies even from the early and mid-1990s, for example, abound 
with unexplicated references to the social construction of knowledge 
and understanding and to the related concepts of context and commu-
nity. See, e.g., Bloom, Daiker and White (1996); Bullock and Trimbur 
(1991); Clifford and Schilb (1994).
41. See Crowley (1998) for a discussion of the continued practical empha-
sis on current-traditional rhetoric in pedagogical situations, a situation 
which, it seems to me, has changed some, but not entirely, in the years 
since.
42. The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee has since replaced the impromp-
tu examination described by Buley-Meissner and Perkins with a first-year 
composition exit portfolio system, but the consequences for failure 
remain as of this writing. Students get three chances each to pass English 
101 and 102 portfolio assessment; if they do not, they can not graduate.
43. As a rule, faculty are less likely to be materially harmed as a result of 
any particular assessment of students—they are not apt, for example, 
to lose their jobs as a direct result of any single assessment of student 
writing—and in fact, benefits such as the development of community 
or additional pay are more probable than any specific damage. I am 
not, however, arguing that faculty suffer no negative effects as a result 
of large-scale writing assessment, only that the negative consequences 
for the student are more immediate and more directly attached to the 
results of a single specific assessment than the negative consequences 
for faculty.
44. This is not to say that the purpose of testing in general is an untroubled 
concept. F. Allan Hanson (1993), for example, points out the American 
“addiction to testing” which makes our nation’s people (not just chil-
dren) one of the most tested in the world (1993, 1). He argues that the 
knowledge generated by these tests controls the behavior of individuals 
by making them complicitous in their own domination—in order to suc-
ceed, they must “strive to comply with expectations embedded in tests” 
(1993, 5). In addition knowledge derived from testing characterizes
people “in terms of their achievements and talents, their physical and 
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mental characteristics, their normalities and abnormalities as measured 
along innumerable dimensions . . . ” (1993, 5). These purposes—con-
trol and definition—hardly qualify as admirable, and Hanson does not 
intend them to be. I return to notions of control and domination later 
in this chapter and in my conclusion.
45. The criteria for evaluation—whether formal or not—should be devel-
oped by those working explicitly within the context so that the continu-
ity among the assessment and instruction is maintained, a point made 
in many recent assessment-oriented texts, including the NCTE and 
IRA Standards, the CCCC’s “Position Statement,” Huot’s (Re)Articulating 
Writing Assessment and Broad’s What We Really Value.
46. In chapter four, I discuss Huot’s persuasive challenge to the equation 
of reliability and fairness that White relies upon. Briefly, Huot points 
out that reliability only indicates consistency among raters—one por-
tion of “fairness” but certainly not its equivalent. He argues that “fair-
ness” must include information regarding “the nature of the judgment 
itself”; however, he is not clear about what else might be necessary for a 
“fair” assessment (2002, 88). Huot’s project in this section of his article, 
though, is not to explicate “fairness” but rather to challenge reliability 
as a theoretical principle appropriate to writing assessment. See also 
Huot and Williamson (1997).
47. Others who explicitly consider fairness a significant issue include Peter 
Elbow (1993, 189) and David W. Smit (1994). 
48. I would argue that, in practice, determining the purpose and object 
of assessment would occur roughly at the same time as discussions of 
criteria and procedures, but for the purposes of explicating the terms 
“meaningful” and “ethical,” I am suggesting they occur sequentially. 
This is intended to reinforce the idea that determinations of purpose 
and object should precede determinations of procedure, even if the 
discussion occurs simultaneously.
49. The term “validity” appears throughout the texts on communicative 
ethics, but its meaning is less technically oriented than in those coming 
out of psychometrics. Validity here is used in the sense of legitimacy, 
authority, or soundness. On the one hand, the usage is troubling in 
that my work is arguing for a different vocabulary. On the other hand, 
the link between ethics and validity is somewhat gratifying in its implicit 
claim that decisions about what is valid are also ethical decisions and 
not merely rational. “Validity,” however, does not appear to carry the 
same baggage for critical theory as it does for writing assessment.
50. The essay entitled “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical 
Justification” also appears in Benhabib and Dallmayr (1990) published 
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the same year. The latter version, however, is excerpted and so I am 
using the essay as it appears in Habermas’s Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (1990a). There are some minor translational dif-
ferences in passages I cite, but none are substantive.
51. Communicative ethics structures argumentation on the notion of 
intersubjectivity: not only am I a subject, but the other is also a subject. 
For a discussion of the psychoanalytic principle of intersubjectivity, see 
Benjamin (1988), especially 25–42.
52. Guba and Lincoln do not cite Habermas or any other theorist working 
specifically with communicative ethics; they tend to rely on texts that dis-
cuss methodological issues and the history and philosophy of science.
53. Benhabib calls the set of rules “the symmetry condition” and the set 
of relations “the reciprocity condition” (1986, 285). For the symmetry 
condition to be met, “each participant must have an equal chance to 
initiate and to continue communication,” and “each must have an 
equal chance to make assertions, recommendations, and explanations, 
and to challenge justifications” (1986, 285). For the reciprocity condi-
tion to be met, “all must have equal chances as actors to express their 
wishes, feelings and intentions,” and all “must act as if in contexts of 
action there is an equal distribution of chances” to act with authority, 
to refuse authority, to be accountable and to hold others accountable 
(1986, 285). The symmetry condition refers to the possibility and con-
dition of speech acts. The reciprocity condition refers to the possibility 
and condition of action.
54. See, e.g., Black et al. (1994a), Sommers (1989), and Yancey (1996).
55. I use the qualifier “published” here because my suspicion is that the 
majority of written work in the area of writing assessment actually deals 
with issues of meaningfulness; however, since this work appears in the 
form of unpublished site-specific criteria and scoring guides, it has not 
been systematically investigated.
C H A P T E R  S E V E N
56. Absent are specific references to legislatures, university government, or 
employers, groups that have been named as stakeholders in other schol-
arship, but these missing stakeholders seem the least directly connected 
to the purpose of Beyond Outcomes.
57. I originally presented the results of this research at the 2001 Conference 
on College Composition and Communication; my last name at the time 
was LaCoste (LaCoste 2001).
58. For a more detailed description of the theory of decision logics, see 
Macoubrie (2003).
Notes 51–58            179
59. As both a teacher-participant and a researcher in this project, I have 
had considerable difficulty with the pronouns in this section. While 
the use of “we” often feels more comfortable, there is a certain remove 
from the research now that encourages me to use “they.” To clarify the 
result of my discomfort, I avoid the use of “we” or “I” here unless I am 
specifically referring to myself.
60. This beginning point is clearer in Broad’s 2000 study.
C O N C L U S I O N
61. Interestingly, both do so in footnotes. In “Will the Virtues of Portfolios 
Blind Us to Their Potential Dangers?” Elbow undermines his utopian 
vision of minimalist holistic scoring—which would separate the excep-
tionally strong and exceptionally weak papers from the (rather large) 
middle ground of unclassified and unscored papers—by pointing out 
that practical considerations force the use of two categories, essentially 
“passing” and “failing” (1994, 54 n. 3). Similarly, Broad points out that 
an attempt at a contextually-sensitive scoring system which awarded 0, 
3 or 6 credits to student essays failed in practice because it was not suf-
ficiently flexible to address the “‘economic realities’” of the situation; 
the original six-point holistic scoring guide was reinstated after one year 
(1994, 276 n. 9).
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